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The State of Punjab framed its Sports Policy in the year 2018 which provided that 3% reservation in admissions will be provided for 2graded sports persons. Clause 10 of the said policy also provided that the said Sports Policy shall prevail on all the Departments and Organizations of Government of Punjab, however, if any other department wishes to have specific policy, it will be finalised in consultation with the Department of Sports. It appears that by order dated 25.07.2019, a conscious decision was taken by the Government of Punjab to provide 1% reservation for sports persons. The said order was passed taking into consideration Clause 10 of the Sporty Policy, 2018.
2.2 For the academic year 2018-19, the State Government issued notification dated 6.2.2018 for admission in Medical/Dental Colleges. Clause 16 of the said notification provided for reservation in Government Medical/Dental Colleges and Clause 17 provided for admission to private institutes. However, it appears that though 1% seats were reserved for sports persons and the children/grand children of terrorist affected persons so far as the State quota seats in Government Institutions are concerned, similar reservation was not provided for admission to private institutes even with respect to government quota seats in the private institutes.
Subsequently, for the academic year 2019-20, the State Government issued a notification dated 6.6.2019, which subsequently came to be modified vide corrigendum dated 11.07.2019. Clauses 15 & 16 provided for reservation in Government Medical/Dental Colleges as well as admission to private institutes respectively. Clause 15 provided for 1% reservation for sports persons; 1% reservation for children/grandchildren of terrorist affected persons and 1% reservation for children/grand children of Sikh riot affected persons in the State quota seats in government institutions. Clause 16 provided for 1% reservation 4 for sports persons, children/grand children of terrorist affected persons, children/grand children of Sikh riot-affected persons and 1% for wards of defence personnel so far as the State quota seats in private institutions are concerned. However, no such reservation was provided for the management quota seats.
In which case Supreme Court said The High Court can’t exercise its jurisdiction while issuing a writ of mandamus directing the State to provide a particular percentage of reservation for sports persons.
The State of Punjab framed its Sports Policy in the year 2018 which provided that 3% reservation in admissions will be provided for 2graded sports persons. Clause 10 of the said policy also provided that the said Sports Policy shall prevail on all the Departments and Organizations of Government of Punjab, however, if any other department wishes to have specific policy, it will be finalised in consultation with the Department of Sports. It appears that by order dated 25.07.2019, a conscious decision was taken by the Government of Punjab to provide 1% reservation for sports persons. The said order was passed taking into consideration Clause 10 of the Sporty Policy, 2018.
2.2 For the academic year 2018-19, the State Government issued notification dated 6.2.2018 for admission in Medical/Dental Colleges. Clause 16 of the said notification provided for reservation in Government Medical/Dental Colleges and Clause 17 provided for admission to private institutes. However, it appears that though 1% seats were reserved for sports persons and the children/grand children of terrorist affected persons so far as the State quota seats in Government Institutions are concerned, similar reservation was not provided for admission to private institutes even with respect to government quota seats in the private institutes.
Subsequently, for the academic year 2019-20, the State Government issued a notification dated 6.6.2019, which subsequently came to be modified vide corrigendum dated 11.07.2019. Clauses 15 & 16 provided for reservation in Government Medical/Dental Colleges as well as admission to private institutes respectively. Clause 15 provided for 1% reservation for sports persons; 1% reservation for children/grandchildren of terrorist affected persons and 1% reservation for children/grand children of Sikh riot affected persons in the State quota seats in government institutions. Clause 16 provided for 1% reservation 4 for sports persons, children/grand children of terrorist affected persons, children/grand children of Sikh riot-affected persons and 1% for wards of defence personnel so far as the State quota seats in private institutions are concerned. However, no such reservation was provided for the management quota seats.
Supreme Court has adopted a new approach to the interpretation of the concept ‘Equality’ in :-
The State of Punjab framed its Sports Policy in the year 2018 which provided that 3% reservation in admissions will be provided for 2graded sports persons. Clause 10 of the said policy also provided that the said Sports Policy shall prevail on all the Departments and Organizations of Government of Punjab, however, if any other department wishes to have specific policy, it will be finalised in consultation with the Department of Sports. It appears that by order dated 25.07.2019, a conscious decision was taken by the Government of Punjab to provide 1% reservation for sports persons. The said order was passed taking into consideration Clause 10 of the Sporty Policy, 2018.
2.2 For the academic year 2018-19, the State Government issued notification dated 6.2.2018 for admission in Medical/Dental Colleges. Clause 16 of the said notification provided for reservation in Government Medical/Dental Colleges and Clause 17 provided for admission to private institutes. However, it appears that though 1% seats were reserved for sports persons and the children/grand children of terrorist affected persons so far as the State quota seats in Government Institutions are concerned, similar reservation was not provided for admission to private institutes even with respect to government quota seats in the private institutes.
Subsequently, for the academic year 2019-20, the State Government issued a notification dated 6.6.2019, which subsequently came to be modified vide corrigendum dated 11.07.2019. Clauses 15 & 16 provided for reservation in Government Medical/Dental Colleges as well as admission to private institutes respectively. Clause 15 provided for 1% reservation for sports persons; 1% reservation for children/grandchildren of terrorist affected persons and 1% reservation for children/grand children of Sikh riot affected persons in the State quota seats in government institutions. Clause 16 provided for 1% reservation 4 for sports persons, children/grand children of terrorist affected persons, children/grand children of Sikh riot-affected persons and 1% for wards of defence personnel so far as the State quota seats in private institutions are concerned. However, no such reservation was provided for the management quota seats.
Under the writ of Mandamus, the Court can
The State of Punjab framed its Sports Policy in the year 2018 which provided that 3% reservation in admissions will be provided for 2graded sports persons. Clause 10 of the said policy also provided that the said Sports Policy shall prevail on all the Departments and Organizations of Government of Punjab, however, if any other department wishes to have specific policy, it will be finalised in consultation with the Department of Sports. It appears that by order dated 25.07.2019, a conscious decision was taken by the Government of Punjab to provide 1% reservation for sports persons. The said order was passed taking into consideration Clause 10 of the Sporty Policy, 2018.
2.2 For the academic year 2018-19, the State Government issued notification dated 6.2.2018 for admission in Medical/Dental Colleges. Clause 16 of the said notification provided for reservation in Government Medical/Dental Colleges and Clause 17 provided for admission to private institutes. However, it appears that though 1% seats were reserved for sports persons and the children/grand children of terrorist affected persons so far as the State quota seats in Government Institutions are concerned, similar reservation was not provided for admission to private institutes even with respect to government quota seats in the private institutes.
Subsequently, for the academic year 2019-20, the State Government issued a notification dated 6.6.2019, which subsequently came to be modified vide corrigendum dated 11.07.2019. Clauses 15 & 16 provided for reservation in Government Medical/Dental Colleges as well as admission to private institutes respectively. Clause 15 provided for 1% reservation for sports persons; 1% reservation for children/grandchildren of terrorist affected persons and 1% reservation for children/grand children of Sikh riot affected persons in the State quota seats in government institutions. Clause 16 provided for 1% reservation 4 for sports persons, children/grand children of terrorist affected persons, children/grand children of Sikh riot-affected persons and 1% for wards of defence personnel so far as the State quota seats in private institutions are concerned. However, no such reservation was provided for the management quota seats.
Article 16(2) prohibits discrimination among citizens with respect to employment in state services only on the ground of:
The State of Punjab framed its Sports Policy in the year 2018 which provided that 3% reservation in admissions will be provided for 2graded sports persons. Clause 10 of the said policy also provided that the said Sports Policy shall prevail on all the Departments and Organizations of Government of Punjab, however, if any other department wishes to have specific policy, it will be finalised in consultation with the Department of Sports. It appears that by order dated 25.07.2019, a conscious decision was taken by the Government of Punjab to provide 1% reservation for sports persons. The said order was passed taking into consideration Clause 10 of the Sporty Policy, 2018.
2.2 For the academic year 2018-19, the State Government issued notification dated 6.2.2018 for admission in Medical/Dental Colleges. Clause 16 of the said notification provided for reservation in Government Medical/Dental Colleges and Clause 17 provided for admission to private institutes. However, it appears that though 1% seats were reserved for sports persons and the children/grand children of terrorist affected persons so far as the State quota seats in Government Institutions are concerned, similar reservation was not provided for admission to private institutes even with respect to government quota seats in the private institutes.
Subsequently, for the academic year 2019-20, the State Government issued a notification dated 6.6.2019, which subsequently came to be modified vide corrigendum dated 11.07.2019. Clauses 15 & 16 provided for reservation in Government Medical/Dental Colleges as well as admission to private institutes respectively. Clause 15 provided for 1% reservation for sports persons; 1% reservation for children/grandchildren of terrorist affected persons and 1% reservation for children/grand children of Sikh riot affected persons in the State quota seats in government institutions. Clause 16 provided for 1% reservation 4 for sports persons, children/grand children of terrorist affected persons, children/grand children of Sikh riot-affected persons and 1% for wards of defence personnel so far as the State quota seats in private institutions are concerned. However, no such reservation was provided for the management quota seats.
What is meant by the term “Laches”
The appellant approached Supreme Court challenging the order passed by the principal magistrate, Juvenile Justice board, Baghpat which declared respondent no. 2 as a juvenile delinquent. The counsel for appellant contended that respondent no. 2 has been accused of committing grave offences along with the other co-accused and that declaring him juvenile is an erroneous decision. It was argued that the JJ Board misunderstood the legislative intent behind section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 when it declared that a matriculation certificate is a conclusive document for determining a juvenile’s age despite material discrepancies in the witnesses’ oral testimony or other documents produced. As a result, it was contended that the age stated on the matriculation certificate cannot be accepted at face value if other information contradicts it. The learned additional Advocate General for the State of Uttar Pradesh backed up this contention. He asserted that the exhibits could not have been signed by Nishant, hence these documents could not be taken at face value. They also don’t match the age of respondent 2 at the time he started and finished high school.
Even if the documents seeking admission to class 1 and class 8 were discredited or eschewed, the fact remained that the mark-sheet pertaining to the matriculation supported the presumption that the respondent was less than 16 years of age on the date of the incident.
In which of the following case the Apex Court deal with a plea of juvenility under the Juvenile Justice Act?
Which of the following statements is not true regarding the determination of juvenility?
The appellant approached Supreme Court challenging the order passed by the principal magistrate, Juvenile Justice board, Baghpat which declared respondent no. 2 as a juvenile delinquent. The counsel for appellant contended that respondent no. 2 has been accused of committing grave offences along with the other co-accused and that declaring him juvenile is an erroneous decision. It was argued that the JJ Board misunderstood the legislative intent behind section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 when it declared that a matriculation certificate is a conclusive document for determining a juvenile’s age despite material discrepancies in the witnesses’ oral testimony or other documents produced. As a result, it was contended that the age stated on the matriculation certificate cannot be accepted at face value if other information contradicts it. The learned additional Advocate General for the State of Uttar Pradesh backed up this contention. He asserted that the exhibits could not have been signed by Nishant, hence these documents could not be taken at face value. They also don’t match the age of respondent 2 at the time he started and finished high school.
