CLAT PG Mock:- 4

The apex court in Nikesh Tarachand Shah vs. Union of India, the PMLA provision had challenged under Article 14, the Supreme Court considered the discrimination caused by (a) the classification of the offences under Section 45(1) and (b) the application of Section 45(1) to various situations. The Supreme Court held that a classification based on sentence of imprisonment of the Scheduled Offence, had no rational relation to the object of the PMLA, i.e. attaching and bringing back into the economy large amounts byway of proceeds of crime. The court considered that the money/proceeds could also be derived from other serious offences under the IPC (i.e. offences with a maximum punishment of 10 years), which were not explicitly mentioned in Part A, however, a person accused of such an offence could get bail without the application of the Impugned Conditions.

It is the duty of the court to examine the jurisdictional facts including the mandate of Section 45 of the PMLA Act, which must be kept in mind, the bench comprising Justices AM Khanwilkar and CT Ravi Kumar observed while setting aside an order passed by the High Court of Telangana by which it granted anticipatory bail to an accused in connection with offence concerning the Prevention of Money Laundering Act.

The court observed that Indeed, the offence under the PMLA Act is dependent on the predicate offence which would be under ordinary law, including provisions of Indian Penal Code. That does not mean that while considering the prayer for grant of anticipatory bail in connection with PMLA offence, the mandate of Section 45 of the PMLA Act would not come into play.

In which of the following case Supreme Court observed that anticipatory application under CrPC is maintainable under PMLA?

In which of the following case the Supreme Court struck down the provision of Section 45(1) on the ground that it violated Article 14 and Article 21 of the Constitution of India, i.e. provisions which protect the constitutional right to equality and the right to life and personal liberty, and it directed all the petitions (arising from bail applications) to be remanded to the respective courts to be heard and decided on merits, without the application of the additional conditions contained in Section 45(1) of the PMLA.

The apex court in Nikesh Tarachand Shah vs. Union of India, the PMLA provision had challenged under Article 14, the Supreme Court considered the discrimination caused by (a) the classification of the offences under Section 45(1) and (b) the application of Section 45(1) to various situations. The Supreme Court held that a classification based on sentence of imprisonment of the Scheduled Offence, had no rational relation to the object of the PMLA, i.e. attaching and bringing back into the economy large amounts byway of proceeds of crime. The court considered that the money/proceeds could also be derived from other serious offences under the IPC (i.e. offences with a maximum punishment of 10 years), which were not explicitly mentioned in Part A, however, a person accused of such an offence could get bail without the application of the Impugned Conditions.

It is the duty of the court to examine the jurisdictional facts including the mandate of Section 45 of the PMLA Act, which must be kept in mind, the bench comprising Justices AM Khanwilkar and CT Ravi Kumar observed while setting aside an order passed by the High Court of Telangana by which it granted anticipatory bail to an accused in connection with offence concerning the Prevention of Money Laundering Act.

The court observed that Indeed, the offence under the PMLA Act is dependent on the predicate offence which would be under ordinary law, including provisions of Indian Penal Code. That does not mean that while considering the prayer for grant of anticipatory bail in connection with PMLA offence, the mandate of Section 45 of the PMLA Act would not come into play.

In a bailable offence, the bail is granted as a matter of right

The apex court in Nikesh Tarachand Shah vs. Union of India, the PMLA provision had challenged under Article 14, the Supreme Court considered the discrimination caused by (a) the classification of the offences under Section 45(1) and (b) the application of Section 45(1) to various situations. The Supreme Court held that a classification based on sentence of imprisonment of the Scheduled Offence, had no rational relation to the object of the PMLA, i.e. attaching and bringing back into the economy large amounts byway of proceeds of crime. The court considered that the money/proceeds could also be derived from other serious offences under the IPC (i.e. offences with a maximum punishment of 10 years), which were not explicitly mentioned in Part A, however, a person accused of such an offence could get bail without the application of the Impugned Conditions.

It is the duty of the court to examine the jurisdictional facts including the mandate of Section 45 of the PMLA Act, which must be kept in mind, the bench comprising Justices AM Khanwilkar and CT Ravi Kumar observed while setting aside an order passed by the High Court of Telangana by which it granted anticipatory bail to an accused in connection with offence concerning the Prevention of Money Laundering Act.

The court observed that Indeed, the offence under the PMLA Act is dependent on the predicate offence which would be under ordinary law, including provisions of Indian Penal Code. That does not mean that while considering the prayer for grant of anticipatory bail in connection with PMLA offence, the mandate of Section 45 of the PMLA Act would not come into play.

Classification of offences given in the Code of Criminal Procedure under

The apex court in Nikesh Tarachand Shah vs. Union of India, the PMLA provision had challenged under Article 14, the Supreme Court considered the discrimination caused by (a) the classification of the offences under Section 45(1) and (b) the application of Section 45(1) to various situations. The Supreme Court held that a classification based on sentence of imprisonment of the Scheduled Offence, had no rational relation to the object of the PMLA, i.e. attaching and bringing back into the economy large amounts byway of proceeds of crime. The court considered that the money/proceeds could also be derived from other serious offences under the IPC (i.e. offences with a maximum punishment of 10 years), which were not explicitly mentioned in Part A, however, a person accused of such an offence could get bail without the application of the Impugned Conditions.

It is the duty of the court to examine the jurisdictional facts including the mandate of Section 45 of the PMLA Act, which must be kept in mind, the bench comprising Justices AM Khanwilkar and CT Ravi Kumar observed while setting aside an order passed by the High Court of Telangana by which it granted anticipatory bail to an accused in connection with offence concerning the Prevention of Money Laundering Act.

The court observed that Indeed, the offence under the PMLA Act is dependent on the predicate offence which would be under ordinary law, including provisions of Indian Penal Code. That does not mean that while considering the prayer for grant of anticipatory bail in connection with PMLA offence, the mandate of Section 45 of the PMLA Act would not come into play.

Classification of compoundable & non-compoundable offences has been provided under

In rape and sexual assault cases, no compromise can be made or even can be thought of under any circumstance as it would be against her honour. Courts and other law enforcement agencies are supposed to be neutral agencies and are entrusted to ensure fair conduct of the trial by maintaining impartiality and neutrality. And such approaches in rape and sexual assault cases will shake the confidence of rape survivor in the impartiality of the courts.

Apex court also highlighted the condition of women and the attribute of society towards them is not good and they suffer a lot. They are already facing various challenges in their lives for being a woman in this society.

The court has mandated a module as a part of fundamental training of every judge to ensure the sensitivity of judges while hearing cases related to sexual offence and to eliminate entrenched social bias and misogyny. National Judicial Academy has also been directed to include gender sanitization as a part of training of young judges as soon as possible. Likewise, Bar Council of India was directed to include gender sanitization in the curriculum of LL.B. and as a compulsory topic in All India Bar Examination syllabus.

In which of the following cases Supreme Court laid down the guidelines and gender sanitization those who deal with sexual offences case?

In rape and sexual assault cases, no compromise can be made or even can be thought of under any circumstance as it would be against her honour. Courts and other law enforcement agencies are supposed to be neutral agencies and are entrusted to ensure fair conduct of the trial by maintaining impartiality and neutrality. And such approaches in rape and sexual assault cases will shake the confidence of rape survivor in the impartiality of the courts.

Apex court also highlighted the condition of women and the attribute of society towards them is not good and they suffer a lot. They are already facing various challenges in their lives for being a woman in this society.

The court has mandated a module as a part of fundamental training of every judge to ensure the sensitivity of judges while hearing cases related to sexual offence and to eliminate entrenched social bias and misogyny. National Judicial Academy has also been directed to include gender sanitization as a part of training of young judges as soon as possible. Likewise, Bar Council of India was directed to include gender sanitization in the curriculum of LL.B. and as a compulsory topic in All India Bar Examination syllabus.

Private registered medical practitioner is required to examine the accused of rape ?

In rape and sexual assault cases, no compromise can be made or even can be thought of under any circumstance as it would be against her honour. Courts and other law enforcement agencies are supposed to be neutral agencies and are entrusted to ensure fair conduct of the trial by maintaining impartiality and neutrality. And such approaches in rape and sexual assault cases will shake the confidence of rape survivor in the impartiality of the courts.

Apex court also highlighted the condition of women and the attribute of society towards them is not good and they suffer a lot. They are already facing various challenges in their lives for being a woman in this society.

The court has mandated a module as a part of fundamental training of every judge to ensure the sensitivity of judges while hearing cases related to sexual offence and to eliminate entrenched social bias and misogyny. National Judicial Academy has also been directed to include gender sanitization as a part of training of young judges as soon as possible. Likewise, Bar Council of India was directed to include gender sanitization in the curriculum of LL.B. and as a compulsory topic in All India Bar Examination syllabus.

Can any condition be imposed by the Court while releasing an accused person on bail ?

In rape and sexual assault cases, no compromise can be made or even can be thought of under any circumstance as it would be against her honour. Courts and other law enforcement agencies are supposed to be neutral agencies and are entrusted to ensure fair conduct of the trial by maintaining impartiality and neutrality. And such approaches in rape and sexual assault cases will shake the confidence of rape survivor in the impartiality of the courts.

Apex court also highlighted the condition of women and the attribute of society towards them is not good and they suffer a lot. They are already facing various challenges in their lives for being a woman in this society.

The court has mandated a module as a part of fundamental training of every judge to ensure the sensitivity of judges while hearing cases related to sexual offence and to eliminate entrenched social bias and misogyny. National Judicial Academy has also been directed to include gender sanitization as a part of training of young judges as soon as possible. Likewise, Bar Council of India was directed to include gender sanitization in the curriculum of LL.B. and as a compulsory topic in All India Bar Examination syllabus.

In which of the following case Supreme Court urges that in cases of sexual offences, the idea of compromise, especially in the form of marriage between the accused and the prosecutrix is abhorrent, and should not be considered a judicial remedy, as it would be antithetical to the woman’s honour and dignity.

In rape and sexual assault cases, no compromise can be made or even can be thought of under any circumstance as it would be against her honour. Courts and other law enforcement agencies are supposed to be neutral agencies and are entrusted to ensure fair conduct of the trial by maintaining impartiality and neutrality. And such approaches in rape and sexual assault cases will shake the confidence of rape survivor in the impartiality of the courts.

Apex court also highlighted the condition of women and the attribute of society towards them is not good and they suffer a lot. They are already facing various challenges in their lives for being a woman in this society.

The court has mandated a module as a part of fundamental training of every judge to ensure the sensitivity of judges while hearing cases related to sexual offence and to eliminate entrenched social bias and misogyny. National Judicial Academy has also been directed to include gender sanitization as a part of training of young judges as soon as possible. Likewise, Bar Council of India was directed to include gender sanitization in the curriculum of LL.B. and as a compulsory topic in All India Bar Examination syllabus.

