CLAT PG Mock:-I

It is a settled principle of criminal law that only the person who actually commits the offence can be held guilty and sentenced in accordance with law. However, Section 34 lays down a principle of joint liability in a criminal act, the essence of which is to be found in the existence of common intention, instigating the main accused to do the criminal act, in furtherance of such intention. Even when separate acts are done by two or more persons in furtherance of a common intention, each person is liable for the result of all the acts as if all the acts had been done by all of these persons.

Section 34 is only attracted when a specific criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, in which case all the offenders are liable for that criminal act in the same manner as the principal offender as if the act were done by all the offenders. This Section does not whittle down the liability of the principal offender committing the principal act but additionally makes all other offenders liable. The essence of liability under Section 34 is simultaneous consensus of the minds of persons participating in the criminal act to bring about a particular result, which consensus can even be developed at the spot as held in Lallan Rai & Ors. vs. State of Bihar reported in (2003) 1 SCC 268. There must be a common intention to commit the particular offence. To constitute common intention, it is absolutely necessary that the intention of each one of the accused should be known to the rest of the accused.

1. Which case laid down the foundation to right to speedy trial?

It is a settled principle of criminal law that only the person who actually commits the offence can be held guilty and sentenced in accordance with law. However, Section 34 lays down a principle of joint liability in a criminal act, the essence of which is to be found in the existence of common intention, instigating the main accused to do the criminal act, in furtherance of such intention. Even when separate acts are done by two or more persons in furtherance of a common intention, each person is liable for the result of all the acts as if all the acts had been done by all of these persons.

Section 34 is only attracted when a specific criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, in which case all the offenders are liable for that criminal act in the same manner as the principal offender as if the act were done by all the offenders. This Section does not whittle down the liability of the principal offender committing the principal act but additionally makes all other offenders liable. The essence of liability under Section 34 is simultaneous consensus of the minds of persons participating in the criminal act to bring about a particular result, which consensus can even be developed at the spot as held in Lallan Rai & Ors. vs. State of Bihar reported in (2003) 1 SCC 268. There must be a common intention to commit the particular offence. To constitute common intention, it is absolutely necessary that the intention of each one of the accused should be known to the rest of the accused.

2. The most controversial provision involved in the above case is section 43 D (5) of UAPA. What does the section states?

It is a settled principle of criminal law that only the person who actually commits the offence can be held guilty and sentenced in accordance with law. However, Section 34 lays down a principle of joint liability in a criminal act, the essence of which is to be found in the existence of common intention, instigating the main accused to do the criminal act, in furtherance of such intention. Even when separate acts are done by two or more persons in furtherance of a common intention, each person is liable for the result of all the acts as if all the acts had been done by all of these persons.

Section 34 is only attracted when a specific criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, in which case all the offenders are liable for that criminal act in the same manner as the principal offender as if the act were done by all the offenders. This Section does not whittle down the liability of the principal offender committing the principal act but additionally makes all other offenders liable. The essence of liability under Section 34 is simultaneous consensus of the minds of persons participating in the criminal act to bring about a particular result, which consensus can even be developed at the spot as held in Lallan Rai & Ors. vs. State of Bihar reported in (2003) 1 SCC 268. There must be a common intention to commit the particular offence. To constitute common intention, it is absolutely necessary that the intention of each one of the accused should be known to the rest of the accused.

3. The main reason in the above case for granting bail is

It is a settled principle of criminal law that only the person who actually commits the offence can be held guilty and sentenced in accordance with law. However, Section 34 lays down a principle of joint liability in a criminal act, the essence of which is to be found in the existence of common intention, instigating the main accused to do the criminal act, in furtherance of such intention. Even when separate acts are done by two or more persons in furtherance of a common intention, each person is liable for the result of all the acts as if all the acts had been done by all of these persons.

Section 34 is only attracted when a specific criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, in which case all the offenders are liable for that criminal act in the same manner as the principal offender as if the act were done by all the offenders. This Section does not whittle down the liability of the principal offender committing the principal act but additionally makes all other offenders liable. The essence of liability under Section 34 is simultaneous consensus of the minds of persons participating in the criminal act to bring about a particular result, which consensus can even be developed at the spot as held in Lallan Rai & Ors. vs. State of Bihar reported in (2003) 1 SCC 268. There must be a common intention to commit the particular offence. To constitute common intention, it is absolutely necessary that the intention of each one of the accused should be known to the rest of the accused.

4. Right to speedy trial is a facet of which article of the constitution of India?

It is a settled principle of criminal law that only the person who actually commits the offence can be held guilty and sentenced in accordance with law. However, Section 34 lays down a principle of joint liability in a criminal act, the essence of which is to be found in the existence of common intention, instigating the main accused to do the criminal act, in furtherance of such intention. Even when separate acts are done by two or more persons in furtherance of a common intention, each person is liable for the result of all the acts as if all the acts had been done by all of these persons.

Section 34 is only attracted when a specific criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, in which case all the offenders are liable for that criminal act in the same manner as the principal offender as if the act were done by all the offenders. This Section does not whittle down the liability of the principal offender committing the principal act but additionally makes all other offenders liable. The essence of liability under Section 34 is simultaneous consensus of the minds of persons participating in the criminal act to bring about a particular result, which consensus can even be developed at the spot as held in Lallan Rai & Ors. vs. State of Bihar reported in (2003) 1 SCC 268. There must be a common intention to commit the particular offence. To constitute common intention, it is absolutely necessary that the intention of each one of the accused should be known to the rest of the accused.