Even if the documents seeking admission to class 1 and class 8 were discredited or eschewed, the fact remained that the mark-sheet pertaining to the matriculation supported the presumption that the respondent was less than 16 years of age on the date of the incident.
Which article of the Indian Constitution provides power to the legislature to enact a special law for children?
Which of the following represents one of the key features of the juvenile justice (case and protection of Children) Act, 2015
The appellant approached Supreme Court challenging the order passed by the principal magistrate, Juvenile Justice board, Baghpat which declared respondent no. 2 as a juvenile delinquent. The counsel for appellant contended that respondent no. 2 has been accused of committing grave offences along with the other co-accused and that declaring him juvenile is an erroneous decision. It was argued that the JJ Board misunderstood the legislative intent behind section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 when it declared that a matriculation certificate is a conclusive document for determining a juvenile’s age despite material discrepancies in the witnesses’ oral testimony or other documents produced. As a result, it was contended that the age stated on the matriculation certificate cannot be accepted at face value if other information contradicts it. The learned additional Advocate General for the State of Uttar Pradesh backed up this contention. He asserted that the exhibits could not have been signed by Nishant, hence these documents could not be taken at face value. They also don’t match the age of respondent 2 at the time he started and finished high school.
Even if the documents seeking admission to class 1 and class 8 were discredited or eschewed, the fact remained that the mark-sheet pertaining to the matriculation supported the presumption that the respondent was less than 16 years of age on the date of the incident.
Which of the following constitutes a type of juvenile delinquency?
Serious offences are those that are punishable for-
The appellant approached Supreme Court challenging the order passed by the principal magistrate, Juvenile Justice board, Baghpat which declared respondent no. 2 as a juvenile delinquent. The counsel for appellant contended that respondent no. 2 has been accused of committing grave offences along with the other co-accused and that declaring him juvenile is an erroneous decision. It was argued that the JJ Board misunderstood the legislative intent behind section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 when it declared that a matriculation certificate is a conclusive document for determining a juvenile’s age despite material discrepancies in the witnesses’ oral testimony or other documents produced. As a result, it was contended that the age stated on the matriculation certificate cannot be accepted at face value if other information contradicts it. The learned additional Advocate General for the State of Uttar Pradesh backed up this contention. He asserted that the exhibits could not have been signed by Nishant, hence these documents could not be taken at face value. They also don’t match the age of respondent 2 at the time he started and finished high school.
Even if the documents seeking admission to class 1 and class 8 were discredited or eschewed, the fact remained that the mark-sheet pertaining to the matriculation supported the presumption that the respondent was less than 16 years of age on the date of the incident.
Commutation of sentence of death is dealt under-
The appellant approached Supreme Court challenging the order passed by the principal magistrate, Juvenile Justice board, Baghpat which declared respondent no. 2 as a juvenile delinquent. The counsel for appellant contended that respondent no. 2 has been accused of committing grave offences along with the other co-accused and that declaring him juvenile is an erroneous decision. It was argued that the JJ Board misunderstood the legislative intent behind section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 when it declared that a matriculation certificate is a conclusive document for determining a juvenile’s age despite material discrepancies in the witnesses’ oral testimony or other documents produced. As a result, it was contended that the age stated on the matriculation certificate cannot be accepted at face value if other information contradicts it. The learned additional Advocate General for the State of Uttar Pradesh backed up this contention. He asserted that the exhibits could not have been signed by Nishant, hence these documents could not be taken at face value. They also don’t match the age of respondent 2 at the time he started and finished high school.
Even if the documents seeking admission to class 1 and class 8 were discredited or eschewed, the fact remained that the mark-sheet pertaining to the matriculation supported the presumption that the respondent was less than 16 years of age on the date of the incident.
Which of the following cases has laid down that the name of the victim of sexual should not be indicated in the judgment-
The appellant approached Supreme Court challenging the order passed by the principal magistrate, Juvenile Justice board, Baghpat which declared respondent no. 2 as a juvenile delinquent. The counsel for appellant contended that respondent no. 2 has been accused of committing grave offences along with the other co-accused and that declaring him juvenile is an erroneous decision. It was argued that the JJ Board misunderstood the legislative intent behind section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 when it declared that a matriculation certificate is a conclusive document for determining a juvenile’s age despite material discrepancies in the witnesses’ oral testimony or other documents produced. As a result, it was contended that the age stated on the matriculation certificate cannot be accepted at face value if other information contradicts it. The learned additional Advocate General for the State of Uttar Pradesh backed up this contention. He asserted that the exhibits could not have been signed by Nishant, hence these documents could not be taken at face value. They also don’t match the age of respondent 2 at the time he started and finished high school.
Even if the documents seeking admission to class 1 and class 8 were discredited or eschewed, the fact remained that the mark-sheet pertaining to the matriculation supported the presumption that the respondent was less than 16 years of age on the date of the incident.
Assertion (A): X, because of unsoundness of mind, not knowing the nature of the act attacks Y, who in self-defence and in order to ward of the attack, hits him thereby causing him hurt. Y does not commit an offence.
Reason (R): Y had a right of private defence against X under Section 98 of the Indian Penal Code.
Of the above statements.
The appellant approached Supreme Court challenging the order passed by the principal magistrate, Juvenile Justice board, Baghpat which declared respondent no. 2 as a juvenile delinquent. The counsel for appellant contended that respondent no. 2 has been accused of committing grave offences along with the other co-accused and that declaring him juvenile is an erroneous decision. It was argued that the JJ Board misunderstood the legislative intent behind section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 when it declared that a matriculation certificate is a conclusive document for determining a juvenile’s age despite material discrepancies in the witnesses’ oral testimony or other documents produced. As a result, it was contended that the age stated on the matriculation certificate cannot be accepted at face value if other information contradicts it. The learned additional Advocate General for the State of Uttar Pradesh backed up this contention. He asserted that the exhibits could not have been signed by Nishant, hence these documents could not be taken at face value. They also don’t match the age of respondent 2 at the time he started and finished high school.
Even if the documents seeking admission to class 1 and class 8 were discredited or eschewed, the fact remained that the mark-sheet pertaining to the matriculation supported the presumption that the respondent was less than 16 years of age on the date of the incident.
Give correct response.
Section 83 of the Indian Penal Code deals with the defence of infancy. It provides that :
A Larger Bench of Justice L. Nageswara Rao, Justice B.R. Gavai and Justice B.V. Nagarathna observed that in respect of the order of conviction and sentence being passed on the same day, the object and purpose of Section 235 (2) of CrPC is that the accused must be given an opportunity to make a representation against the sentence to be imposed on him.
It is travesty of justice as Bhagwani (Appellant – accused) was not given a fair opportunity to defend himself, and therefore, this is a classic case indicating the disturbing tendency of Trial Courts adjudicating criminal cases involving rape and murder in haste, added the Bench.
The observation came pursuant to an appeal challenging the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh whereby the conviction and sentence of the appellant by the Trial Court u/s 363, 366A, 364, 346, 376D, 376A, 302, 201 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and Section 5(g)(m) r/w/s 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) were upheld.
The Larger Bench found that the Appellant was aged 25 years on the date of commission of the offence and belongs to a Scheduled Tribes community, eking his livelihood by doing manual labour.
No evidence has been placed by the prosecution on record to show that there is no probability of rehabilitation and reformation of the Appellant and the question of an alternative option to death sentence is foreclosed, added the Bench.
The Top Court further found that the Appellant had no criminal antecedents before the commission of crime for which he has been convicted, and there is nothing adverse that has been reported against his conduct in jail.
In which case bifurcate hearing for convicting and sentencing was stressed and it was held that adequate opportunity should be provided to the accused by the trail court to produce relevant material on the question of a death sentence?
A Larger Bench of Justice L. Nageswara Rao, Justice B.R. Gavai and Justice B.V. Nagarathna observed that in respect of the order of conviction and sentence being passed on the same day, the object and purpose of Section 235 (2) of CrPC is that the accused must be given an opportunity to make a representation against the sentence to be imposed on him.
It is travesty of justice as Bhagwani (Appellant – accused) was not given a fair opportunity to defend himself, and therefore, this is a classic case indicating the disturbing tendency of Trial Courts adjudicating criminal cases involving rape and murder in haste, added the Bench.
The observation came pursuant to an appeal challenging the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh whereby the conviction and sentence of the appellant by the Trial Court u/s 363, 366A, 364, 346, 376D, 376A, 302, 201 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and Section 5(g)(m) r/w/s 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) were upheld.
The Larger Bench found that the Appellant was aged 25 years on the date of commission of the offence and belongs to a Scheduled Tribes community, eking his livelihood by doing manual labour.
No evidence has been placed by the prosecution on record to show that there is no probability of rehabilitation and reformation of the Appellant and the question of an alternative option to death sentence is foreclosed, added the Bench.
The Top Court further found that the Appellant had no criminal antecedents before the commission of crime for which he has been convicted, and there is nothing adverse that has been reported against his conduct in jail.
Which of the following statements can be the reason enough to communicate a sentence of death to that of life imprisonment?
A Larger Bench of Justice L. Nageswara Rao, Justice B.R. Gavai and Justice B.V. Nagarathna observed that in respect of the order of conviction and sentence being passed on the same day, the object and purpose of Section 235 (2) of CrPC is that the accused must be given an opportunity to make a representation against the sentence to be imposed on him.
It is travesty of justice as Bhagwani (Appellant – accused) was not given a fair opportunity to defend himself, and therefore, this is a classic case indicating the disturbing tendency of Trial Courts adjudicating criminal cases involving rape and murder in haste, added the Bench.
The observation came pursuant to an appeal challenging the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh whereby the conviction and sentence of the appellant by the Trial Court u/s 363, 366A, 364, 346, 376D, 376A, 302, 201 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and Section 5(g)(m) r/w/s 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) were upheld.
The Larger Bench found that the Appellant was aged 25 years on the date of commission of the offence and belongs to a Scheduled Tribes community, eking his livelihood by doing manual labour.
No evidence has been placed by the prosecution on record to show that there is no probability of rehabilitation and reformation of the Appellant and the question of an alternative option to death sentence is foreclosed, added the Bench.
The Top Court further found that the Appellant had no criminal antecedents before the commission of crime for which he has been convicted, and there is nothing adverse that has been reported against his conduct in jail.
Which provision talks about the conviction is for an offense punishable with death or in the alternative, with imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of years must be state the reasons ?