Assertion: Section 437 (3)(c) and Section 438(2)(iv) of the CrPC empowers the courts to impose any condition as it may deem fit in the interest of the public

Reason: But the conditions required in any case have to be in accordance with other conditions of the provisions.

The essential ingredients for the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act to the effect that the dishonoured cheque received by the complainant was against “legally enforceable debt or liability”.  “In any case, when there is a legal presumption, it would not be judicious for the quashing Court to carry out a detailed enquiry on the facts alleged, without first permitting the trial Court to evaluate the evidence of the parties. The quashing Court should not take upon itself, the burden of separating the wheat from the chaff where facts are contested. To say it differently, the quashing proceedings must not become an expedition into the merits of factual dispute, so as to conclusively vindicate either the complainant or the defence.”

The consequences of scuttling the criminal process at a pre-trial stage can be grave and irreparable. Quashing proceedings at preliminary stages will result in finality without the parties having had an opportunity to adduce evidence and the consequence then is that the proper forum i.e., the trial Court is ousted from weighing the material evidence. If this is allowed, the accused may be given an unmerited advantage in the criminal process. Also because of the legal presumption, when the cheque and the signature are not disputed by the appellant, the balance of convenience at this stage is in favour of the complainant/prosecution, as the accused will have due opportunity to adduce defence evidence during the trial, to rebut the presumption.

In which of the following judgement, the apex court held that High Courts should be slow to grant relief of quashing complaint u/s 138 NI Act at a pre-trial stage?

The essential ingredients for the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act to the effect that the dishonoured cheque received by the complainant was against “legally enforceable debt or liability”.  “In any case, when there is a legal presumption, it would not be judicious for the quashing Court to carry out a detailed enquiry on the facts alleged, without first permitting the trial Court to evaluate the evidence of the parties. The quashing Court should not take upon itself, the burden of separating the wheat from the chaff where facts are contested. To say it differently, the quashing proceedings must not become an expedition into the merits of factual dispute, so as to conclusively vindicate either the complainant or the defence.”

The consequences of scuttling the criminal process at a pre-trial stage can be grave and irreparable. Quashing proceedings at preliminary stages will result in finality without the parties having had an opportunity to adduce evidence and the consequence then is that the proper forum i.e., the trial Court is ousted from weighing the material evidence. If this is allowed, the accused may be given an unmerited advantage in the criminal process. Also because of the legal presumption, when the cheque and the signature are not disputed by the appellant, the balance of convenience at this stage is in favour of the complainant/prosecution, as the accused will have due opportunity to adduce defence evidence during the trial, to rebut the presumption.

Which of the following is civil liability stated in section 138 of NI Act?

The essential ingredients for the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act to the effect that the dishonoured cheque received by the complainant was against “legally enforceable debt or liability”.  “In any case, when there is a legal presumption, it would not be judicious for the quashing Court to carry out a detailed enquiry on the facts alleged, without first permitting the trial Court to evaluate the evidence of the parties. The quashing Court should not take upon itself, the burden of separating the wheat from the chaff where facts are contested. To say it differently, the quashing proceedings must not become an expedition into the merits of factual dispute, so as to conclusively vindicate either the complainant or the defence.”

The consequences of scuttling the criminal process at a pre-trial stage can be grave and irreparable. Quashing proceedings at preliminary stages will result in finality without the parties having had an opportunity to adduce evidence and the consequence then is that the proper forum i.e., the trial Court is ousted from weighing the material evidence. If this is allowed, the accused may be given an unmerited advantage in the criminal process. Also because of the legal presumption, when the cheque and the signature are not disputed by the appellant, the balance of convenience at this stage is in favour of the complainant/prosecution, as the accused will have due opportunity to adduce defence evidence during the trial, to rebut the presumption.

Which of the following is criminal liability stated in section 138 of N.I Act?

The essential ingredients for the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act to the effect that the dishonoured cheque received by the complainant was against “legally enforceable debt or liability”.  “In any case, when there is a legal presumption, it would not be judicious for the quashing Court to carry out a detailed enquiry on the facts alleged, without first permitting the trial Court to evaluate the evidence of the parties. The quashing Court should not take upon itself, the burden of separating the wheat from the chaff where facts are contested. To say it differently, the quashing proceedings must not become an expedition into the merits of factual dispute, so as to conclusively vindicate either the complainant or the defence.”

The consequences of scuttling the criminal process at a pre-trial stage can be grave and irreparable. Quashing proceedings at preliminary stages will result in finality without the parties having had an opportunity to adduce evidence and the consequence then is that the proper forum i.e., the trial Court is ousted from weighing the material evidence. If this is allowed, the accused may be given an unmerited advantage in the criminal process. Also because of the legal presumption, when the cheque and the signature are not disputed by the appellant, the balance of convenience at this stage is in favour of the complainant/prosecution, as the accused will have due opportunity to adduce defence evidence during the trial, to rebut the presumption.

The Court may initiate the proceedings under the section 138 of the N.A Act on

The essential ingredients for the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act to the effect that the dishonoured cheque received by the complainant was against “legally enforceable debt or liability”.  “In any case, when there is a legal presumption, it would not be judicious for the quashing Court to carry out a detailed enquiry on the facts alleged, without first permitting the trial Court to evaluate the evidence of the parties. The quashing Court should not take upon itself, the burden of separating the wheat from the chaff where facts are contested. To say it differently, the quashing proceedings must not become an expedition into the merits of factual dispute, so as to conclusively vindicate either the complainant or the defence.”

The consequences of scuttling the criminal process at a pre-trial stage can be grave and irreparable. Quashing proceedings at preliminary stages will result in finality without the parties having had an opportunity to adduce evidence and the consequence then is that the proper forum i.e., the trial Court is ousted from weighing the material evidence. If this is allowed, the accused may be given an unmerited advantage in the criminal process. Also because of the legal presumption, when the cheque and the signature are not disputed by the appellant, the balance of convenience at this stage is in favour of the complainant/prosecution, as the accused will have due opportunity to adduce defence evidence during the trial, to rebut the presumption.

What kind of liability does section 138 of N.I Act involves?

The essential ingredients for the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act to the effect that the dishonoured cheque received by the complainant was against “legally enforceable debt or liability”.  “In any case, when there is a legal presumption, it would not be judicious for the quashing Court to carry out a detailed enquiry on the facts alleged, without first permitting the trial Court to evaluate the evidence of the parties. The quashing Court should not take upon itself, the burden of separating the wheat from the chaff where facts are contested. To say it differently, the quashing proceedings must not become an expedition into the merits of factual dispute, so as to conclusively vindicate either the complainant or the defence.”

The consequences of scuttling the criminal process at a pre-trial stage can be grave and irreparable. Quashing proceedings at preliminary stages will result in finality without the parties having had an opportunity to adduce evidence and the consequence then is that the proper forum i.e., the trial Court is ousted from weighing the material evidence. If this is allowed, the accused may be given an unmerited advantage in the criminal process. Also because of the legal presumption, when the cheque and the signature are not disputed by the appellant, the balance of convenience at this stage is in favour of the complainant/prosecution, as the accused will have due opportunity to adduce defence evidence during the trial, to rebut the presumption.

Which is NOT an example of “Promissory Note”:

The essential ingredients for the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act to the effect that the dishonoured cheque received by the complainant was against “legally enforceable debt or liability”.  “In any case, when there is a legal presumption, it would not be judicious for the quashing Court to carry out a detailed enquiry on the facts alleged, without first permitting the trial Court to evaluate the evidence of the parties. The quashing Court should not take upon itself, the burden of separating the wheat from the chaff where facts are contested. To say it differently, the quashing proceedings must not become an expedition into the merits of factual dispute, so as to conclusively vindicate either the complainant or the defence.”

The consequences of scuttling the criminal process at a pre-trial stage can be grave and irreparable. Quashing proceedings at preliminary stages will result in finality without the parties having had an opportunity to adduce evidence and the consequence then is that the proper forum i.e., the trial Court is ousted from weighing the material evidence. If this is allowed, the accused may be given an unmerited advantage in the criminal process. Also because of the legal presumption, when the cheque and the signature are not disputed by the appellant, the balance of convenience at this stage is in favour of the complainant/prosecution, as the accused will have due opportunity to adduce defence evidence during the trial, to rebut the presumption.

In an appeal by the drawer against conviction under section 138, the Appellate Court may order the appellant to deposit such sum which shall be a minimum of or compensation awarded by the trial Court:

The essential ingredients for the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act to the effect that the dishonoured cheque received by the complainant was against “legally enforceable debt or liability”.  “In any case, when there is a legal presumption, it would not be judicious for the quashing Court to carry out a detailed enquiry on the facts alleged, without first permitting the trial Court to evaluate the evidence of the parties. The quashing Court should not take upon itself, the burden of separating the wheat from the chaff where facts are contested. To say it differently, the quashing proceedings must not become an expedition into the merits of factual dispute, so as to conclusively vindicate either the complainant or the defence.”

The consequences of scuttling the criminal process at a pre-trial stage can be grave and irreparable. Quashing proceedings at preliminary stages will result in finality without the parties having had an opportunity to adduce evidence and the consequence then is that the proper forum i.e., the trial Court is ousted from weighing the material evidence. If this is allowed, the accused may be given an unmerited advantage in the criminal process. Also because of the legal presumption, when the cheque and the signature are not disputed by the appellant, the balance of convenience at this stage is in favour of the complainant/prosecution, as the accused will have due opportunity to adduce defence evidence during the trial, to rebut the presumption.

The interim compensation payable under section 143 A may be recovered as if it were a fine;

The essential ingredients for the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act to the effect that the dishonoured cheque received by the complainant was against “legally enforceable debt or liability”.  “In any case, when there is a legal presumption, it would not be judicious for the quashing Court to carry out a detailed enquiry on the facts alleged, without first permitting the trial Court to evaluate the evidence of the parties. The quashing Court should not take upon itself, the burden of separating the wheat from the chaff where facts are contested. To say it differently, the quashing proceedings must not become an expedition into the merits of factual dispute, so as to conclusively vindicate either the complainant or the defence.”

The consequences of scuttling the criminal process at a pre-trial stage can be grave and irreparable. Quashing proceedings at preliminary stages will result in finality without the parties having had an opportunity to adduce evidence and the consequence then is that the proper forum i.e., the trial Court is ousted from weighing the material evidence. If this is allowed, the accused may be given an unmerited advantage in the criminal process. Also because of the legal presumption, when the cheque and the signature are not disputed by the appellant, the balance of convenience at this stage is in favour of the complainant/prosecution, as the accused will have due opportunity to adduce defence evidence during the trial, to rebut the presumption.

Which court can entertain any offence punishable under section 138:

The essential ingredients for the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act to the effect that the dishonoured cheque received by the complainant was against “legally enforceable debt or liability”.  “In any case, when there is a legal presumption, it would not be judicious for the quashing Court to carry out a detailed enquiry on the facts alleged, without first permitting the trial Court to evaluate the evidence of the parties. The quashing Court should not take upon itself, the burden of separating the wheat from the chaff where facts are contested. To say it differently, the quashing proceedings must not become an expedition into the merits of factual dispute, so as to conclusively vindicate either the complainant or the defence.”

The consequences of scuttling the criminal process at a pre-trial stage can be grave and irreparable. Quashing proceedings at preliminary stages will result in finality without the parties having had an opportunity to adduce evidence and the consequence then is that the proper forum i.e., the trial Court is ousted from weighing the material evidence. If this is allowed, the accused may be given an unmerited advantage in the criminal process. Also because of the legal presumption, when the cheque and the signature are not disputed by the appellant, the balance of convenience at this stage is in favour of the complainant/prosecution, as the accused will have due opportunity to adduce defence evidence during the trial, to rebut the presumption.

Inland instrument means:

It is fundamental to the Law of Contract that whenever a material alteration takes place in the terms of the original contract, on account of any act of omission or commission on the part of one of the parties to the contract, it is open to the other party not to perform the original contract. This will not amount to abandonment. Moreover, abandonment is normally understood, in the context of a right and not in the context of a liability or obligation.

A party to a contract may abandon his rights under the contract leading to a plea of waiver by the other party, but there is no question of abandoning an obligation. In this case, the appellant refused to perform his obligations under the work order, for reasons stated by him. This refusal to perform the obligations can perhaps be termed as a breach of contract and not abandonment.

It is interesting to note that the respondents did not choose, (i) to allege breach of contract against the appellant; and (ii) consequently to invoke the right to rescind the contract under clause 3(a). The respondents, if they were justified in doing so, could have taken recourse to the remedy available under Section 75 of the Contract Act and sought compensation for the damage sustained through the nonfulfillment of the contract. On the contrary, they attributed abandonment to the appellant (without understanding the true purport of the word ‘abandonment’) and refused to honour the claims made by the appellant.

Which of the following case, the apex court observed that refusal of a contractor to continue to execute the work, unless the reciprocal promises are performed by the other party, can’t be termed as an abandonment of contract?

It is fundamental to the Law of Contract that whenever a material alteration takes place in the terms of the original contract, on account of any act of omission or commission on the part of one of the parties to the contract, it is open to the other party not to perform the original contract. This will not amount to abandonment. Moreover, abandonment is normally understood, in the context of a right and not in the context of a liability or obligation.

A party to a contract may abandon his rights under the contract leading to a plea of waiver by the other party, but there is no question of abandoning an obligation. In this case, the appellant refused to perform his obligations under the work order, for reasons stated by him. This refusal to perform the obligations can perhaps be termed as a breach of contract and not abandonment.

It is interesting to note that the respondents did not choose, (i) to allege breach of contract against the appellant; and (ii) consequently to invoke the right to rescind the contract under clause 3(a). The respondents, if they were justified in doing so, could have taken recourse to the remedy available under Section 75 of the Contract Act and sought compensation for the damage sustained through the nonfulfillment of the contract. On the contrary, they attributed abandonment to the appellant (without understanding the true purport of the word ‘abandonment’) and refused to honour the claims made by the appellant.

The Maxim principle of quantum meruit is discussed in which of the following provision of Indian Contract Act?

It is fundamental to the Law of Contract that whenever a material alteration takes place in the terms of the original contract, on account of any act of omission or commission on the part of one of the parties to the contract, it is open to the other party not to perform the original contract. This will not amount to abandonment. Moreover, abandonment is normally understood, in the context of a right and not in the context of a liability or obligation.

A party to a contract may abandon his rights under the contract leading to a plea of waiver by the other party, but there is no question of abandoning an obligation. In this case, the appellant refused to perform his obligations under the work order, for reasons stated by him. This refusal to perform the obligations can perhaps be termed as a breach of contract and not abandonment.

It is interesting to note that the respondents did not choose, (i) to allege breach of contract against the appellant; and (ii) consequently to invoke the right to rescind the contract under clause 3(a). The respondents, if they were justified in doing so, could have taken recourse to the remedy available under Section 75 of the Contract Act and sought compensation for the damage sustained through the nonfulfillment of the contract. On the contrary, they attributed abandonment to the appellant (without understanding the true purport of the word ‘abandonment’) and refused to honour the claims made by the appellant.

In which of following judgements, Doctrine of Privity of Contract was explained?

It is fundamental to the Law of Contract that whenever a material alteration takes place in the terms of the original contract, on account of any act of omission or commission on the part of one of the parties to the contract, it is open to the other party not to perform the original contract. This will not amount to abandonment. Moreover, abandonment is normally understood, in the context of a right and not in the context of a liability or obligation.

A party to a contract may abandon his rights under the contract leading to a plea of waiver by the other party, but there is no question of abandoning an obligation. In this case, the appellant refused to perform his obligations under the work order, for reasons stated by him. This refusal to perform the obligations can perhaps be termed as a breach of contract and not abandonment.

It is interesting to note that the respondents did not choose, (i) to allege breach of contract against the appellant; and (ii) consequently to invoke the right to rescind the contract under clause 3(a). The respondents, if they were justified in doing so, could have taken recourse to the remedy available under Section 75 of the Contract Act and sought compensation for the damage sustained through the nonfulfillment of the contract. On the contrary, they attributed abandonment to the appellant (without understanding the true purport of the word ‘abandonment’) and refused to honour the claims made by the appellant.

X’ applied for the principal ship of a local college and the Governing Body passed a resolution appointing him. After the meeting, one of the members of the Governing body privately informed him of the resolution. Subsequently the resolution was rescinded. X claims damages. In this situation:

It is fundamental to the Law of Contract that whenever a material alteration takes place in the terms of the original contract, on account of any act of omission or commission on the part of one of the parties to the contract, it is open to the other party not to perform the original contract. This will not amount to abandonment. Moreover, abandonment is normally understood, in the context of a right and not in the context of a liability or obligation.

A party to a contract may abandon his rights under the contract leading to a plea of waiver by the other party, but there is no question of abandoning an obligation. In this case, the appellant refused to perform his obligations under the work order, for reasons stated by him. This refusal to perform the obligations can perhaps be termed as a breach of contract and not abandonment.

It is interesting to note that the respondents did not choose, (i) to allege breach of contract against the appellant; and (ii) consequently to invoke the right to rescind the contract under clause 3(a). The respondents, if they were justified in doing so, could have taken recourse to the remedy available under Section 75 of the Contract Act and sought compensation for the damage sustained through the nonfulfillment of the contract. On the contrary, they attributed abandonment to the appellant (without understanding the true purport of the word ‘abandonment’) and refused to honour the claims made by the appellant.

The primary aim of the law of damages is to:

Judicial review may be defined as a Court’s power to review the actions of other branches or levels of Government; especially the Court’s power to invalidate legislative and executive actions as being unconstitutional [Black’s Law Dictionary] . Power of judicial review is within the domain of the judiciary to determine the legality of administrative action and the validity of legislations and it aims to protect citizens from abuse and misuse of power by any branch of the State [Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625] . The power of judicial review is a basic feature of the Constitution of India [Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225] . Judicial review has certain inherent limitations. However, it is suited more for adjudication of disputes other than for performing administrative functions. It is for the executive to administer law and the function of the judiciary is to ensure that the Government carries out its duties in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution [S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1] .

The discretionary power vested in an administrative authority is not absolute and unfettered. In Wednesbury [Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA)] , Lord Greene was of the opinion that discretion must be exercised reasonably. Explaining the concept of unreasonableness, Lord Greene stated that a person entrusted with discretion must direct himself properly in law and that he must call his own attention to the matter which he is bound to consider. He observed that the authority must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to the matter he is to consider. Lord Greene concluded that if an authority does not obey aforementioned rules, he may truly be said, and often is said, to be acting unreasonably. [Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA)]

In which of the following cases did the Supreme Court hold that a plea of bias can’t be taken after participating in the selection process with knowledge about composition of the panel?

Which of the following cases did the Supreme Court has observed that the basic philosophy behind granting power to review judgments Is ‘Universal Acceptance of Human Fallibility”?

With regards to the grounds for a judicial review, identity the correct statement

Identify the correct statement with regards to the provisions of Judicial Review within the ambit of the Indian Constitution

In which of the following landmark cases Supreme Court held that Judicial Review is an essential and integral part of the Indian Constitution?

The feature of the system if Judicial Review in the Indian Constitution was borrowed from_____

Given below are two statements, one labelled as

Assertion (A) and other labeled as Reason (R). Read the statement and choose the correct answer using the code given below:

Assertion (A): Judicial Review of Administrative Action under Article 32 and 226 is part of the basic structure of Indian Constitution.

Reason (R): It was held to be so by the Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India.

Which of the following case is not related to Judicial Review?

In the case of Golaknath v. State of Punjab, it was remarked that our “Preamble contains in a nustshell its ideals and inspirations.”

Who was the Judge?

In which one of the following cases was it laid down that Presidential proclamation dissolving a State Legislative Assembly is subject to judicial review?

These four categories were further divided into various castes and sub-castes. The Brahmins were usually scholarly and highly educated people while the Kshatriyas were the warriors and rulers, the Vaishyas were generally the traders or merchants, and at the bottom of this structure were the Shudras who did the menial work and were regarded as untouchables. The economic growth and development of the state of Maharashtra depend on them and other Shudra agrarian communities. The Marathas realized that they could not compete with the Dwijas and upper-caste non-Shudra communities in getting opportunities in educational institutes and other state services; because the Dwijas, like Brahmins, Kshatriyas, etc. had education rooted in them. Moreover, the Mandal Commission Report in 1991 which gave OBCs a separate quota, did not include the Maratha Shudra Agrarian community and many other Shudra communities. Further, the reservation limit was already 50% and the inclusion of the Marathas in the already existing other backward classes quota would have made the other beneficiaries of this group angry. Owing to all this, in 2018 the Maharashtra Government passed an Act called Socially and Educationally Backward Classes Act, 2018. This Act sought to give a 16% reservation to the Maratha Community in state services and higher education, separate from the already existing quotas.

The opinion of Justice Sawant expressed that the reservations u/a 16(1) and 16(4) should not exceed 50% and it is only in extraordinary circumstances this percentage exceed. 