A Larger Bench of Justice L. Nageswara Rao, Justice B.R. Gavai and Justice B.V. Nagarathna observed that in respect of the order of conviction and sentence being passed on the same day, the object and purpose of Section 235 (2) of CrPC is that the accused must be given an opportunity to make a representation against the sentence to be imposed on him.
It is travesty of justice as Bhagwani (Appellant – accused) was not given a fair opportunity to defend himself, and therefore, this is a classic case indicating the disturbing tendency of Trial Courts adjudicating criminal cases involving rape and murder in haste, added the Bench.
The observation came pursuant to an appeal challenging the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh whereby the conviction and sentence of the appellant by the Trial Court u/s 363, 366A, 364, 346, 376D, 376A, 302, 201 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and Section 5(g)(m) r/w/s 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) were upheld.
The Larger Bench found that the Appellant was aged 25 years on the date of commission of the offence and belongs to a Scheduled Tribes community, eking his livelihood by doing manual labour.
No evidence has been placed by the prosecution on record to show that there is no probability of rehabilitation and reformation of the Appellant and the question of an alternative option to death sentence is foreclosed, added the Bench.
The Top Court further found that the Appellant had no criminal antecedents before the commission of crime for which he has been convicted, and there is nothing adverse that has been reported against his conduct in jail.
Which of the following statements is true regarding the punishment of death sentence in India?
A Larger Bench of Justice L. Nageswara Rao, Justice B.R. Gavai and Justice B.V. Nagarathna observed that in respect of the order of conviction and sentence being passed on the same day, the object and purpose of Section 235 (2) of CrPC is that the accused must be given an opportunity to make a representation against the sentence to be imposed on him.
It is travesty of justice as Bhagwani (Appellant – accused) was not given a fair opportunity to defend himself, and therefore, this is a classic case indicating the disturbing tendency of Trial Courts adjudicating criminal cases involving rape and murder in haste, added the Bench.
The observation came pursuant to an appeal challenging the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh whereby the conviction and sentence of the appellant by the Trial Court u/s 363, 366A, 364, 346, 376D, 376A, 302, 201 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and Section 5(g)(m) r/w/s 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) were upheld.
The Larger Bench found that the Appellant was aged 25 years on the date of commission of the offence and belongs to a Scheduled Tribes community, eking his livelihood by doing manual labour.
No evidence has been placed by the prosecution on record to show that there is no probability of rehabilitation and reformation of the Appellant and the question of an alternative option to death sentence is foreclosed, added the Bench.
The Top Court further found that the Appellant had no criminal antecedents before the commission of crime for which he has been convicted, and there is nothing adverse that has been reported against his conduct in jail.
The doctrine of death penalty for ‘rarest of rare case’ was used by SC in
A five-judge bench which consisted of Former Chief Justice of India Dipak Misra, Justice Kurian Joseph, Justice RF Nariman And Justice SK Kaul and Justice Indu Malhotra, reviewed the judgment of a previous case dealing with the reservation for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in promotions to Government jobs or public services. This case also looked into the application of the creamy layer among the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes when applying for reservation in promotions. This aspect of the case is important because the ‘creamy layer’ is an economic criterion based on the assumption that a person is liberated from his or her backwardness due to his or her economic progress which leads to social advancements. With this social and economic standard of the creamy layer, many people preview it as caste discrimination in institutions.
Reservation has always been a controversial topic in India. Its foundation started after the Poona Pact when Doctor B.R. Ambedkar demanded separate electorates for the Dalit community. The then described “depressed classes” were given reservation in employment with joint electorates. Gradually, it was observed that the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes or even the backward classes are given reservation, not because of their poverty, but because they are excluded mostly everywhere. Based on this, it was decided that they should be able to represent themselves in Government jobs and public services or local bodies which is why they were granted reservations in these jobs. Since the problem of exclusion still continued as they did get the job through reservation however, they were not favoured for promotions. Reservation in promotions was introduced for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes subject to certain conditions until the need was felt to review these conditions. This case highlights the decision of the judiciary in this regard.
Poona Pact of 1932 was signed by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and
A five-judge bench which consisted of Former Chief Justice of India Dipak Misra, Justice Kurian Joseph, Justice RF Nariman And Justice SK Kaul and Justice Indu Malhotra, reviewed the judgment of a previous case dealing with the reservation for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in promotions to Government jobs or public services. This case also looked into the application of the creamy layer among the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes when applying for reservation in promotions. This aspect of the case is important because the ‘creamy layer’ is an economic criterion based on the assumption that a person is liberated from his or her backwardness due to his or her economic progress which leads to social advancements. With this social and economic standard of the creamy layer, many people preview it as caste discrimination in institutions.
Reservation has always been a controversial topic in India. Its foundation started after the Poona Pact when Doctor B.R. Ambedkar demanded separate electorates for the Dalit community. The then described “depressed classes” were given reservation in employment with joint electorates. Gradually, it was observed that the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes or even the backward classes are given reservation, not because of their poverty, but because they are excluded mostly everywhere. Based on this, it was decided that they should be able to represent themselves in Government jobs and public services or local bodies which is why they were granted reservations in these jobs. Since the problem of exclusion still continued as they did get the job through reservation however, they were not favoured for promotions. Reservation in promotions was introduced for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes subject to certain conditions until the need was felt to review these conditions. This case highlights the decision of the judiciary in this regard.
The five-judges Bench in Nagaraj case upheld the constitutional validity of
A five-judge bench which consisted of Former Chief Justice of India Dipak Misra, Justice Kurian Joseph, Justice RF Nariman And Justice SK Kaul and Justice Indu Malhotra, reviewed the judgment of a previous case dealing with the reservation for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in promotions to Government jobs or public services. This case also looked into the application of the creamy layer among the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes when applying for reservation in promotions. This aspect of the case is important because the ‘creamy layer’ is an economic criterion based on the assumption that a person is liberated from his or her backwardness due to his or her economic progress which leads to social advancements. With this social and economic standard of the creamy layer, many people preview it as caste discrimination in institutions.
Reservation has always been a controversial topic in India. Its foundation started after the Poona Pact when Doctor B.R. Ambedkar demanded separate electorates for the Dalit community. The then described “depressed classes” were given reservation in employment with joint electorates. Gradually, it was observed that the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes or even the backward classes are given reservation, not because of their poverty, but because they are excluded mostly everywhere. Based on this, it was decided that they should be able to represent themselves in Government jobs and public services or local bodies which is why they were granted reservations in these jobs. Since the problem of exclusion still continued as they did get the job through reservation however, they were not favoured for promotions. Reservation in promotions was introduced for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes subject to certain conditions until the need was felt to review these conditions. This case highlights the decision of the judiciary in this regard.
In which case the SC refused to refer the Nagaraj judgment to a higher bench but later altered the decision by saying that states will not be required to present quantifiable data of backwardness of SC/ST communities.
A five-judge bench which consisted of Former Chief Justice of India Dipak Misra, Justice Kurian Joseph, Justice RF Nariman And Justice SK Kaul and Justice Indu Malhotra, reviewed the judgment of a previous case dealing with the reservation for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in promotions to Government jobs or public services. This case also looked into the application of the creamy layer among the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes when applying for reservation in promotions. This aspect of the case is important because the ‘creamy layer’ is an economic criterion based on the assumption that a person is liberated from his or her backwardness due to his or her economic progress which leads to social advancements. With this social and economic standard of the creamy layer, many people preview it as caste discrimination in institutions.
Reservation has always been a controversial topic in India. Its foundation started after the Poona Pact when Doctor B.R. Ambedkar demanded separate electorates for the Dalit community. The then described “depressed classes” were given reservation in employment with joint electorates. Gradually, it was observed that the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes or even the backward classes are given reservation, not because of their poverty, but because they are excluded mostly everywhere. Based on this, it was decided that they should be able to represent themselves in Government jobs and public services or local bodies which is why they were granted reservations in these jobs. Since the problem of exclusion still continued as they did get the job through reservation however, they were not favoured for promotions. Reservation in promotions was introduced for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes subject to certain conditions until the need was felt to review these conditions. This case highlights the decision of the judiciary in this regard.
Article 16(4A) and Article 16(4B) Inserted by which constitutional amendment
A five-judge bench which consisted of Former Chief Justice of India Dipak Misra, Justice Kurian Joseph, Justice RF Nariman And Justice SK Kaul and Justice Indu Malhotra, reviewed the judgment of a previous case dealing with the reservation for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in promotions to Government jobs or public services. This case also looked into the application of the creamy layer among the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes when applying for reservation in promotions. This aspect of the case is important because the ‘creamy layer’ is an economic criterion based on the assumption that a person is liberated from his or her backwardness due to his or her economic progress which leads to social advancements. With this social and economic standard of the creamy layer, many people preview it as caste discrimination in institutions.
Reservation has always been a controversial topic in India. Its foundation started after the Poona Pact when Doctor B.R. Ambedkar demanded separate electorates for the Dalit community. The then described “depressed classes” were given reservation in employment with joint electorates. Gradually, it was observed that the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes or even the backward classes are given reservation, not because of their poverty, but because they are excluded mostly everywhere. Based on this, it was decided that they should be able to represent themselves in Government jobs and public services or local bodies which is why they were granted reservations in these jobs. Since the problem of exclusion still continued as they did get the job through reservation however, they were not favoured for promotions. Reservation in promotions was introduced for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes subject to certain conditions until the need was felt to review these conditions. This case highlights the decision of the judiciary in this regard.
Main object of Constitution 104th Amendment Act 2019 is:
A five-judge bench which consisted of Former Chief Justice of India Dipak Misra, Justice Kurian Joseph, Justice RF Nariman And Justice SK Kaul and Justice Indu Malhotra, reviewed the judgment of a previous case dealing with the reservation for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in promotions to Government jobs or public services. This case also looked into the application of the creamy layer among the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes when applying for reservation in promotions. This aspect of the case is important because the ‘creamy layer’ is an economic criterion based on the assumption that a person is liberated from his or her backwardness due to his or her economic progress which leads to social advancements. With this social and economic standard of the creamy layer, many people preview it as caste discrimination in institutions.
Reservation has always been a controversial topic in India. Its foundation started after the Poona Pact when Doctor B.R. Ambedkar demanded separate electorates for the Dalit community. The then described “depressed classes” were given reservation in employment with joint electorates. Gradually, it was observed that the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes or even the backward classes are given reservation, not because of their poverty, but because they are excluded mostly everywhere. Based on this, it was decided that they should be able to represent themselves in Government jobs and public services or local bodies which is why they were granted reservations in these jobs. Since the problem of exclusion still continued as they did get the job through reservation however, they were not favoured for promotions. Reservation in promotions was introduced for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes subject to certain conditions until the need was felt to review these conditions. This case highlights the decision of the judiciary in this regard.
Who said these: Fraternity means “a sense of common brotherhood to all Indian and is the principle which gives unity and solidarity to social life”.
A five-judge bench which consisted of Former Chief Justice of India Dipak Misra, Justice Kurian Joseph, Justice RF Nariman And Justice SK Kaul and Justice Indu Malhotra, reviewed the judgment of a previous case dealing with the reservation for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in promotions to Government jobs or public services. This case also looked into the application of the creamy layer among the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes when applying for reservation in promotions. This aspect of the case is important because the ‘creamy layer’ is an economic criterion based on the assumption that a person is liberated from his or her backwardness due to his or her economic progress which leads to social advancements. With this social and economic standard of the creamy layer, many people preview it as caste discrimination in institutions.
Reservation has always been a controversial topic in India. Its foundation started after the Poona Pact when Doctor B.R. Ambedkar demanded separate electorates for the Dalit community. The then described “depressed classes” were given reservation in employment with joint electorates. Gradually, it was observed that the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes or even the backward classes are given reservation, not because of their poverty, but because they are excluded mostly everywhere. Based on this, it was decided that they should be able to represent themselves in Government jobs and public services or local bodies which is why they were granted reservations in these jobs. Since the problem of exclusion still continued as they did get the job through reservation however, they were not favoured for promotions. Reservation in promotions was introduced for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes subject to certain conditions until the need was felt to review these conditions. This case highlights the decision of the judiciary in this regard.
‘Carry forward’ rule was held to be ‘ultra vires’ in the case of:-
A five-judge bench which consisted of Former Chief Justice of India Dipak Misra, Justice Kurian Joseph, Justice RF Nariman And Justice SK Kaul and Justice Indu Malhotra, reviewed the judgment of a previous case dealing with the reservation for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in promotions to Government jobs or public services. This case also looked into the application of the creamy layer among the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes when applying for reservation in promotions. This aspect of the case is important because the ‘creamy layer’ is an economic criterion based on the assumption that a person is liberated from his or her backwardness due to his or her economic progress which leads to social advancements. With this social and economic standard of the creamy layer, many people preview it as caste discrimination in institutions.
Reservation has always been a controversial topic in India. Its foundation started after the Poona Pact when Doctor B.R. Ambedkar demanded separate electorates for the Dalit community. The then described “depressed classes” were given reservation in employment with joint electorates. Gradually, it was observed that the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes or even the backward classes are given reservation, not because of their poverty, but because they are excluded mostly everywhere. Based on this, it was decided that they should be able to represent themselves in Government jobs and public services or local bodies which is why they were granted reservations in these jobs. Since the problem of exclusion still continued as they did get the job through reservation however, they were not favoured for promotions. Reservation in promotions was introduced for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes subject to certain conditions until the need was felt to review these conditions. This case highlights the decision of the judiciary in this regard.
It has been said in many cases, viz., Devdasan case that Article 16 should be read with
A five-judge bench which consisted of Former Chief Justice of India Dipak Misra, Justice Kurian Joseph, Justice RF Nariman And Justice SK Kaul and Justice Indu Malhotra, reviewed the judgment of a previous case dealing with the reservation for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in promotions to Government jobs or public services. This case also looked into the application of the creamy layer among the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes when applying for reservation in promotions. This aspect of the case is important because the ‘creamy layer’ is an economic criterion based on the assumption that a person is liberated from his or her backwardness due to his or her economic progress which leads to social advancements. With this social and economic standard of the creamy layer, many people preview it as caste discrimination in institutions.
Reservation has always been a controversial topic in India. Its foundation started after the Poona Pact when Doctor B.R. Ambedkar demanded separate electorates for the Dalit community. The then described “depressed classes” were given reservation in employment with joint electorates. Gradually, it was observed that the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes or even the backward classes are given reservation, not because of their poverty, but because they are excluded mostly everywhere. Based on this, it was decided that they should be able to represent themselves in Government jobs and public services or local bodies which is why they were granted reservations in these jobs. Since the problem of exclusion still continued as they did get the job through reservation however, they were not favoured for promotions. Reservation in promotions was introduced for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes subject to certain conditions until the need was felt to review these conditions. This case highlights the decision of the judiciary in this regard.
In which case it was held that Scheduled Castes form homogenous classes and there can’t be any sub-division?
A five-judge bench which consisted of Former Chief Justice of India Dipak Misra, Justice Kurian Joseph, Justice RF Nariman And Justice SK Kaul and Justice Indu Malhotra, reviewed the judgment of a previous case dealing with the reservation for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in promotions to Government jobs or public services. This case also looked into the application of the creamy layer among the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes when applying for reservation in promotions. This aspect of the case is important because the ‘creamy layer’ is an economic criterion based on the assumption that a person is liberated from his or her backwardness due to his or her economic progress which leads to social advancements. With this social and economic standard of the creamy layer, many people preview it as caste discrimination in institutions.
Reservation has always been a controversial topic in India. Its foundation started after the Poona Pact when Doctor B.R. Ambedkar demanded separate electorates for the Dalit community. The then described “depressed classes” were given reservation in employment with joint electorates. Gradually, it was observed that the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes or even the backward classes are given reservation, not because of their poverty, but because they are excluded mostly everywhere. Based on this, it was decided that they should be able to represent themselves in Government jobs and public services or local bodies which is why they were granted reservations in these jobs. Since the problem of exclusion still continued as they did get the job through reservation however, they were not favoured for promotions. Reservation in promotions was introduced for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes subject to certain conditions until the need was felt to review these conditions. This case highlights the decision of the judiciary in this regard.
Which Constitutional Amendment Act was Article 342A inserted in the Indian Constitution?
The Railway Board under the Union Ministry of Railways introduced a scheme known as the Safety Related Retirement Scheme for the categories of Gangmen and Drivers. The scheme was intended to cover these “two safety categories” since the working of Drivers and Gangmen was erceived to have a crucial earing on train operations and track maintenance. Taking note of the fact that the reflexes of the staff recruited to these categories and their physical fitness might deteriorate with advancing age, causing a safety hazard, the scheme incorporated the following provisions:
(i) Drivers and Gangmen in the age group of 55-57 could seek voluntary retirement;
(ii) When the application for retirement is accepted, employment would be considered for a ‘suitable ward’ of the employee;
The employee should have completed 33 years of qualifying service in
order to be eligible for seeking voluntary retirement under the scheme;
(iv) The ward of the employee would be considered for employment only in the
lowest recruitment grade of the category from which the employee sought
retirement, depending upon eligibility and suitability but not in any other
category;
Railway Board notified that the benefit of the scheme would be extended to other safety categories of staff with a grade pay of Rs.1800/- per month. The period of qualifying service was reduced from 33 years to 20 years and the eligible age group from 55-57 to 50-57 years for seeking retirement under the scheme. The nomenclature of the scheme was modified to read as
Liberalized Active Retirement Scheme for Guaranteed Employment for Safety Staff (“LARSGESS Scheme”). The qualifying service period of 33 years and the age group of 55-57 years was to remain unchanged for Drivers.
In which of the following case did the apex court help that a scheme providing backdoor entry into services violates Article 16 of the Constitution?
Clause (6) under Article 15 and clause (6) under Article 16 were inserted by:
Identify the correct statement amongst the following
In which of the following cases did the SC for the first time held that in order to grant reservation to SC/ST, the State must collect ‘quantifiable data’ to demonstrate their backwardness?
Article 16 of the Indian Constitution, provides for Equality of Opportunity in matter of
A Larger Bench of Justice B.V Nagarathna, Justice L. Nageswara Rao and Justice B.R Gavai further reiterated that an appeal cannot be entertained against an order of acquittal which has, after recording valid and weighty reasons, has arrived at an unassailable, logical conclusion which justifies acquittal, by relying on the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Lakhbir Singh.
The bench observed that approach to be adopted while deciding an appeal against acquittal by the trial court as well as by the High Court. Section 378 of the Cr. P.C deals with appeals in case of acquittal. In one of the earliest cases on the powers of the High Court in dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup vs. R. Emperor, AIR 1934 PC 227(2) considered the provisions relating to the power of an appellate court in dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal.
In which case the Supreme Court recently observed that Apex Court may entertain appeal against order of acquittal & pass order of conviction, where approach or reasoning of High Court is perverse?
A Larger Bench of Justice B.V Nagarathna, Justice L. Nageswara Rao and Justice B.R Gavai further reiterated that an appeal cannot be entertained against an order of acquittal which has, after recording valid and weighty reasons, has arrived at an unassailable, logical conclusion which justifies acquittal, by relying on the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Lakhbir Singh.
The bench observed that approach to be adopted while deciding an appeal against acquittal by the trial court as well as by the High Court. Section 378 of the Cr. P.C deals with appeals in case of acquittal. In one of the earliest cases on the powers of the High Court in dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup vs. R. Emperor, AIR 1934 PC 227(2) considered the provisions relating to the power of an appellate court in dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal.
Which of the following statements is true under which an appeal would be entertained by the Supreme Court from an order of acquittal?
A Larger Bench of Justice B.V Nagarathna, Justice L. Nageswara Rao and Justice B.R Gavai further reiterated that an appeal cannot be entertained against an order of acquittal which has, after recording valid and weighty reasons, has arrived at an unassailable, logical conclusion which justifies acquittal, by relying on the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Lakhbir Singh.
The bench observed that approach to be adopted while deciding an appeal against acquittal by the trial court as well as by the High Court. Section 378 of the Cr. P.C deals with appeals in case of acquittal. In one of the earliest cases on the powers of the High Court in dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup vs. R. Emperor, AIR 1934 PC 227(2) considered the provisions relating to the power of an appellate court in dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal.
Which section of the CrPC has dealt with power of High Court to commit the sentence of death to life imprisonment on pregnant woman?
A Larger Bench of Justice B.V Nagarathna, Justice L. Nageswara Rao and Justice B.R Gavai further reiterated that an appeal cannot be entertained against an order of acquittal which has, after recording valid and weighty reasons, has arrived at an unassailable, logical conclusion which justifies acquittal, by relying on the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Lakhbir Singh.
The bench observed that approach to be adopted while deciding an appeal against acquittal by the trial court as well as by the High Court. Section 378 of the Cr. P.C deals with appeals in case of acquittal. In one of the earliest cases on the powers of the High Court in dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup vs. R. Emperor, AIR 1934 PC 227(2) considered the provisions relating to the power of an appellate court in dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal.
Under which Constitutional Article, Special leave to appeal lies with the Supreme Court—
A Larger Bench of Justice B.V Nagarathna, Justice L. Nageswara Rao and Justice B.R Gavai further reiterated that an appeal cannot be entertained against an order of acquittal which has, after recording valid and weighty reasons, has arrived at an unassailable, logical conclusion which justifies acquittal, by relying on the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Lakhbir Singh.