In which of the following cases does the issue of Maratha Quata exceeding the 50% ceiling limit was discussed?

These four categories were further divided into various castes and sub-castes. The Brahmins were usually scholarly and highly educated people while the Kshatriyas were the warriors and rulers, the Vaishyas were generally the traders or merchants, and at the bottom of this structure were the Shudras who did the menial work and were regarded as untouchables. The economic growth and development of the state of Maharashtra depend on them and other Shudra agrarian communities. The Marathas realized that they could not compete with the Dwijas and upper-caste non-Shudra communities in getting opportunities in educational institutes and other state services; because the Dwijas, like Brahmins, Kshatriyas, etc. had education rooted in them. Moreover, the Mandal Commission Report in 1991 which gave OBCs a separate quota, did not include the Maratha Shudra Agrarian community and many other Shudra communities. Further, the reservation limit was already 50% and the inclusion of the Marathas in the already existing other backward classes quota would have made the other beneficiaries of this group angry. Owing to all this, in 2018 the Maharashtra Government passed an Act called Socially and Educationally Backward Classes Act, 2018. This Act sought to give a 16% reservation to the Maratha Community in state services and higher education, separate from the already existing quotas.

The opinion of Justice Sawant expressed that the reservations u/a 16(1) and 16(4) should not exceed 50% and it is only in extraordinary circumstances this percentage exceed.  

______ of the Constitution empowers the state to make provision for reservation for any other backward class of the citizens in case of appointment in services under state?

These four categories were further divided into various castes and sub-castes. The Brahmins were usually scholarly and highly educated people while the Kshatriyas were the warriors and rulers, the Vaishyas were generally the traders or merchants, and at the bottom of this structure were the Shudras who did the menial work and were regarded as untouchables. The economic growth and development of the state of Maharashtra depend on them and other Shudra agrarian communities. The Marathas realized that they could not compete with the Dwijas and upper-caste non-Shudra communities in getting opportunities in educational institutes and other state services; because the Dwijas, like Brahmins, Kshatriyas, etc. had education rooted in them. Moreover, the Mandal Commission Report in 1991 which gave OBCs a separate quota, did not include the Maratha Shudra Agrarian community and many other Shudra communities. Further, the reservation limit was already 50% and the inclusion of the Marathas in the already existing other backward classes quota would have made the other beneficiaries of this group angry. Owing to all this, in 2018 the Maharashtra Government passed an Act called Socially and Educationally Backward Classes Act, 2018. This Act sought to give a 16% reservation to the Maratha Community in state services and higher education, separate from the already existing quotas.

The opinion of Justice Sawant expressed that the reservations u/a 16(1) and 16(4) should not exceed 50% and it is only in extraordinary circumstances this percentage exceed.  

According to M. Nagaraj & Ors v. UOI what is the duty of the state while making reservation provisions.

These four categories were further divided into various castes and sub-castes. The Brahmins were usually scholarly and highly educated people while the Kshatriyas were the warriors and rulers, the Vaishyas were generally the traders or merchants, and at the bottom of this structure were the Shudras who did the menial work and were regarded as untouchables. The economic growth and development of the state of Maharashtra depend on them and other Shudra agrarian communities. The Marathas realized that they could not compete with the Dwijas and upper-caste non-Shudra communities in getting opportunities in educational institutes and other state services; because the Dwijas, like Brahmins, Kshatriyas, etc. had education rooted in them. Moreover, the Mandal Commission Report in 1991 which gave OBCs a separate quota, did not include the Maratha Shudra Agrarian community and many other Shudra communities. Further, the reservation limit was already 50% and the inclusion of the Marathas in the already existing other backward classes quota would have made the other beneficiaries of this group angry. Owing to all this, in 2018 the Maharashtra Government passed an Act called Socially and Educationally Backward Classes Act, 2018. This Act sought to give a 16% reservation to the Maratha Community in state services and higher education, separate from the already existing quotas.

The opinion of Justice Sawant expressed that the reservations u/a 16(1) and 16(4) should not exceed 50% and it is only in extraordinary circumstances this percentage exceed.  

Which Article of the Constitution gives law to the precedent as decided by the Supreme Court a binding power over all other courts?

These four categories were further divided into various castes and sub-castes. The Brahmins were usually scholarly and highly educated people while the Kshatriyas were the warriors and rulers, the Vaishyas were generally the traders or merchants, and at the bottom of this structure were the Shudras who did the menial work and were regarded as untouchables. The economic growth and development of the state of Maharashtra depend on them and other Shudra agrarian communities. The Marathas realized that they could not compete with the Dwijas and upper-caste non-Shudra communities in getting opportunities in educational institutes and other state services; because the Dwijas, like Brahmins, Kshatriyas, etc. had education rooted in them. Moreover, the Mandal Commission Report in 1991 which gave OBCs a separate quota, did not include the Maratha Shudra Agrarian community and many other Shudra communities. Further, the reservation limit was already 50% and the inclusion of the Marathas in the already existing other backward classes quota would have made the other beneficiaries of this group angry. Owing to all this, in 2018 the Maharashtra Government passed an Act called Socially and Educationally Backward Classes Act, 2018. This Act sought to give a 16% reservation to the Maratha Community in state services and higher education, separate from the already existing quotas.

The opinion of Justice Sawant expressed that the reservations u/a 16(1) and 16(4) should not exceed 50% and it is only in extraordinary circumstances this percentage exceed.  

‘Catch-up Rule’ in relation to reservation was evolved by Supreme Court in

These four categories were further divided into various castes and sub-castes. The Brahmins were usually scholarly and highly educated people while the Kshatriyas were the warriors and rulers, the Vaishyas were generally the traders or merchants, and at the bottom of this structure were the Shudras who did the menial work and were regarded as untouchables. The economic growth and development of the state of Maharashtra depend on them and other Shudra agrarian communities. The Marathas realized that they could not compete with the Dwijas and upper-caste non-Shudra communities in getting opportunities in educational institutes and other state services; because the Dwijas, like Brahmins, Kshatriyas, etc. had education rooted in them. Moreover, the Mandal Commission Report in 1991 which gave OBCs a separate quota, did not include the Maratha Shudra Agrarian community and many other Shudra communities. Further, the reservation limit was already 50% and the inclusion of the Marathas in the already existing other backward classes quota would have made the other beneficiaries of this group angry. Owing to all this, in 2018 the Maharashtra Government passed an Act called Socially and Educationally Backward Classes Act, 2018. This Act sought to give a 16% reservation to the Maratha Community in state services and higher education, separate from the already existing quotas.

The opinion of Justice Sawant expressed that the reservations u/a 16(1) and 16(4) should not exceed 50% and it is only in extraordinary circumstances this percentage exceed.  

In which of the following cases, the notification of 4 th March, 2014 regarding Jat reservation was set aside?

The Supreme Court noted that the distinction between a ‘pledge’ and a ‘mortgage’ of movable property is that under a pledge, there is only a bailment, whereas under a mortgage, there is transfer of the right of the property by way of security. Therefore, unlike a pledgee, a mortgagee acquires general rights in the things mortgaged, subject to the right of redemption of a mortgagor. In other words, the legal estate in the goods mortgaged passes on to the mortgagee. In comparison, a pawnee has only the special right in the goods pledged, namely, the right of possession as security and in case of default, he can bring a suit against the pawnor as well as sell the goods after giving a reasonable notice.

The Supreme Court made pertinent observations on the interplay between the Depositories Act and the Contract Act. The Court noted that if a pawnee wants to exercise his right to sell dematerialized security, it is mandatory first to get himself recorded as a ‘beneficial owner’ in the ‘depository’s records. Without the said exercise, the pawnee cannot exercise its rights to sell the pledge and retrieve the monies due by taking recourse to its rights under Section 176 of the Contract Act.

However, exercise of right on the part of the pawnee and consequent action on the part of the ‘depository’ recording the pawnee as the ‘beneficial owner’ is not ‘actual sale’. The pawnor’s right to redemption under Section 177 of the Contract Act continues and can be exercised even after the pawnee has been registered and has acquired the status of ‘beneficial owner’. The right of redemption would cease on the ‘actual sale’, that is, when the ‘beneficial owner’ sells the dematerialised securities to a third person. Once the ‘actual sale’ has been affected by the pawnee, the pawnor forfeits his right under Section 177 of the Contract Act to ask for redemption of the pawned goods.

In which of the case supreme court has held that the Indian Contract Act does not recognize the sale of the pledged goods by a pawnee to himself in the event of default of payment by the pawnor?

The Supreme Court noted that the distinction between a ‘pledge’ and a ‘mortgage’ of movable property is that under a pledge, there is only a bailment, whereas under a mortgage, there is transfer of the right of the property by way of security. Therefore, unlike a pledgee, a mortgagee acquires general rights in the things mortgaged, subject to the right of redemption of a mortgagor. In other words, the legal estate in the goods mortgaged passes on to the mortgagee. In comparison, a pawnee has only the special right in the goods pledged, namely, the right of possession as security and in case of default, he can bring a suit against the pawnor as well as sell the goods after giving a reasonable notice.

The Supreme Court made pertinent observations on the interplay between the Depositories Act and the Contract Act. The Court noted that if a pawnee wants to exercise his right to sell dematerialized security, it is mandatory first to get himself recorded as a ‘beneficial owner’ in the ‘depository’s records. Without the said exercise, the pawnee cannot exercise its rights to sell the pledge and retrieve the monies due by taking recourse to its rights under Section 176 of the Contract Act.

However, exercise of right on the part of the pawnee and consequent action on the part of the ‘depository’ recording the pawnee as the ‘beneficial owner’ is not ‘actual sale’. The pawnor’s right to redemption under Section 177 of the Contract Act continues and can be exercised even after the pawnee has been registered and has acquired the status of ‘beneficial owner’. The right of redemption would cease on the ‘actual sale’, that is, when the ‘beneficial owner’ sells the dematerialised securities to a third person. Once the ‘actual sale’ has been affected by the pawnee, the pawnor forfeits his right under Section 177 of the Contract Act to ask for redemption of the pawned goods.

The pawnor’s right to redemption under ____ ICA continues and can be exercised even after the pawnee has registered and has acquired the status of “beneficial owner’.

The Supreme Court noted that the distinction between a ‘pledge’ and a ‘mortgage’ of movable property is that under a pledge, there is only a bailment, whereas under a mortgage, there is transfer of the right of the property by way of security. Therefore, unlike a pledgee, a mortgagee acquires general rights in the things mortgaged, subject to the right of redemption of a mortgagor. In other words, the legal estate in the goods mortgaged passes on to the mortgagee. In comparison, a pawnee has only the special right in the goods pledged, namely, the right of possession as security and in case of default, he can bring a suit against the pawnor as well as sell the goods after giving a reasonable notice.

The Supreme Court made pertinent observations on the interplay between the Depositories Act and the Contract Act. The Court noted that if a pawnee wants to exercise his right to sell dematerialized security, it is mandatory first to get himself recorded as a ‘beneficial owner’ in the ‘depository’s records. Without the said exercise, the pawnee cannot exercise its rights to sell the pledge and retrieve the monies due by taking recourse to its rights under Section 176 of the Contract Act.

However, exercise of right on the part of the pawnee and consequent action on the part of the ‘depository’ recording the pawnee as the ‘beneficial owner’ is not ‘actual sale’. The pawnor’s right to redemption under Section 177 of the Contract Act continues and can be exercised even after the pawnee has been registered and has acquired the status of ‘beneficial owner’. The right of redemption would cease on the ‘actual sale’, that is, when the ‘beneficial owner’ sells the dematerialised securities to a third person. Once the ‘actual sale’ has been affected by the pawnee, the pawnor forfeits his right under Section 177 of the Contract Act to ask for redemption of the pawned goods.

Which of the section of ICA gives the right to Pawnnee to sell the goods and reimburse his amount?

The Supreme Court noted that the distinction between a ‘pledge’ and a ‘mortgage’ of movable property is that under a pledge, there is only a bailment, whereas under a mortgage, there is transfer of the right of the property by way of security. Therefore, unlike a pledgee, a mortgagee acquires general rights in the things mortgaged, subject to the right of redemption of a mortgagor. In other words, the legal estate in the goods mortgaged passes on to the mortgagee. In comparison, a pawnee has only the special right in the goods pledged, namely, the right of possession as security and in case of default, he can bring a suit against the pawnor as well as sell the goods after giving a reasonable notice.

The Supreme Court made pertinent observations on the interplay between the Depositories Act and the Contract Act. The Court noted that if a pawnee wants to exercise his right to sell dematerialized security, it is mandatory first to get himself recorded as a ‘beneficial owner’ in the ‘depository’s records. Without the said exercise, the pawnee cannot exercise its rights to sell the pledge and retrieve the monies due by taking recourse to its rights under Section 176 of the Contract Act.

However, exercise of right on the part of the pawnee and consequent action on the part of the ‘depository’ recording the pawnee as the ‘beneficial owner’ is not ‘actual sale’. The pawnor’s right to redemption under Section 177 of the Contract Act continues and can be exercised even after the pawnee has been registered and has acquired the status of ‘beneficial owner’. The right of redemption would cease on the ‘actual sale’, that is, when the ‘beneficial owner’ sells the dematerialised securities to a third person. Once the ‘actual sale’ has been affected by the pawnee, the pawnor forfeits his right under Section 177 of the Contract Act to ask for redemption of the pawned goods.

Which of the following statement is correct regarding the concept of pledge under the ICA?

The Supreme Court noted that the distinction between a ‘pledge’ and a ‘mortgage’ of movable property is that under a pledge, there is only a bailment, whereas under a mortgage, there is transfer of the right of the property by way of security. Therefore, unlike a pledgee, a mortgagee acquires general rights in the things mortgaged, subject to the right of redemption of a mortgagor. In other words, the legal estate in the goods mortgaged passes on to the mortgagee. In comparison, a pawnee has only the special right in the goods pledged, namely, the right of possession as security and in case of default, he can bring a suit against the pawnor as well as sell the goods after giving a reasonable notice.

The Supreme Court made pertinent observations on the interplay between the Depositories Act and the Contract Act. The Court noted that if a pawnee wants to exercise his right to sell dematerialized security, it is mandatory first to get himself recorded as a ‘beneficial owner’ in the ‘depository’s records. Without the said exercise, the pawnee cannot exercise its rights to sell the pledge and retrieve the monies due by taking recourse to its rights under Section 176 of the Contract Act.

However, exercise of right on the part of the pawnee and consequent action on the part of the ‘depository’ recording the pawnee as the ‘beneficial owner’ is not ‘actual sale’. The pawnor’s right to redemption under Section 177 of the Contract Act continues and can be exercised even after the pawnee has been registered and has acquired the status of ‘beneficial owner’. The right of redemption would cease on the ‘actual sale’, that is, when the ‘beneficial owner’ sells the dematerialised securities to a third person. Once the ‘actual sale’ has been affected by the pawnee, the pawnor forfeits his right under Section 177 of the Contract Act to ask for redemption of the pawned goods.

An agreement is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade or business of any kind is:

A Bench comprising Justice Nageswara Rao and Justice Hima Kohli has issued the direction in an appeal challenging Manipur High Court’s order which upheld the Central Educational Institutions (Reservation in Admission) Act, in 2012 under which the Manipur University was required to follow the reservation norms of 2% for the candidates belonging to Scheduled Caste [SC], 31% for the Scheduled Tribes [ST] and 17% for the Other Backward Classes [OBC] for purposes of admission in the University.

The Amendment Act was challenged by the Appellants Before the Apex Court. The Counsel for the Appellants had argued that High Court had erred in taking the view that the Amendment Act would be applicable to a Central Educational Institution located in Manipur. It was submitted that the amendments brought about by the Amendment Act are only in respect of tribal States falling under the purview of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India and not in respect of other States including a State like Manipur falling under “Specified north eastern region”, defined in the amended Section 2 (ia) of the Parent Act [ Reservation Act]. It was further submitted that It was submitted that the intention of the Legislature in amending the Reservation Act by introducing the Amendment Act was not to make the amendments applicable to CEIs situated in nontribal States like the State of Manipur.

In which of the cases Supreme Court Upholds Manipur University’s Decision To Reduce SC Quota To 2%, OBC Quota To 17% & Increase ST Quota To 31%?

As per the given excerpt from a judgment, which of the following is correct in relation to the Central Educational Institutions (Reservation in Admission) Act 2006?

On April 2008, Supreme Court in following case upheld the OBC quota in Central Educational Institutions clearing the way For reservation of 27% seats for Backward Classes –

Which statement is correct regarding Waiver of Fundamental Rights’ in the Indian context?

The Constitution 102nd Amendment Act 2018 inserted:

The words ‘defeat the provisions of any law’ must be taken as limited to defeating the intention which the legislature has expressed, or which is necessarily implied from the express terms of an Act. It is unlawful to contract to do that which it is unlawful to do; but an agreement will not be void, merely because it tends to defeat some purpose ascribed to the legislature by conjecture, or even appearing, as a matter of history, from extraneous evidence, such as legislative debates or preliminary memoranda, not forming part of the enactment.

With respect, the principle laid down, does not commend itself to us. We do agree that the illegality cannot be a matter of conjecture nor the purpose divined by the Court from parliamentary debates. But that is not to say that as found by this Court in AIR 1968 SC 1358 (supra), which decision was not considered by this Court, that it cannot be implied. But we must find that the Court was dealing with a Notification, which was, in fact, a ‘letter’ written by the Government of India. We can have no quarrel with the proposition that a ‘letter’ cannot be law within the meaning of Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act.

In which of the following case Supreme Court observed that “Not only would a Statutory Rule be law within the meaning of Article 13 of the Constitution of India but it would also be law under Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act.”

The words ‘defeat the provisions of any law’ must be taken as limited to defeating the intention which the legislature has expressed, or which is necessarily implied from the express terms of an Act. It is unlawful to contract to do that which it is unlawful to do; but an agreement will not be void, merely because it tends to defeat some purpose ascribed to the legislature by conjecture, or even appearing, as a matter of history, from extraneous evidence, such as legislative debates or preliminary memoranda, not forming part of the enactment.

With respect, the principle laid down, does not commend itself to us. We do agree that the illegality cannot be a matter of conjecture nor the purpose divined by the Court from parliamentary debates. But that is not to say that as found by this Court in AIR 1968 SC 1358 (supra), which decision was not considered by this Court, that it cannot be implied. But we must find that the Court was dealing with a Notification, which was, in fact, a ‘letter’ written by the Government of India. We can have no quarrel with the proposition that a ‘letter’ cannot be law within the meaning of Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act.

Which section of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 deals with What considerations and objects are lawful, and what not?

The words ‘defeat the provisions of any law’ must be taken as limited to defeating the intention which the legislature has expressed, or which is necessarily implied from the express terms of an Act. It is unlawful to contract to do that which it is unlawful to do; but an agreement will not be void, merely because it tends to defeat some purpose ascribed to the legislature by conjecture, or even appearing, as a matter of history, from extraneous evidence, such as legislative debates or preliminary memoranda, not forming part of the enactment.

With respect, the principle laid down, does not commend itself to us. We do agree that the illegality cannot be a matter of conjecture nor the purpose divined by the Court from parliamentary debates. But that is not to say that as found by this Court in AIR 1968 SC 1358 (supra), which decision was not considered by this Court, that it cannot be implied. But we must find that the Court was dealing with a Notification, which was, in fact, a ‘letter’ written by the Government of India. We can have no quarrel with the proposition that a ‘letter’ cannot be law within the meaning of Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act.

A agrees to serve B as B’s housekeeper and also to live in adultery with him at a fixed salary of Rs. 500/- per month. In this situation:

The words ‘defeat the provisions of any law’ must be taken as limited to defeating the intention which the legislature has expressed, or which is necessarily implied from the express terms of an Act. It is unlawful to contract to do that which it is unlawful to do; but an agreement will not be void, merely because it tends to defeat some purpose ascribed to the legislature by conjecture, or even appearing, as a matter of history, from extraneous evidence, such as legislative debates or preliminary memoranda, not forming part of the enactment.

With respect, the principle laid down, does not commend itself to us. We do agree that the illegality cannot be a matter of conjecture nor the purpose divined by the Court from parliamentary debates. But that is not to say that as found by this Court in AIR 1968 SC 1358 (supra), which decision was not considered by this Court, that it cannot be implied. But we must find that the Court was dealing with a Notification, which was, in fact, a ‘letter’ written by the Government of India. We can have no quarrel with the proposition that a ‘letter’ cannot be law within the meaning of Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act.

In case of an alternative promise, one branch of which is legal and the other Illegal

The words ‘defeat the provisions of any law’ must be taken as limited to defeating the intention which the legislature has expressed, or which is necessarily implied from the express terms of an Act. It is unlawful to contract to do that which it is unlawful to do; but an agreement will not be void, merely because it tends to defeat some purpose ascribed to the legislature by conjecture, or even appearing, as a matter of history, from extraneous evidence, such as legislative debates or preliminary memoranda, not forming part of the enactment.