The bench observed that approach to be adopted while deciding an appeal against acquittal by the trial court as well as by the High Court. Section 378 of the Cr. P.C deals with appeals in case of acquittal. In one of the earliest cases on the powers of the High Court in dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup vs. R. Emperor, AIR 1934 PC 227(2) considered the provisions relating to the power of an appellate court in dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal.
In which case did the Supreme Court first hold that the right of a victim to file an appeal under the proviso to Sec 372 of CrPC is available against orders of acquittal rendered after 31.12.2009 and that for exercising such right no leave to appeal is required to be sough?
Due to the rise of the Covid-19 and the consequent Nationwide lockdown imposed due to it, the economy suffered a huge blow. As a response for the same Government issued a notification dated April 17, 2020 under Section 5 of the Factories Act, 1948.
Through the exercise of the aforementioned power, the act aimed to exempt all class of factories from complying “various provisions relating to weekly hours, daily hours, intervals for rest etc. for adult workers,” as provided under Sections 51[i], 54[ii], 55[iii] and 56[iv] of the Act. In addition to this, the notification also called for revised working conditions applicable to the workers. The notification was applicable from April 20, 2020 till July 19, 2020.
Upon the lapse of the notification due to efflux of time, the State government issued another notification on 20 July 2020, which extended the grant of exemption till 19 October 2020. The said notification was challenged by the Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha and the Trade Union Centre of India before the Supreme Court of India.
In which case apex court deal with “Whether the economic crisis caused due to the Pandemic be considered as a ‘Public Emergency’as provided in Section 5 of the Factories Act?
Due to the rise of the Covid-19 and the consequent Nationwide lockdown imposed due to it, the economy suffered a huge blow. As a response for the same Government issued a notification dated April 17, 2020 under Section 5 of the Factories Act, 1948.
Through the exercise of the aforementioned power, the act aimed to exempt all class of factories from complying “various provisions relating to weekly hours, daily hours, intervals for rest etc. for adult workers,” as provided under Sections 51[i], 54[ii], 55[iii] and 56[iv] of the Act. In addition to this, the notification also called for revised working conditions applicable to the workers. The notification was applicable from April 20, 2020 till July 19, 2020.
Upon the lapse of the notification due to efflux of time, the State government issued another notification on 20 July 2020, which extended the grant of exemption till 19 October 2020. The said notification was challenged by the Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha and the Trade Union Centre of India before the Supreme Court of India.
A wider definition of ‘Industry’ was given by 7-Judges Bench of Supreme Court in:
Due to the rise of the Covid-19 and the consequent Nationwide lockdown imposed due to it, the economy suffered a huge blow. As a response for the same Government issued a notification dated April 17, 2020 under Section 5 of the Factories Act, 1948.
Through the exercise of the aforementioned power, the act aimed to exempt all class of factories from complying “various provisions relating to weekly hours, daily hours, intervals for rest etc. for adult workers,” as provided under Sections 51[i], 54[ii], 55[iii] and 56[iv] of the Act. In addition to this, the notification also called for revised working conditions applicable to the workers. The notification was applicable from April 20, 2020 till July 19, 2020.
Upon the lapse of the notification due to efflux of time, the State government issued another notification on 20 July 2020, which extended the grant of exemption till 19 October 2020. The said notification was challenged by the Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha and the Trade Union Centre of India before the Supreme Court of India.
As per section 2 in factories act, who will be called as an adult?
Due to the rise of the Covid-19 and the consequent Nationwide lockdown imposed due to it, the economy suffered a huge blow. As a response for the same Government issued a notification dated April 17, 2020 under Section 5 of the Factories Act, 1948.
Through the exercise of the aforementioned power, the act aimed to exempt all class of factories from complying “various provisions relating to weekly hours, daily hours, intervals for rest etc. for adult workers,” as provided under Sections 51[i], 54[ii], 55[iii] and 56[iv] of the Act. In addition to this, the notification also called for revised working conditions applicable to the workers. The notification was applicable from April 20, 2020 till July 19, 2020.
Upon the lapse of the notification due to efflux of time, the State government issued another notification on 20 July 2020, which extended the grant of exemption till 19 October 2020. The said notification was challenged by the Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha and the Trade Union Centre of India before the Supreme Court of India.
If there are ____ numbers of employees, then the employer has to provide a canteen.
Due to the rise of the Covid-19 and the consequent Nationwide lockdown imposed due to it, the economy suffered a huge blow. As a response for the same Government issued a notification dated April 17, 2020 under Section 5 of the Factories Act, 1948.
Through the exercise of the aforementioned power, the act aimed to exempt all class of factories from complying “various provisions relating to weekly hours, daily hours, intervals for rest etc. for adult workers,” as provided under Sections 51[i], 54[ii], 55[iii] and 56[iv] of the Act. In addition to this, the notification also called for revised working conditions applicable to the workers. The notification was applicable from April 20, 2020 till July 19, 2020.
Upon the lapse of the notification due to efflux of time, the State government issued another notification on 20 July 2020, which extended the grant of exemption till 19 October 2020. The said notification was challenged by the Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha and the Trade Union Centre of India before the Supreme Court of India.
Whether the notifications violate the fundamental rights mentioned under Article 23, Article 21 and Article 14 of labour?
The subject ‘Cooperative Societies’ falls within Schedule 7 List 2, i.e., the State List as a part of Entry 32 thereof. According to the writ petitioner, a careful reading of Part IX-B would show that the unfettered power of State Legislatures prior to the amendment has now been fettered by the provisions of Part IX-B in several material particulars: for example, fixation of maximum number of directors of cooperative societies; reservation provision contained in 243-ZJ; duration of the term of office of elected members of the board of cooperative societies, etc. In short, what has been done is to add exception after exception to Entry 32 thereby carving out of Entry 32 a number of matters which otherwise were exclusively within the domain of State Legislatures.
On this basis, it was challenged that as a direct inroad is made into Article 246(3) and Entry 32 List 2, such amendment would have to be struck down for want of ratification. If the subject matter of an amendment falls within Article 368(2) proviso, then the additional procedural requirement is that such amendment shall also be required to be ratified by the legislatures of not less than one-half of the States by resolution to that effect passed by those legislatures before the Bill making provision for such amendment is presented to the President for assent.
In which case Supreme Court declared Part IX-B of Constitution relating to cooperative societies unconstitutional for want of ratification by half of the States
The subject ‘Cooperative Societies’ falls within Schedule 7 List 2, i.e., the State List as a part of Entry 32 thereof. According to the writ petitioner, a careful reading of Part IX-B would show that the unfettered power of State Legislatures prior to the amendment has now been fettered by the provisions of Part IX-B in several material particulars: for example, fixation of maximum number of directors of cooperative societies; reservation provision contained in 243-ZJ; duration of the term of office of elected members of the board of cooperative societies, etc. In short, what has been done is to add exception after exception to Entry 32 thereby carving out of Entry 32 a number of matters which otherwise were exclusively within the domain of State Legislatures.
On this basis, it was challenged that as a direct inroad is made into Article 246(3) and Entry 32 List 2, such amendment would have to be struck down for want of ratification. If the subject matter of an amendment falls within Article 368(2) proviso, then the additional procedural requirement is that such amendment shall also be required to be ratified by the legislatures of not less than one-half of the States by resolution to that effect passed by those legislatures before the Bill making provision for such amendment is presented to the President for assent.
As per Article 246 , 3 lists are given in which schedule?
Read Assertion (A) and Reason (R) and answer using the codes given below:
Assertion (A): The power under Article 368 of the Constitution is a constituent power subject to the constitutional scheme as to the distribution of legislative power according to entries in the 7th Schedule.
Reason (R) Because Sasanka Sekhar Maity b. Union of India decided so.
The subject ‘Cooperative Societies’ falls within Schedule 7 List 2, i.e., the State List as a part of Entry 32 thereof. According to the writ petitioner, a careful reading of Part IX-B would show that the unfettered power of State Legislatures prior to the amendment has now been fettered by the provisions of Part IX-B in several material particulars: for example, fixation of maximum number of directors of cooperative societies; reservation provision contained in 243-ZJ; duration of the term of office of elected members of the board of cooperative societies, etc. In short, what has been done is to add exception after exception to Entry 32 thereby carving out of Entry 32 a number of matters which otherwise were exclusively within the domain of State Legislatures.
On this basis, it was challenged that as a direct inroad is made into Article 246(3) and Entry 32 List 2, such amendment would have to be struck down for want of ratification. If the subject matter of an amendment falls within Article 368(2) proviso, then the additional procedural requirement is that such amendment shall also be required to be ratified by the legislatures of not less than one-half of the States by resolution to that effect passed by those legislatures before the Bill making provision for such amendment is presented to the President for assent.
Part IX-B of Indian Constitution inserted by
The subject ‘Cooperative Societies’ falls within Schedule 7 List 2, i.e., the State List as a part of Entry 32 thereof. According to the writ petitioner, a careful reading of Part IX-B would show that the unfettered power of State Legislatures prior to the amendment has now been fettered by the provisions of Part IX-B in several material particulars: for example, fixation of maximum number of directors of cooperative societies; reservation provision contained in 243-ZJ; duration of the term of office of elected members of the board of cooperative societies, etc. In short, what has been done is to add exception after exception to Entry 32 thereby carving out of Entry 32 a number of matters which otherwise were exclusively within the domain of State Legislatures.
On this basis, it was challenged that as a direct inroad is made into Article 246(3) and Entry 32 List 2, such amendment would have to be struck down for want of ratification. If the subject matter of an amendment falls within Article 368(2) proviso, then the additional procedural requirement is that such amendment shall also be required to be ratified by the legislatures of not less than one-half of the States by resolution to that effect passed by those legislatures before the Bill making provision for such amendment is presented to the President for assent.
The United Nations General Assembly had when declared the International Year of Cooperatives?
The subject ‘Cooperative Societies’ falls within Schedule 7 List 2, i.e., the State List as a part of Entry 32 thereof. According to the writ petitioner, a careful reading of Part IX-B would show that the unfettered power of State Legislatures prior to the amendment has now been fettered by the provisions of Part IX-B in several material particulars: for example, fixation of maximum number of directors of cooperative societies; reservation provision contained in 243-ZJ; duration of the term of office of elected members of the board of cooperative societies, etc. In short, what has been done is to add exception after exception to Entry 32 thereby carving out of Entry 32 a number of matters which otherwise were exclusively within the domain of State Legislatures.
On this basis, it was challenged that as a direct inroad is made into Article 246(3) and Entry 32 List 2, such amendment would have to be struck down for want of ratification. If the subject matter of an amendment falls within Article 368(2) proviso, then the additional procedural requirement is that such amendment shall also be required to be ratified by the legislatures of not less than one-half of the States by resolution to that effect passed by those legislatures before the Bill making provision for such amendment is presented to the President for assent.