With respect, the principle laid down, does not commend itself to us. We do agree that the illegality cannot be a matter of conjecture nor the purpose divined by the Court from parliamentary debates. But that is not to say that as found by this Court in AIR 1968 SC 1358 (supra), which decision was not considered by this Court, that it cannot be implied. But we must find that the Court was dealing with a Notification, which was, in fact, a ‘letter’ written by the Government of India. We can have no quarrel with the proposition that a ‘letter’ cannot be law within the meaning of Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act.

What will be effect of mistakes as to law in force in India on the agreement?

A Division Bench of Justice M.R Shah and Justice B.V Nagarathna observed that in case of any conflict between State legislation and Central legislation, Central legislation shall prevail by applying the rule/principle of repugnancy as enunciated in Article 254 of the Constitution as the subject ‘education’ is in the Concurrent List (List III) of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. 

Regulation 7.3.0 of UGC regulations prescribes the eligibility criteria for the post of VC, where the person shall have 10 years of work experience as a professor in the University system and, further, that a Search Committee should be constituted consisting of a nominee of the Visitor/Chancellor, a nominee of the Chairman of UGC, a nominee of Syndicate/Executive Council of the University.
The petitioner, an ex-employee of the Sardar Patel University (“SPU”), filed a quo warranto writ petition under Article 32 against the appointment of Respondent No.4 (“R4”) as the Vice-Chancellor (“VC”) of the SPU (Respondent No.2).
SPU constituted a search committee as per Article Section 10(2)(b) of the SPU Act, 1955, and also issued an advertisement inviting applications for the post of VC mentioning the eligibility criteria prescribed by the said search committee. Thereafter, R4 was appointed as the VC of the SPU. R4 was acting as the VC for the second term and has been receiving the fixed pay of Rs.75,000/­ as prescribed under the regulations.
The said appointment was challenged through a Special Civil Application (SCA) in the first term of R4 by the petitioner in front of a division bench of the High Court. The court dismissed the SCA by noting that Section 10 of the SPU Act does not prescribe any eligibility criteria for the appointment and hence the concerned appointment is legal. Further, the bench also noted that Gujrat has not adopted the UGC Regulations. However, the High Court ordered the State of Gujarat to implement the UGC regulations in the state to avoid such controversies in future. The petitioner then approached the SC with the Special Leave Petition, which was dismissed since by that time only one month was left in the first term of R4. The questions of law were left unanswered. Further, the R4 was selected for a second term. Hence, the current writ petition.

In which case the relation of ‘education’ as a subject in Concurrent List and appointment of Vice-Chancellor in Universities was discussed?

A Division Bench of Justice M.R Shah and Justice B.V Nagarathna observed that in case of any conflict between State legislation and Central legislation, Central legislation shall prevail by applying the rule/principle of repugnancy as enunciated in Article 254 of the Constitution as the subject ‘education’ is in the Concurrent List (List III) of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. 

Regulation 7.3.0 of UGC regulations prescribes the eligibility criteria for the post of VC, where the person shall have 10 years of work experience as a professor in the University system and, further, that a Search Committee should be constituted consisting of a nominee of the Visitor/Chancellor, a nominee of the Chairman of UGC, a nominee of Syndicate/Executive Council of the University.
The petitioner, an ex-employee of the Sardar Patel University (“SPU”), filed a quo warranto writ petition under Article 32 against the appointment of Respondent No.4 (“R4”) as the Vice-Chancellor (“VC”) of the SPU (Respondent No.2).
SPU constituted a search committee as per Article Section 10(2)(b) of the SPU Act, 1955, and also issued an advertisement inviting applications for the post of VC mentioning the eligibility criteria prescribed by the said search committee. Thereafter, R4 was appointed as the VC of the SPU. R4 was acting as the VC for the second term and has been receiving the fixed pay of Rs.75,000/­ as prescribed under the regulations.
The said appointment was challenged through a Special Civil Application (SCA) in the first term of R4 by the petitioner in front of a division bench of the High Court. The court dismissed the SCA by noting that Section 10 of the SPU Act does not prescribe any eligibility criteria for the appointment and hence the concerned appointment is legal. Further, the bench also noted that Gujrat has not adopted the UGC Regulations. However, the High Court ordered the State of Gujarat to implement the UGC regulations in the state to avoid such controversies in future. The petitioner then approached the SC with the Special Leave Petition, which was dismissed since by that time only one month was left in the first term of R4. The questions of law were left unanswered. Further, the R4 was selected for a second term. Hence, the current writ petition.

Writ of “Mandamus cannot be issued against:

. Under Article 365 what are the duties of the Union Government with respect to State Governments—

A Division Bench of Justice M.R Shah and Justice B.V Nagarathna observed that in case of any conflict between State legislation and Central legislation, Central legislation shall prevail by applying the rule/principle of repugnancy as enunciated in Article 254 of the Constitution as the subject ‘education’ is in the Concurrent List (List III) of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. 

Regulation 7.3.0 of UGC regulations prescribes the eligibility criteria for the post of VC, where the person shall have 10 years of work experience as a professor in the University system and, further, that a Search Committee should be constituted consisting of a nominee of the Visitor/Chancellor, a nominee of the Chairman of UGC, a nominee of Syndicate/Executive Council of the University.
The petitioner, an ex-employee of the Sardar Patel University (“SPU”), filed a quo warranto writ petition under Article 32 against the appointment of Respondent No.4 (“R4”) as the Vice-Chancellor (“VC”) of the SPU (Respondent No.2).
SPU constituted a search committee as per Article Section 10(2)(b) of the SPU Act, 1955, and also issued an advertisement inviting applications for the post of VC mentioning the eligibility criteria prescribed by the said search committee. Thereafter, R4 was appointed as the VC of the SPU. R4 was acting as the VC for the second term and has been receiving the fixed pay of Rs.75,000/­ as prescribed under the regulations.
The said appointment was challenged through a Special Civil Application (SCA) in the first term of R4 by the petitioner in front of a division bench of the High Court. The court dismissed the SCA by noting that Section 10 of the SPU Act does not prescribe any eligibility criteria for the appointment and hence the concerned appointment is legal. Further, the bench also noted that Gujrat has not adopted the UGC Regulations. However, the High Court ordered the State of Gujarat to implement the UGC regulations in the state to avoid such controversies in future. The petitioner then approached the SC with the Special Leave Petition, which was dismissed since by that time only one month was left in the first term of R4. The questions of law were left unanswered. Further, the R4 was selected for a second term. Hence, the current writ petition.

A law is passed by a State legislature about a matter enlisted in the Concurrent list. It clashes with a law made by the Parliament. Can the State law be valid for the purpose of its operation in that State?

A Division Bench of Justice M.R Shah and Justice B.V Nagarathna observed that in case of any conflict between State legislation and Central legislation, Central legislation shall prevail by applying the rule/principle of repugnancy as enunciated in Article 254 of the Constitution as the subject ‘education’ is in the Concurrent List (List III) of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. 

Regulation 7.3.0 of UGC regulations prescribes the eligibility criteria for the post of VC, where the person shall have 10 years of work experience as a professor in the University system and, further, that a Search Committee should be constituted consisting of a nominee of the Visitor/Chancellor, a nominee of the Chairman of UGC, a nominee of Syndicate/Executive Council of the University.
The petitioner, an ex-employee of the Sardar Patel University (“SPU”), filed a quo warranto writ petition under Article 32 against the appointment of Respondent No.4 (“R4”) as the Vice-Chancellor (“VC”) of the SPU (Respondent No.2).
SPU constituted a search committee as per Article Section 10(2)(b) of the SPU Act, 1955, and also issued an advertisement inviting applications for the post of VC mentioning the eligibility criteria prescribed by the said search committee. Thereafter, R4 was appointed as the VC of the SPU. R4 was acting as the VC for the second term and has been receiving the fixed pay of Rs.75,000/­ as prescribed under the regulations.
The said appointment was challenged through a Special Civil Application (SCA) in the first term of R4 by the petitioner in front of a division bench of the High Court. The court dismissed the SCA by noting that Section 10 of the SPU Act does not prescribe any eligibility criteria for the appointment and hence the concerned appointment is legal. Further, the bench also noted that Gujrat has not adopted the UGC Regulations. However, the High Court ordered the State of Gujarat to implement the UGC regulations in the state to avoid such controversies in future. The petitioner then approached the SC with the Special Leave Petition, which was dismissed since by that time only one month was left in the first term of R4. The questions of law were left unanswered. Further, the R4 was selected for a second term. Hence, the current writ petition.

What is the function intended by a writ of Quo Warranto?

The Supreme Court has recently referred to its judgment in State of U.P. v. Sahai and reiterated that it is only in rarest of rare cases, where the High Court, on an absolutely wrong process of reasoning and a legally erroneous and perverse approach to the facts of the case, ignoring some of the most vital facts, has acquitted the accused, that the same may be reversed by exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution.

A Larger Bench of Justice B.V Nagarathna, Justice L. Nageswara Rao and Justice B.R Gavai further reiterated that an appeal cannot be entertained against an order of acquittal which has, after recording valid and weighty reasons, has arrived at an unassailable, logical conclusion which justifies acquittal, by relying on the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Lakhbir Singh.

It is the case of the prosecution that the accused Mahendra Ram, Upendra Ram, Munna Ram, Dhappu Ram, all being sons of Kishori Ram and Chandrabhanu Prasad, with two other unknown persons proceeded towards the informant viz., Rajesh Prasad (Appellant) and protested that as the informant had opposed their illegal activities, his entire family would be blown off by a bomb. Later, accused Munna Ram threw a bomb at the informant’s father Chhote Lal Mahto and accused Mahendra Ram threw another bomb against O.P. Verma and as a result thereof, both died on the spot. The accused, while fleeing away, threatened that their action was a result of opposition by the informant against the illicit sale of liquor by them and if anyone again obstructed their business, they would face similar consequences. 

In which of the following case SC observed that ’the Approach to be adopted while deciding an appeal against acquittal by the trial court – Principles that would regulate and govern the hearing of an appeal by the High Court against an order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court’

The Supreme Court has recently referred to its judgment in State of U.P. v. Sahai and reiterated that it is only in rarest of rare cases, where the High Court, on an absolutely wrong process of reasoning and a legally erroneous and perverse approach to the facts of the case, ignoring some of the most vital facts, has acquitted the accused, that the same may be reversed by exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution.

A Larger Bench of Justice B.V Nagarathna, Justice L. Nageswara Rao and Justice B.R Gavai further reiterated that an appeal cannot be entertained against an order of acquittal which has, after recording valid and weighty reasons, has arrived at an unassailable, logical conclusion which justifies acquittal, by relying on the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Lakhbir Singh.

It is the case of the prosecution that the accused Mahendra Ram, Upendra Ram, Munna Ram, Dhappu Ram, all being sons of Kishori Ram and Chandrabhanu Prasad, with two other unknown persons proceeded towards the informant viz., Rajesh Prasad (Appellant) and protested that as the informant had opposed their illegal activities, his entire family would be blown off by a bomb. Later, accused Munna Ram threw a bomb at the informant’s father Chhote Lal Mahto and accused Mahendra Ram threw another bomb against O.P. Verma and as a result thereof, both died on the spot. The accused, while fleeing away, threatened that their action was a result of opposition by the informant against the illicit sale of liquor by them and if anyone again obstructed their business, they would face similar consequences. 

An appeal against the judgement of acquittal under section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-

The Supreme Court has recently referred to its judgment in State of U.P. v. Sahai and reiterated that it is only in rarest of rare cases, where the High Court, on an absolutely wrong process of reasoning and a legally erroneous and perverse approach to the facts of the case, ignoring some of the most vital facts, has acquitted the accused, that the same may be reversed by exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution.

A Larger Bench of Justice B.V Nagarathna, Justice L. Nageswara Rao and Justice B.R Gavai further reiterated that an appeal cannot be entertained against an order of acquittal which has, after recording valid and weighty reasons, has arrived at an unassailable, logical conclusion which justifies acquittal, by relying on the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Lakhbir Singh.

It is the case of the prosecution that the accused Mahendra Ram, Upendra Ram, Munna Ram, Dhappu Ram, all being sons of Kishori Ram and Chandrabhanu Prasad, with two other unknown persons proceeded towards the informant viz., Rajesh Prasad (Appellant) and protested that as the informant had opposed their illegal activities, his entire family would be blown off by a bomb. Later, accused Munna Ram threw a bomb at the informant’s father Chhote Lal Mahto and accused Mahendra Ram threw another bomb against O.P. Verma and as a result thereof, both died on the spot. The accused, while fleeing away, threatened that their action was a result of opposition by the informant against the illicit sale of liquor by them and if anyone again obstructed their business, they would face similar consequences. 

. Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-

I. Allows the Court to convert finding of acquittal into conviction

II. Allows the Court to pardon the convict

III. Does not allow the Court to act suo motu

IV. Is only applicable to High Court

The Supreme Court has recently referred to its judgment in State of U.P. v. Sahai and reiterated that it is only in rarest of rare cases, where the High Court, on an absolutely wrong process of reasoning and a legally erroneous and perverse approach to the facts of the case, ignoring some of the most vital facts, has acquitted the accused, that the same may be reversed by exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution.

A Larger Bench of Justice B.V Nagarathna, Justice L. Nageswara Rao and Justice B.R Gavai further reiterated that an appeal cannot be entertained against an order of acquittal which has, after recording valid and weighty reasons, has arrived at an unassailable, logical conclusion which justifies acquittal, by relying on the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Lakhbir Singh.

It is the case of the prosecution that the accused Mahendra Ram, Upendra Ram, Munna Ram, Dhappu Ram, all being sons of Kishori Ram and Chandrabhanu Prasad, with two other unknown persons proceeded towards the informant viz., Rajesh Prasad (Appellant) and protested that as the informant had opposed their illegal activities, his entire family would be blown off by a bomb. Later, accused Munna Ram threw a bomb at the informant’s father Chhote Lal Mahto and accused Mahendra Ram threw another bomb against O.P. Verma and as a result thereof, both died on the spot. The accused, while fleeing away, threatened that their action was a result of opposition by the informant against the illicit sale of liquor by them and if anyone again obstructed their business, they would face similar consequences. 

In which of the following cases did the Supreme Court lay down the guidelines for premature release of life convict?

The Supreme Court has recently referred to its judgment in State of U.P. v. Sahai and reiterated that it is only in rarest of rare cases, where the High Court, on an absolutely wrong process of reasoning and a legally erroneous and perverse approach to the facts of the case, ignoring some of the most vital facts, has acquitted the accused, that the same may be reversed by exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution.

A Larger Bench of Justice B.V Nagarathna, Justice L. Nageswara Rao and Justice B.R Gavai further reiterated that an appeal cannot be entertained against an order of acquittal which has, after recording valid and weighty reasons, has arrived at an unassailable, logical conclusion which justifies acquittal, by relying on the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Lakhbir Singh.

It is the case of the prosecution that the accused Mahendra Ram, Upendra Ram, Munna Ram, Dhappu Ram, all being sons of Kishori Ram and Chandrabhanu Prasad, with two other unknown persons proceeded towards the informant viz., Rajesh Prasad (Appellant) and protested that as the informant had opposed their illegal activities, his entire family would be blown off by a bomb. Later, accused Munna Ram threw a bomb at the informant’s father Chhote Lal Mahto and accused Mahendra Ram threw another bomb against O.P. Verma and as a result thereof, both died on the spot. The accused, while fleeing away, threatened that their action was a result of opposition by the informant against the illicit sale of liquor by them and if anyone again obstructed their business, they would face similar consequences. 

Appeal in case of acquittal can be made under section_________________?

The Indian Succession Act states that every person is entitled to equal inheritance. Inheritance is a general word which means an individual who derives an interest in property whereas a succession is that who is the next successor of the predecessor of the person who dies. The general law relating to the inheritance and succession in India is the Indian Succession Act, 1925. The law of succession applicable to Parsis or for the intestate succession to a Muslim who died with a will is the (1) Indian Succession Act, 1925 whereas the laws of succession governing the Hindus, Sikhs, Jain and Buddhists are (2) Hindu Succession Act, 1956. At the time of the death of a member of a family, the interest in the property shall be devolved by survivorship rule which is recognized by (3) of Hindu law. The maxim (4) means what ought not to be done becomes valid when done which is fully recognized under the Dayabhaga School.

The Indian Succession Act states that every person is entitled to equal inheritance. The law of succession applicable to Parsis or for the intestate succession or to a Muslim who died with a will is (1). What is (1)?

The Indian Succession Act states that every person is entitled to equal inheritance. The laws of succession governing the Hindus, Sikhs, Jain and Buddhists are (2). What is (2)?

The Indian Succession Act states that every person is entitled to equal inheritance. Inheritance is a general word which means an individual who derives an interest in property whereas a succession is that who is the next successor of the predecessor of the person who dies. The general law relating to the inheritance and succession in India is the Indian Succession Act, 1925. The law of succession applicable to Parsis or for the intestate succession to a Muslim who died with a will is the (1) Indian Succession Act, 1925 whereas the laws of succession governing the Hindus, Sikhs, Jain and Buddhists are (2) Hindu Succession Act, 1956. At the time of the death of a member of a family, the interest in the property shall be devolved by survivorship rule which is recognized by (3) of Hindu law. The maxim (4) means what ought not to be done becomes valid when done which is fully recognized under the Dayabhaga School.

At the time of the death of a member of a family, the interest in the property shall be devolved by survivorship rule upon any member of the family. Which among the following is referred in (3) that recognize the survivorship rule?

The Indian Succession Act states that every person is entitled to equal inheritance. Inheritance is a general word which means an individual who derives an interest in property whereas a succession is that who is the next successor of the predecessor of the person who dies. The general law relating to the inheritance and succession in India is the Indian Succession Act, 1925. The law of succession applicable to Parsis or for the intestate succession to a Muslim who died with a will is the (1) Indian Succession Act, 1925 whereas the laws of succession governing the Hindus, Sikhs, Jain and Buddhists are (2) Hindu Succession Act, 1956. At the time of the death of a member of a family, the interest in the property shall be devolved by survivorship rule which is recognized by (3) of Hindu law. The maxim (4) means what ought not to be done becomes valid when done which is fully recognized under the Dayabhaga School.

The maxim (4) means what ought not to be done becomes valid when done which is fully recognized under the Dayabhaga School. Which maxim is referred in (4)?

The Indian Succession Act states that every person is entitled to equal inheritance. Inheritance is a general word which means an individual who derives an interest in property whereas a succession is that who is the next successor of the predecessor of the person who dies. The general law relating to the inheritance and succession in India is the Indian Succession Act, 1925. The law of succession applicable to Parsis or for the intestate succession to a Muslim who died with a will is the (1) Indian Succession Act, 1925 whereas the laws of succession governing the Hindus, Sikhs, Jain and Buddhists are (2) Hindu Succession Act, 1956. At the time of the death of a member of a family, the interest in the property shall be devolved by survivorship rule which is recognized by (3) of Hindu law. The maxim (4) means what ought not to be done becomes valid when done which is fully recognized under the Dayabhaga School.

Who among the following will not inherit the intestate property of a Hindu female under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956?

The Code of Criminal Procedure is the main legislation on the administration of substantial criminal code in India. An FIR is the earliest form and first information of a cognizable offence recorded by an officer in charge of a police station stated under (1) of CrPC.. The Supreme Court in a landmark case (2) iterated in its judgment that CrPC contemplates two kinds of FIR, one registered by the informant and other by any person other than the informant. The charge sheet is a final report by the police submitted to the court at the end of the investigation stated under (3) of CrPC.

The SC iterated in the case of (4) that the section 482 envisages three circumstances in which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised namely to “give effect to an order under CrPC or to prevent abuse of the process of the court and to secure ends of justice”.

Which section under CrPC deals with the provision that enumerates “an arrested person to be presented before the Magistrate within 24 hours of his arrest”?

The Code of Criminal Procedure is the main legislation on the administration of substantial criminal code in India. An FIR is the earliest form and first information of a cognizable offence recorded by an officer in charge of a police station stated under (1) of CrPC.. The Supreme Court in a landmark case (2) iterated in its judgment that CrPC contemplates two kinds of FIR, one registered by the informant and other by any person other than the informant. The charge sheet is a final report by the police submitted to the court at the end of the investigation stated under (3) of CrPC.

The SC iterated in the case of (4) that the section 482 envisages three circumstances in which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised namely to “give effect to an order under CrPC or to prevent abuse of the process of the court and to secure ends of justice”.

The Supreme Court in a landmark case iterated in its judgment that CrPC contemplates two kinds of FIR, one registered by the informant and the other by any person other than the informant. Which case has been referred in (2)?

The Code of Criminal Procedure is the main legislation on the administration of substantial criminal code in India. An FIR is the earliest form and first information of a cognizable offence recorded by an officer in charge of a police station stated under (1) of CrPC.. The Supreme Court in a landmark case (2) iterated in its judgment that CrPC contemplates two kinds of FIR, one registered by the informant and other by any person other than the informant. The charge sheet is a final report by the police submitted to the court at the end of the investigation stated under (3) of CrPC.