Other major provision added by the 97th Amendment
The subject ‘Cooperative Societies’ falls within Schedule 7 List 2, i.e., the State List as a part of Entry 32 thereof. According to the writ petitioner, a careful reading of Part IX-B would show that the unfettered power of State Legislatures prior to the amendment has now been fettered by the provisions of Part IX-B in several material particulars: for example, fixation of maximum number of directors of cooperative societies; reservation provision contained in 243-ZJ; duration of the term of office of elected members of the board of cooperative societies, etc. In short, what has been done is to add exception after exception to Entry 32 thereby carving out of Entry 32 a number of matters which otherwise were exclusively within the domain of State Legislatures.
On this basis, it was challenged that as a direct inroad is made into Article 246(3) and Entry 32 List 2, such amendment would have to be struck down for want of ratification. If the subject matter of an amendment falls within Article 368(2) proviso, then the additional procedural requirement is that such amendment shall also be required to be ratified by the legislatures of not less than one-half of the States by resolution to that effect passed by those legislatures before the Bill making provision for such amendment is presented to the President for assent.
If India decides to have a Presidential form of government, the first and foremost Amendment has to be made affecting the:
Supreme Court noted that Assam Legislature enacted the relevant statute in 2004, providing for appointment of members of the Assam Legislative Assembly as Parliamentary Secretaries.
The Assam Act, 2004 and the 2012 Act were undoubtedly in pari materia. This Court in Bimolangshu Roy v. State of Assam, (2018) 14 SCC 408 struck down the Assam Act, 2004 as unconstitutional. The appointments of Parliamentary Secretaries were discontinued by the Chief Minister of Manipur around the time the Supreme Court decision was delivered. Thereafter, the Repealing Act, 2018 was enacted and notified.
Later, the 2012 Act and the Repealing Act, 2018 were challenged before the High Court of Manipur.
Supreme Court: Stating that declaration by a Court that a statute is unconstitutional obliterates that statute entirely as though it had never been passed, the Bench of L. Nageswara Rao, B.R. Gavai and B.V. Nagarathna, JJ., added that the consequences of the declaration of unconstitutionality of a statute have to be dealt with only by the Court.
Recently Supreme Court in which case ruled that Law passed by the legislature is good law till it is declared unconstitutional by a Court
In the above-said case supreme court used the doctrine of prospective overruling. In which the first time said doctrine was used by the apex court in India?
Supreme Court noted that Assam Legislature enacted the relevant statute in 2004, providing for appointment of members of the Assam Legislative Assembly as Parliamentary Secretaries.
The Assam Act, 2004 and the 2012 Act were undoubtedly in pari materia. This Court in Bimolangshu Roy v. State of Assam, (2018) 14 SCC 408 struck down the Assam Act, 2004 as unconstitutional. The appointments of Parliamentary Secretaries were discontinued by the Chief Minister of Manipur around the time the Supreme Court decision was delivered. Thereafter, the Repealing Act, 2018 was enacted and notified.
Later, the 2012 Act and the Repealing Act, 2018 were challenged before the High Court of Manipur.
Supreme Court: Stating that declaration by a Court that a statute is unconstitutional obliterates that statute entirely as though it had never been passed, the Bench of L. Nageswara Rao, B.R. Gavai and B.V. Nagarathna, JJ., added that the consequences of the declaration of unconstitutionality of a statute have to be dealt with only by the Court.
Which of the following statements is/are found to be correct?
Supreme Court noted that Assam Legislature enacted the relevant statute in 2004, providing for appointment of members of the Assam Legislative Assembly as Parliamentary Secretaries.
The Assam Act, 2004 and the 2012 Act were undoubtedly in pari materia. This Court in Bimolangshu Roy v. State of Assam, (2018) 14 SCC 408 struck down the Assam Act, 2004 as unconstitutional. The appointments of Parliamentary Secretaries were discontinued by the Chief Minister of Manipur around the time the Supreme Court decision was delivered. Thereafter, the Repealing Act, 2018 was enacted and notified.
Later, the 2012 Act and the Repealing Act, 2018 were challenged before the High Court of Manipur.
Supreme Court: Stating that declaration by a Court that a statute is unconstitutional obliterates that statute entirely as though it had never been passed, the Bench of L. Nageswara Rao, B.R. Gavai and B.V. Nagarathna, JJ., added that the consequences of the declaration of unconstitutionality of a statute have to be dealt with only by the Court.
Clause (4) of Article 13 of the Indian Constitution says, “Nothing in this Article shall apply to any amendment of this Constitution made under Article 368 of the Indian Constitution”. Clause (4) has been inserted by which of the following Amendment Acts?
Who, among the following, can challenge the constitutionality of a law?
III. A person who challenges the constitutionality of a statute must show that he is sustaining some direct injury as the result of enforcement of the statute.
Supreme Court noted that Assam Legislature enacted the relevant statute in 2004, providing for appointment of members of the Assam Legislative Assembly as Parliamentary Secretaries.
The Assam Act, 2004 and the 2012 Act were undoubtedly in pari materia. This Court in Bimolangshu Roy v. State of Assam, (2018) 14 SCC 408 struck down the Assam Act, 2004 as unconstitutional. The appointments of Parliamentary Secretaries were discontinued by the Chief Minister of Manipur around the time the Supreme Court decision was delivered. Thereafter, the Repealing Act, 2018 was enacted and notified.
Later, the 2012 Act and the Repealing Act, 2018 were challenged before the High Court of Manipur.
Supreme Court: Stating that declaration by a Court that a statute is unconstitutional obliterates that statute entirely as though it had never been passed, the Bench of L. Nageswara Rao, B.R. Gavai and B.V. Nagarathna, JJ., added that the consequences of the declaration of unconstitutionality of a statute have to be dealt with only by the Court.
Clause (4) of Article 13 the Indian Constitution which were inserted by the 24th Amendment Act, 1971, states that a Constitution Amendment Act, passed according to Article 368, Indian Constitution is a law within the meaning of Article 13 and would, accordingly be void if it contravenes a fundamental right. This amendment was declared void in which of the following cases?
Supreme Court noted that Assam Legislature enacted the relevant statute in 2004, providing for appointment of members of the Assam Legislative Assembly as Parliamentary Secretaries.
The Assam Act, 2004 and the 2012 Act were undoubtedly in pari materia. This Court in Bimolangshu Roy v. State of Assam, (2018) 14 SCC 408 struck down the Assam Act, 2004 as unconstitutional. The appointments of Parliamentary Secretaries were discontinued by the Chief Minister of Manipur around the time the Supreme Court decision was delivered. Thereafter, the Repealing Act, 2018 was enacted and notified.
Later, the 2012 Act and the Repealing Act, 2018 were challenged before the High Court of Manipur.
Supreme Court: Stating that declaration by a Court that a statute is unconstitutional obliterates that statute entirely as though it had never been passed, the Bench of L. Nageswara Rao, B.R. Gavai and B.V. Nagarathna, JJ., added that the consequences of the declaration of unconstitutionality of a statute have to be dealt with only by the Court.
In which of the following cases did the Supreme Court that an amendment of the Constitution under Art. 368 was ‘law’ within the meaning of Art. 13 of the Constitution of India:-
Supreme Court: In a case where out of the total 128 home buyers, 82 were against the insolvency proceedings of the Corporate Debtor of a Gurgaon based housing project, the bench of MR Shah* and BV Nagarathna, JJ has allowed the original applicants (three home buyers) to withdraw the CIRP proceedings as the same shall be in the larger interest of the home buyers who are waiting for the possession since more than eight years. The Court observed that this decision will also be in line with the object and purpose of the IBC i.e. not to kill the company and stop/stall the project, but to ensure that the business of the company runs as a going concern.
The Court noticed that although the COC was constituted on 23.11.2020, there has been a stay of CIRP proceedings on 3.12.2020 (within ten days) and no proceedings have taken place before the COC. Also, the COC comprises 91 members, of which 70% are the members of the Flat Buyers Association who are willing for the CIRP proceedings being set aside, subject to the Corporate Debtor company honouring the settlement plan.
Recently in which case Supreme Court said “IBC’s object is not to kill the company”
Supreme Court: In a case where out of the total 128 home buyers, 82 were against the insolvency proceedings of the Corporate Debtor of a Gurgaon based housing project, the bench of MR Shah* and BV Nagarathna, JJ has allowed the original applicants (three home buyers) to withdraw the CIRP proceedings as the same shall be in the larger interest of the home buyers who are waiting for the possession since more than eight years. The Court observed that this decision will also be in line with the object and purpose of the IBC i.e. not to kill the company and stop/stall the project, but to ensure that the business of the company runs as a going concern.
The Court noticed that although the COC was constituted on 23.11.2020, there has been a stay of CIRP proceedings on 3.12.2020 (within ten days) and no proceedings have taken place before the COC. Also, the COC comprises 91 members, of which 70% are the members of the Flat Buyers Association who are willing for the CIRP proceedings being set aside, subject to the Corporate Debtor company honouring the settlement plan.
Who can initiate Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP):
Supreme Court: In a case where out of the total 128 home buyers, 82 were against the insolvency proceedings of the Corporate Debtor of a Gurgaon based housing project, the bench of MR Shah* and BV Nagarathna, JJ has allowed the original applicants (three home buyers) to withdraw the CIRP proceedings as the same shall be in the larger interest of the home buyers who are waiting for the possession since more than eight years. The Court observed that this decision will also be in line with the object and purpose of the IBC i.e. not to kill the company and stop/stall the project, but to ensure that the business of the company runs as a going concern.
The Court noticed that although the COC was constituted on 23.11.2020, there has been a stay of CIRP proceedings on 3.12.2020 (within ten days) and no proceedings have taken place before the COC. Also, the COC comprises 91 members, of which 70% are the members of the Flat Buyers Association who are willing for the CIRP proceedings being set aside, subject to the Corporate Debtor company honouring the settlement plan.
What is the time limit for completion of insolvency resolution process:
Supreme Court: In a case where out of the total 128 home buyers, 82 were against the insolvency proceedings of the Corporate Debtor of a Gurgaon based housing project, the bench of MR Shah* and BV Nagarathna, JJ has allowed the original applicants (three home buyers) to withdraw the CIRP proceedings as the same shall be in the larger interest of the home buyers who are waiting for the possession since more than eight years. The Court observed that this decision will also be in line with the object and purpose of the IBC i.e. not to kill the company and stop/stall the project, but to ensure that the business of the company runs as a going concern.
The Court noticed that although the COC was constituted on 23.11.2020, there has been a stay of CIRP proceedings on 3.12.2020 (within ten days) and no proceedings have taken place before the COC. Also, the COC comprises 91 members, of which 70% are the members of the Flat Buyers Association who are willing for the CIRP proceedings being set aside, subject to the Corporate Debtor company honouring the settlement plan.
What is the voting requirement for approval of resolution plan by creditors:
Supreme Court: In a case where out of the total 128 home buyers, 82 were against the insolvency proceedings of the Corporate Debtor of a Gurgaon based housing project, the bench of MR Shah* and BV Nagarathna, JJ has allowed the original applicants (three home buyers) to withdraw the CIRP proceedings as the same shall be in the larger interest of the home buyers who are waiting for the possession since more than eight years. The Court observed that this decision will also be in line with the object and purpose of the IBC i.e. not to kill the company and stop/stall the project, but to ensure that the business of the company runs as a going concern.
The Court noticed that although the COC was constituted on 23.11.2020, there has been a stay of CIRP proceedings on 3.12.2020 (within ten days) and no proceedings have taken place before the COC. Also, the COC comprises 91 members, of which 70% are the members of the Flat Buyers Association who are willing for the CIRP proceedings being set aside, subject to the Corporate Debtor company honouring the settlement plan.
Which is the Appellate Authority under this Code:
The Supreme Court recently observed that the appointments to the reserved vacancies are meant only for those who are deserving by being members of reserved community alone.
Reservation of appointments or posts etc.- (1) After the appointed day, while making appointments to any office in the civil service of the State of Karnataka or to a civil post under the State of Karnataka, appointments or posts shall be reserved for the members of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other Backward Classes to such extent and in such manner as may be specified from time to time in the order made by the Government under clause (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution of India.
The scheme of the Act appears to be in tune with the Constitutional mandate which is to reserve appointments in favour of the deserving categories as are covered under Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution, inter alia. In other words, appointments are to be made inter alia in favour of the Scheduled Tribes. If an appointment is made in contravention of the said mandate then it is, no doubt, declared voidable. The expression ‘voidable’ in the context of the Act and the object of the Act and more importantly, and the constitutional value of equality would mean that appointments to the reserved vacancies are meant only for those who are deserving by being members of the said community alone.
In which case apex court observed that the appointment in public service to the reserved vacancies is meant only for those who are deserving in the reserved categories themselves?
The Supreme Court recently observed that the appointments to the reserved vacancies are meant only for those who are deserving by being members of reserved community alone.
Reservation of appointments or posts etc.- (1) After the appointed day, while making appointments to any office in the civil service of the State of Karnataka or to a civil post under the State of Karnataka, appointments or posts shall be reserved for the members of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other Backward Classes to such extent and in such manner as may be specified from time to time in the order made by the Government under clause (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution of India.
The scheme of the Act appears to be in tune with the Constitutional mandate which is to reserve appointments in favour of the deserving categories as are covered under Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution, inter alia. In other words, appointments are to be made inter alia in favour of the Scheduled Tribes. If an appointment is made in contravention of the said mandate then it is, no doubt, declared voidable. The expression ‘voidable’ in the context of the Act and the object of the Act and more importantly, and the constitutional value of equality would mean that appointments to the reserved vacancies are meant only for those who are deserving by being members of the said community alone.
Which part of the Constitution provides the Special Provisions relating to certain classes?
The Supreme Court in Dhurandhar Prasad Singh v. Jai Prakash University and others, 2001, dealing with the expressions “void and voidable” have been the subject matter of consideration on innumerable occasions by courts. Which of the following ‘Void acts’?
The Supreme Court recently observed that the appointments to the reserved vacancies are meant only for those who are deserving by being members of reserved community alone.
Reservation of appointments or posts etc.- (1) After the appointed day, while making appointments to any office in the civil service of the State of Karnataka or to a civil post under the State of Karnataka, appointments or posts shall be reserved for the members of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other Backward Classes to such extent and in such manner as may be specified from time to time in the order made by the Government under clause (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution of India.
The scheme of the Act appears to be in tune with the Constitutional mandate which is to reserve appointments in favour of the deserving categories as are covered under Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution, inter alia. In other words, appointments are to be made inter alia in favour of the Scheduled Tribes. If an appointment is made in contravention of the said mandate then it is, no doubt, declared voidable. The expression ‘voidable’ in the context of the Act and the object of the Act and more importantly, and the constitutional value of equality would mean that appointments to the reserved vacancies are meant only for those who are deserving by being members of the said community alone.
The National Commission for Schedule Caste was established under……..of Indian Constitution.
Who appoints the Chairman of the National Commission for Scheduled Castes?
The Supreme Court recently observed that the appointments to the reserved vacancies are meant only for those who are deserving by being members of reserved community alone.
Reservation of appointments or posts etc.- (1) After the appointed day, while making appointments to any office in the civil service of the State of Karnataka or to a civil post under the State of Karnataka, appointments or posts shall be reserved for the members of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other Backward Classes to such extent and in such manner as may be specified from time to time in the order made by the Government under clause (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution of India.
The scheme of the Act appears to be in tune with the Constitutional mandate which is to reserve appointments in favour of the deserving categories as are covered under Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution, inter alia. In other words, appointments are to be made inter alia in favour of the Scheduled Tribes. If an appointment is made in contravention of the said mandate then it is, no doubt, declared voidable. The expression ‘voidable’ in the context of the Act and the object of the Act and more importantly, and the constitutional value of equality would mean that appointments to the reserved vacancies are meant only for those who are deserving by being members of the said community alone.
Which constitution amendment has recommended the establishment of a commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes?
What are functions of National Commission for SCs?
1) Investigate and monitor all matters relating to the legal safeguards for the SCs.
2) Present reports to President.
3) Advise on the planning process of socio-economic development of the SCs.
The Supreme Court recently observed that the appointments to the reserved vacancies are meant only for those who are deserving by being members of reserved community alone.
Reservation of appointments or posts etc.- (1) After the appointed day, while making appointments to any office in the civil service of the State of Karnataka or to a civil post under the State of Karnataka, appointments or posts shall be reserved for the members of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other Backward Classes to such extent and in such manner as may be specified from time to time in the order made by the Government under clause (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution of India.
The scheme of the Act appears to be in tune with the Constitutional mandate which is to reserve appointments in favour of the deserving categories as are covered under Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution, inter alia. In other words, appointments are to be made inter alia in favour of the Scheduled Tribes. If an appointment is made in contravention of the said mandate then it is, no doubt, declared voidable. The expression ‘voidable’ in the context of the Act and the object of the Act and more importantly, and the constitutional value of equality would mean that appointments to the reserved vacancies are meant only for those who are deserving by being members of the said community alone.
Kaka Kalelkar Commission is related to………
The Supreme Court recently observed that the appointments to the reserved vacancies are meant only for those who are deserving by being members of reserved community alone.
Reservation of appointments or posts etc.- (1) After the appointed day, while making appointments to any office in the civil service of the State of Karnataka or to a civil post under the State of Karnataka, appointments or posts shall be reserved for the members of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other Backward Classes to such extent and in such manner as may be specified from time to time in the order made by the Government under clause (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution of India.
The scheme of the Act appears to be in tune with the Constitutional mandate which is to reserve appointments in favour of the deserving categories as are covered under Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution, inter alia. In other words, appointments are to be made inter alia in favour of the Scheduled Tribes. If an appointment is made in contravention of the said mandate then it is, no doubt, declared voidable. The expression ‘voidable’ in the context of the Act and the object of the Act and more importantly, and the constitutional value of equality would mean that appointments to the reserved vacancies are meant only for those who are deserving by being members of the said community alone.
Which committee recommended the 27% reservation of the OBCs in the government jobs in 1991?
The Supreme Court recently observed that the appointments to the reserved vacancies are meant only for those who are deserving by being members of reserved community alone.
Reservation of appointments or posts etc.- (1) After the appointed day, while making appointments to any office in the civil service of the State of Karnataka or to a civil post under the State of Karnataka, appointments or posts shall be reserved for the members of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other Backward Classes to such extent and in such manner as may be specified from time to time in the order made by the Government under clause (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution of India.
The scheme of the Act appears to be in tune with the Constitutional mandate which is to reserve appointments in favour of the deserving categories as are covered under Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution, inter alia. In other words, appointments are to be made inter alia in favour of the Scheduled Tribes. If an appointment is made in contravention of the said mandate then it is, no doubt, declared voidable. The expression ‘voidable’ in the context of the Act and the object of the Act and more importantly, and the constitutional value of equality would mean that appointments to the reserved vacancies are meant only for those who are deserving by being members of the said community alone.
National Commission for Other Backward Class came into effect from:
Supreme Court: In a detailed judgment stressing on the importance of the work done by the Anganwadi workers/helpers at the grassroot level, the bench of Ajay Rastogi and Abhay S. Oka, JJ has held that Anganwadi workers/helpers are entitled to gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.
Writing separate but concurrent opinions, both the judges agreed that the Anganwadi Workers/Helpers have been entrusted with the important tasks of providing food security to children in the age group of 6 months to 6 years, pregnant women as well as lactating mothers, apart from rendering pre¬school education. And for all this, they are being paid very meagre remuneration and paltry benefits.
The Court observed that it is high time that the Central Government and State Governments take serious note of the plight of Anganwadi Workers/Helpers who are expected to render such important services to the society.
Justice Oka wrote that the definition of ‘wages’ is very wide. It means all emoluments which are earned by an employee on duty. Thus, the honorarium paid to Anganwadi Workers/Helpers will also be covered by the definition of wages. As Anganwadi Workers/Helpers are employed by the State Government for wages in the establishments to which the 1972 Act applies, the AWWs and AWHs are employees within the meaning of the 1972 Act.
He also held that it was impossible to accept the contention that the job assigned to Anganwadi Workers/Helpers is a part-time job. It is full-time employment.
The SC observed “The Anganwadi centers have been established to give effect to the obligations of the state-defined under Art 47 of the Constitution. It can be safely said that the posts of AWWs are statutory posts”.
What is mean by the term ‘quantum meruit’?
Which of the article of the constitution not provided the positive right to children?
According to Section 2 (b) of the Payment of Gratuity Act 1972, completed year of service” means continuous service for_______year
The employer shall arrange to pay the amount of gratuity within ______days from the date it becomes payable to the person to whom the gratuity is payable.
Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 is applicable to every shop or establishment within the meaning of any law for the time being in force in relation to shops and establishment in a State, in which ——— persons are or were employed on any day in the preceding 12 months.
Holding that, in the case at hand, the ‘victims’ have been denied a fair and effective hearing at the time of granting bail to the Accused, the Court expressed its disappointment with the manner in which the High Court failed to acknowledge the right of the victims.
It is important to note that the Counsel for the ‘victims’ had got disconnected from the online proceedings and could not make effective submissions before the High Court. Thereafter, an application seeking a rehearing was also moved on the same ground but the same was not considered by the High Court while granting bail to Mishra.