The SC iterated in the case of (4) that the section 482 envisages three circumstances in which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised namely to “give effect to an order under CrPC or to prevent abuse of the process of the court and to secure ends of justice”.

What is known as an arrangement between prosecutor and defendant whereby the defendant pleads guilty to a lesser charge in exchange for a more lenient sentence or an agreement to drop other charges stated under 265A of CrPC?

The Code of Criminal Procedure is the main legislation on the administration of substantial criminal code in India. An FIR is the earliest form and first information of a cognizable offence recorded by an officer in charge of a police station stated under (1) of CrPC.. The Supreme Court in a landmark case (2) iterated in its judgment that CrPC contemplates two kinds of FIR, one registered by the informant and other by any person other than the informant. The charge sheet is a final report by the police submitted to the court at the end of the investigation stated under (3) of CrPC.

The SC iterated in the case of (4) that the section 482 envisages three circumstances in which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised namely to “give effect to an order under CrPC or to prevent abuse of the process of the court and to secure ends of justice”.

The charge sheet is a final report by the police submitted to the court at the end of an investigation. Which section deals with the provision of chargesheet?

The Code of Criminal Procedure is the main legislation on the administration of substantial criminal code in India. An FIR is the earliest form and first information of a cognizable offence recorded by an officer in charge of a police station stated under (1) of CrPC.. The Supreme Court in a landmark case (2) iterated in its judgment that CrPC contemplates two kinds of FIR, one registered by the informant and other by any person other than the informant. The charge sheet is a final report by the police submitted to the court at the end of the investigation stated under (3) of CrPC.

The SC iterated in the case of (4) that the section 482 envisages three circumstances in which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised namely to “give effect to an order under CrPC or to prevent abuse of the process of the court and to secure ends of justice”.

The SC iterated in a case that section 482 envisages 3 circumstances in which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised namely to “give effect to an order under CrPC or to prevent abuse of the process of the court and to secure ends of justice”. Which case has been referred in (4)?

The Supreme Court observed that the remission or pre­mature release in terms of the policy which is applicable in the State where the crime was committed has to be considered. The bench comprising Justices Ajay Rastogi and Vikram Nath observed that the appropriate Government under Section 432(7) CrPC. petition for pre­mature release under Sections 433 and 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 stating that he had undergone more than 15 years 4 months of custody. His petition filed in the High Court of Gujarat was dismissed taking note of Section 432(7) CrPC on the premise that since the trial has been concluded in the State of Maharashtra, the application for pre­mature release has to be filed in the State of Maharashtra and not in the State of Gujarat, as prayed by the petitioner by judgment impugned dated 17th July 2019.

Remission or pre­mature release has to consider in terms of the policy which is applicable in the State where the crime was committed and not the State in which case transferred. The application for grant of pre­mature release will have to be considered on the basis of the policy which stood on the date of conviction. [Referred]

In which case the Supreme Court observed that the remission or premature release policy which is applicable in the State where the crime was committed has to be considered?

Which of the following statement is nor correct regarding the meaning of the appropriate Government u/s 432(7) of CrPC

The Supreme Court observed that the remission or pre­mature release in terms of the policy which is applicable in the State where the crime was committed has to be considered. The bench comprising Justices Ajay Rastogi and Vikram Nath observed that the appropriate Government under Section 432(7) CrPC. petition for pre­mature release under Sections 433 and 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 stating that he had undergone more than 15 years 4 months of custody. His petition filed in the High Court of Gujarat was dismissed taking note of Section 432(7) CrPC on the premise that since the trial has been concluded in the State of Maharashtra, the application for pre­mature release has to be filed in the State of Maharashtra and not in the State of Gujarat, as prayed by the petitioner by judgment impugned dated 17th July 2019.

Remission or pre­mature release has to consider in terms of the policy which is applicable in the State where the crime was committed and not the State in which case transferred. The application for grant of pre­mature release will have to be considered on the basis of the policy which stood on the date of conviction. [Referred]

Which of the following statements is correct regarding the power of the Government to remit sentences u/s 432 of CrPC

The Supreme Court observed that the remission or pre­mature release in terms of the policy which is applicable in the State where the crime was committed has to be considered. The bench comprising Justices Ajay Rastogi and Vikram Nath observed that the appropriate Government under Section 432(7) CrPC. petition for pre­mature release under Sections 433 and 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 stating that he had undergone more than 15 years 4 months of custody. His petition filed in the High Court of Gujarat was dismissed taking note of Section 432(7) CrPC on the premise that since the trial has been concluded in the State of Maharashtra, the application for pre­mature release has to be filed in the State of Maharashtra and not in the State of Gujarat, as prayed by the petitioner by judgment impugned dated 17th July 2019.

Remission or pre­mature release has to consider in terms of the policy which is applicable in the State where the crime was committed and not the State in which case transferred. The application for grant of pre­mature release will have to be considered on the basis of the policy which stood on the date of conviction. [Referred]

Which Article of the Indian Constitution 1950 grants to the President the power to remit any sentence?

The Supreme Court observed that the remission or pre­mature release in terms of the policy which is applicable in the State where the crime was committed has to be considered. The bench comprising Justices Ajay Rastogi and Vikram Nath observed that the appropriate Government under Section 432(7) CrPC. petition for pre­mature release under Sections 433 and 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 stating that he had undergone more than 15 years 4 months of custody. His petition filed in the High Court of Gujarat was dismissed taking note of Section 432(7) CrPC on the premise that since the trial has been concluded in the State of Maharashtra, the application for pre­mature release has to be filed in the State of Maharashtra and not in the State of Gujarat, as prayed by the petitioner by judgment impugned dated 17th July 2019.

Remission or pre­mature release has to consider in terms of the policy which is applicable in the State where the crime was committed and not the State in which case transferred. The application for grant of pre­mature release will have to be considered on the basis of the policy which stood on the date of conviction. [Referred]

The Governor does not enjoy the power to grand pardon to____

This case was one of the earliest international environment law cases that involved a dispute over Transboundary air pollution from a factory. It gave rise to Polluters Pay Principle (PPP) that was a key foundation of international environmental law. The first endorsement of the precautionary principle was made in 1982 when World Charter for nature was adopted by UNGA of United Nations Organization and its implementation was done through  for the first time. The International Court of Justice in  was presented with an opportunity to consider the legal status of principles of sustainable development, the precautionary principles and the environmental impact assessment and that the sustainable development is considered as a major principle in the international environmental law.

In which of the following cases was it observed that the laws of the flag state will apply when crimes have occurred on board ship even while it is on foreign waters?

This case was one of the earliest international environment law cases that involved a dispute over Transboundary air pollution from a factory. It gave rise to Polluters Pay Principle (PPP) that was a key foundation of international environmental law. The first endorsement of the precautionary principle was made in 1982 when World Charter for nature was adopted by UNGA of United Nations Organization and its implementation was done through  for the first time. The International Court of Justice in  was presented with an opportunity to consider the legal status of principles of sustainable development, the precautionary principles and the environmental impact assessment and that the sustainable development is considered as a major principle in the international environmental law.

Which of the following statements is correct about an archipelagic state?

This case was one of the earliest international environment law cases that involved a dispute over Transboundary air pollution from a factory. It gave rise to Polluters Pay Principle (PPP) that was a key foundation of international environmental law. The first endorsement of the precautionary principle was made in 1982 when World Charter for nature was adopted by UNGA of United Nations Organization and its implementation was done through  for the first time. The International Court of Justice in  was presented with an opportunity to consider the legal status of principles of sustainable development, the precautionary principles and the environmental impact assessment and that the sustainable development is considered as a major principle in the international environmental law.

The first endorsement of the precautionary principle was made in 1982 when World Charter for nature was adopted by UNGA of United Nations Organization and its implementation was done.

This case was one of the earliest international environment law cases that involved a dispute over Transboundary air pollution from a factory. It gave rise to Polluters Pay Principle (PPP) that was a key foundation of international environmental law. The first endorsement of the precautionary principle was made in 1982 when World Charter for nature was adopted by UNGA of United Nations Organization and its implementation was done through  for the first time. The International Court of Justice in  was presented with an opportunity to consider the legal status of principles of sustainable development, the precautionary principles and the environmental impact assessment and that the sustainable development is considered as a major principle in the international environmental law.

The Polluter Pay Principle is a part of a set of broader principles to guide sustainable development all around the world which is formally known as which was a short document produced at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development.

This case was one of the earliest international environment law cases that involved a dispute over Transboundary air pollution from a factory. It gave rise to Polluters Pay Principle (PPP) that was a key foundation of international environmental law. The first endorsement of the precautionary principle was made in 1982 when World Charter for nature was adopted by UNGA of United Nations Organization and its implementation was done through  for the first time. The International Court of Justice in  was presented with an opportunity to consider the legal status of principles of sustainable development, the precautionary principles and the environmental impact assessment and that the sustainable development is considered as a major principle in the international environmental law.

The Supreme of India observed that the precautionary principle, polluters pay principle and the concept of sustainable development are part of customary international law and there should be no difficulty in accepting these principle in domestic laws of India and that according to new concept the burden of proof lies on the developer or industrialists. Which case of India is referred in?

This case was one of the earliest international environment law cases that involved a dispute over Transboundary air pollution from a factory. It gave rise to Polluters Pay Principle (PPP) that was a key foundation of international environmental law. The first endorsement of the precautionary principle was made in 1982 when World Charter for nature was adopted by UNGA of United Nations Organization and its implementation was done through  for the first time. The International Court of Justice in  was presented with an opportunity to consider the legal status of principles of sustainable development, the precautionary principles and the environmental impact assessment and that the sustainable development is considered as a major principle in the international environmental law.

Which among the following conference not only addressed the issues on environment but also addressed the issue of sustainable development which is the major demand of the time?

This case was one of the earliest international environment law cases that involved a dispute over Transboundary air pollution from a factory. It gave rise to Polluters Pay Principle (PPP) that was a key foundation of international environmental law. The first endorsement of the precautionary principle was made in 1982 when World Charter for nature was adopted by UNGA of United Nations Organization and its implementation was done through  for the first time. The International Court of Justice in  was presented with an opportunity to consider the legal status of principles of sustainable development, the precautionary principles and the environmental impact assessment and that the sustainable development is considered as a major principle in the international environmental law.

Which among the following produced the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)?

PMLA

Director or any other officer who provisionally attaches any property under PMLA Act 2002, shall, within a period of _____days from such attachment, file a complaint stating the facts of such attachment before the Adjudicating Authority?

Whoever commits the offence of money-laundering, which relates to any offence specified under paragraph 2 of Part A of the Schedule, shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to?

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 came into force on?