Instead of looking into aspects such as the nature and gravity of the offence; severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; circumstances which are peculiar to the accused or victims; likelihood of the accused fleeing; likelihood of tampering with the evidence and witnesses and the impact that his release may have on the trial and the society at large; the High Court adopted a myopic view of the evidence on the record and proceeded to decide the case on merits.
It took into account several irrelevant considerations, whilst simultaneously ignoring judicial precedents and established parameters for grant of bail.
Under what provision of law the Sessions Court or High Court can cancel the bail in bailable offence?
Holding that, in the case at hand, the ‘victims’ have been denied a fair and effective hearing at the time of granting bail to the Accused, the Court expressed its disappointment with the manner in which the High Court failed to acknowledge the right of the victims.
It is important to note that the Counsel for the ‘victims’ had got disconnected from the online proceedings and could not make effective submissions before the High Court. Thereafter, an application seeking a rehearing was also moved on the same ground but the same was not considered by the High Court while granting bail to Mishra.
Instead of looking into aspects such as the nature and gravity of the offence; severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; circumstances which are peculiar to the accused or victims; likelihood of the accused fleeing; likelihood of tampering with the evidence and witnesses and the impact that his release may have on the trial and the society at large; the High Court adopted a myopic view of the evidence on the record and proceeded to decide the case on merits.
It took into account several irrelevant considerations, whilst simultaneously ignoring judicial precedents and established parameters for grant of bail.
Can a bail be granted under Section 167(2) be cancelled?
Can a Court cancel the bail granted under Section 437 of the code ?
Holding that, in the case at hand, the ‘victims’ have been denied a fair and effective hearing at the time of granting bail to the Accused, the Court expressed its disappointment with the manner in which the High Court failed to acknowledge the right of the victims.
It is important to note that the Counsel for the ‘victims’ had got disconnected from the online proceedings and could not make effective submissions before the High Court. Thereafter, an application seeking a rehearing was also moved on the same ground but the same was not considered by the High Court while granting bail to Mishra.
Instead of looking into aspects such as the nature and gravity of the offence; severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; circumstances which are peculiar to the accused or victims; likelihood of the accused fleeing; likelihood of tampering with the evidence and witnesses and the impact that his release may have on the trial and the society at large; the High Court adopted a myopic view of the evidence on the record and proceeded to decide the case on merits.
It took into account several irrelevant considerations, whilst simultaneously ignoring judicial precedents and established parameters for grant of bail.
What ls non-Bailable offence ?
Under what provision of law bail can be Granted a non-bailable offence by the Police Officer?
Holding that, in the case at hand, the ‘victims’ have been denied a fair and effective hearing at the time of granting bail to the Accused, the Court expressed its disappointment with the manner in which the High Court failed to acknowledge the right of the victims.
It is important to note that the Counsel for the ‘victims’ had got disconnected from the online proceedings and could not make effective submissions before the High Court. Thereafter, an application seeking a rehearing was also moved on the same ground but the same was not considered by the High Court while granting bail to Mishra.
Instead of looking into aspects such as the nature and gravity of the offence; severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; circumstances which are peculiar to the accused or victims; likelihood of the accused fleeing; likelihood of tampering with the evidence and witnesses and the impact that his release may have on the trial and the society at large; the High Court adopted a myopic view of the evidence on the record and proceeded to decide the case on merits.
It took into account several irrelevant considerations, whilst simultaneously ignoring judicial precedents and established parameters for grant of bail.
The clause (wa) in section 2 in Cr.P.C. defining “victim” as a person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of the act or omission for which the accused person has been charged includes
Which amendment inserted ‘victim’ definition in CrPC?
Holding that, in the case at hand, the ‘victims’ have been denied a fair and effective hearing at the time of granting bail to the Accused, the Court expressed its disappointment with the manner in which the High Court failed to acknowledge the right of the victims.
It is important to note that the Counsel for the ‘victims’ had got disconnected from the online proceedings and could not make effective submissions before the High Court. Thereafter, an application seeking a rehearing was also moved on the same ground but the same was not considered by the High Court while granting bail to Mishra.
Instead of looking into aspects such as the nature and gravity of the offence; severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; circumstances which are peculiar to the accused or victims; likelihood of the accused fleeing; likelihood of tampering with the evidence and witnesses and the impact that his release may have on the trial and the society at large; the High Court adopted a myopic view of the evidence on the record and proceeded to decide the case on merits.
It took into account several irrelevant considerations, whilst simultaneously ignoring judicial precedents and established parameters for grant of bail.
In which case did the Supreme Court first hold that the right of a victim to file an appeal under the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC is available against orders of acquittal rendered after 31.12.2009 and that for exercising such right no leave to appeal is required to be sought?
Holding that, in the case at hand, the ‘victims’ have been denied a fair and effective hearing at the time of granting bail to the Accused, the Court expressed its disappointment with the manner in which the High Court failed to acknowledge the right of the victims.
It is important to note that the Counsel for the ‘victims’ had got disconnected from the online proceedings and could not make effective submissions before the High Court. Thereafter, an application seeking a rehearing was also moved on the same ground but the same was not considered by the High Court while granting bail to Mishra.
Instead of looking into aspects such as the nature and gravity of the offence; severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; circumstances which are peculiar to the accused or victims; likelihood of the accused fleeing; likelihood of tampering with the evidence and witnesses and the impact that his release may have on the trial and the society at large; the High Court adopted a myopic view of the evidence on the record and proceeded to decide the case on merits.
It took into account several irrelevant considerations, whilst simultaneously ignoring judicial precedents and established parameters for grant of bail.
In which case Supreme Court said “From investigation till culmination of appeal/revision, victim has right to be heard at every step post the occurrence of an offence”?
Holding that, in the case at hand, the ‘victims’ have been denied a fair and effective hearing at the time of granting bail to the Accused, the Court expressed its disappointment with the manner in which the High Court failed to acknowledge the right of the victims.
It is important to note that the Counsel for the ‘victims’ had got disconnected from the online proceedings and could not make effective submissions before the High Court. Thereafter, an application seeking a rehearing was also moved on the same ground but the same was not considered by the High Court while granting bail to Mishra.
Instead of looking into aspects such as the nature and gravity of the offence; severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; circumstances which are peculiar to the accused or victims; likelihood of the accused fleeing; likelihood of tampering with the evidence and witnesses and the impact that his release may have on the trial and the society at large; the High Court adopted a myopic view of the evidence on the record and proceeded to decide the case on merits.
It took into account several irrelevant considerations, whilst simultaneously ignoring judicial precedents and established parameters for grant of bail.
In which of the following case Supreme Court laid down circumstances where the bail can be cancelled:-
In which case Supreme Court held that Magistrate can invoke power under Section 156{3) CrPC even at post-congizance state stage.
Rejection of application under Section 156(3) does not preclude the complainant from filing complaint under Section 200. Supreme Court observed this conscience the following case*
Section 164 Cr.PC. does not contemplate that a confession or statement should necessarily he made in presence of advocate acept when such confessional statement is recorded audio-video electronic means. What mandatorily is needed is that Magistrate must satisfy himself of the voluntariness of the statement and all the statutory safeguards are meticulously complied with Supreme Court observed this in which of the following case.
In which case Supreme Court held that where the accused has already applied for default bail the Prosecutor cannot defeat the enforcement of his indefeasible right by subsequently filing a final report. additional complaint or report seeking extension of time*
which case Supreme Court held that while granting default bail/ statutory bail under Section 167(2a) cannot be imposed*
The Supreme Court observed that a Magistrate has jurisdiction to suo mata pass an order forrther investigation/ reinvestigation after he discharge the accused. Supreme court observed this in which of the following case*
In which case Supreme Court observed that a public servant working in a nationalized bank cannot claim benefit of section under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code*
Prosecution can be initiated only by sanction or court under whose proceedings offences reefer to in section 195(1)(D) was allegory committed.. Private complaint is not permissible Supreme Court observed this in which of the following case *
In which case Supreme Court held that Magistrate is not required to record reason at the stage of issuance of summons while taking cognizance on the basis of police report*
Right to receive the copy of the statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. will arise only after cognizance is taken at a stage contemplated under Section 207 and 208 Cr.P.C. Supreme Court observed this in which of the following case*
Explaining that the so-called test is based on the incorrect assumption that a sexually active woman cannot be raped, the Court observed that whether a woman is “habituated to sexual intercourse” or “habitual to sexual intercourse” is irrelevant for the purposes of determining whether the ingredients of Section 375 of the IPC are present in a particular case.
“Nothing could be further from the truth – a woman’s sexual history is wholly immaterial while adjudicating whether the accused raped her. Further, the probative value of a woman’s testimony does not depend upon her sexual history. It is patriarchal and sexist to suggest that a woman cannot be believed when she states that she was raped, merely for the reason that she is sexually active.”
The Court went on to highlight the express recognition of this fact in law as under the Evidence Act, evidence of a victim’s character or of her previous sexual experience with any person shall not be relevant to the issue of consent or the quality of consent, in prosecutions of sexual offences.
Though the Court has banned the “two-finger” test in a series of judgments, the case at hand prompted it to pass specific directions for the Union Government as well as the State Governments to:
Which of the following case Supreme Court recently held that Anyone conducting ‘two-finger’ test will be guilty of misconduct?
In which of the following cases the Supreme Court observed that “There is not even a rule of prudence which has hardened into a rule of law that a dying declaration cannot be acted upon unless it is corroborated. The primary effort of the court has to be to find out whether the dying declaration is true. If it is, no question of corroboration arises. It is only if the circumstances surrounding the dying declaration are not clear or convincing that the court may, for its assurance, look for corroboration to the dying declaration.”
Which of the following judgements Supreme Court observed that “Rape survivors are entitled to legal recourse that does not retraumatise them or violate their physical or mental integrity and dignity”.
Which of the following provision of Indian Evidence Act provided that “Evidence of character or previous sexual experience not relevant in certain cases”
Explaining that the so-called test is based on the incorrect assumption that a sexually active woman cannot be raped, the Court observed that whether a woman is “habituated to sexual intercourse” or “habitual to sexual intercourse” is irrelevant for the purposes of determining whether the ingredients of Section 375 of the IPC are present in a particular case.
“Nothing could be further from the truth – a woman’s sexual history is wholly immaterial while adjudicating whether the accused raped her. Further, the probative value of a woman’s testimony does not depend upon her sexual history. It is patriarchal and sexist to suggest that a woman cannot be believed when she states that she was raped, merely for the reason that she is sexually active.”
The Court went on to highlight the express recognition of this fact in law as under the Evidence Act, evidence of a victim’s character or of her previous sexual experience with any person shall not be relevant to the issue of consent or the quality of consent, in prosecutions of sexual offences.
Though the Court has banned the “two-finger” test in a series of judgments, the case at hand prompted it to pass specific directions for the Union Government as well as the State Governments to:
Which of the following judges of the Supreme Court of India were part of the Bench in the excerpt?