5. In which case the Court held that gross delay in disposal of such cases would justify the invocation of Article 21 of the Constitution and consequential necessity to release the undertrial on bail?

The decision in E.V. Chinnaiah has frozen all State authorities under Articles 14 to 16 of the Constitution. E.V. Chinnaiah does not answer many questions raised. Articles 14 to 16 constitute a triumvirate of citizens’ rights and obligations and conceived as equality and social justice charters. The State is under corresponding obligations to devise measures and methods, fashion, policies to promote and protect these rights. There is an interplay between these rights as held in Indra Sawney. The equality rights under Article 14 and equal opportunity rights under Articles 15 and 16 have been mutually reinforcing facets. The State must undertake the emancipation of the deprived and weaker sections of the community. The obligation to eradicate inequalities in status and wealth is complex obligations involving redistribution and reallocation of resources, opportunities, and equitable access to all public and social goods. Education, health, and public employment are all public goods of immense value. Therefore, the State/States will always need the freedom to carry out informed experiments without being fettered by undue or disproportionate claims. The court has to keep social dynamics in mind and be careful not to chain the State or clamp its hand while interpreting constitutional provisions. The rule of law demands that the State is able to
harmonies and balance several competing claims and interests. E.V. Chinnaiah is based on the premise that all Scheduled Castes can and must collectively enjoy the benefits of reservation regardless of interse inequality. The broad statement in E.V. Chinnaiah has no demonstrable truth in empirical terms and is not supported under the judgment itself. The decision in E.V. Chinnaiah cannot be said to be absolute to a standard so high based on stare decisis as to freeze our constitutional understanding permanently and place of the judicial pronouncement.

Judgments is related to the constitutional validity of Punjab Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes?

The decision in E.V. Chinnaiah has frozen all State authorities under Articles 14 to 16 of the Constitution. E.V. Chinnaiah does not answer many questions raised. Articles 14 to 16 constitute a triumvirate of citizens’ rights and obligations and conceived as equality and social justice charters. The State is under corresponding obligations to devise measures and methods, fashion, policies to promote and protect these rights. There is an interplay between these rights as held in Indra Sawney. The equality rights under Article 14 and equal opportunity rights under Articles 15 and 16 have been mutually reinforcing facets. The State must undertake the emancipation of the deprived and weaker sections of the community. The obligation to eradicate inequalities in status and wealth is complex obligations involving redistribution and reallocation of resources, opportunities, and equitable access to all public and social goods. Education, health, and public employment are all public goods of immense value. Therefore, the State/States will always need the freedom to carry out informed experiments without being fettered by undue or disproportionate claims. The court has to keep social dynamics in mind and be careful not to chain the State or clamp its hand while interpreting constitutional provisions. The rule of law demands that the State is able to
harmonies and balance several competing claims and interests. E.V. Chinnaiah is based on the premise that all Scheduled Castes can and must collectively enjoy the benefits of reservation regardless of interse inequality. The broad statement in E.V. Chinnaiah has no demonstrable truth in empirical terms and is not supported under the judgment itself. The decision in E.V. Chinnaiah cannot be said to be absolute to a standard so high based on stare decisis as to freeze our constitutional understanding permanently and place of the judicial pronouncement.

In which of the following Constitutional Amendments was Article 342A, that provides for Socially and Educationally Backward Classes added in the Constitution?

8. Which of the following judgments relating to the Supreme Court upholding the 102nd Constitutional Amendment is the excerpt taken from?

9 . Main object of Constitution 104th Amendment Act 2019 is:

10. In which case the supreme Court held the rule of carry-forward in state service for backward classes as Valid and constitutional:

The decision in E.V. Chinnaiah has frozen all State authorities under Articles 14 to 16 of the Constitution. E.V. Chinnaiah does not answer many questions raised. Articles 14 to 16 constitute a triumvirate of citizens’ rights and obligations and conceived as equality and social justice charters. The State is under corresponding obligations to devise measures and methods, fashion, policies to promote and protect these rights. There is an interplay between these rights as held in Indra Sawney. The equality rights under Article 14 and equal opportunity rights under Articles 15 and 16 have been mutually reinforcing facets. The State must undertake the emancipation of the deprived and weaker sections of the community. The obligation to eradicate inequalities in status and wealth is complex obligations involving redistribution and reallocation of resources, opportunities, and equitable access to all public and social goods. Education, health, and public employment are all public goods of immense value. Therefore, the State/States will always need the freedom to carry out informed experiments without being fettered by undue or disproportionate claims. The court has to keep social dynamics in mind and be careful not to chain the State or clamp its hand while interpreting constitutional provisions. The rule of law demands that the State is able to
harmonies and balance several competing claims and interests. E.V. Chinnaiah is based on the premise that all Scheduled Castes can and must collectively enjoy the benefits of reservation regardless of interse inequality. The broad statement in E.V. Chinnaiah has no demonstrable truth in empirical terms and is not supported under the judgment itself. The decision in E.V. Chinnaiah cannot be said to be absolute to a standard so high based on stare decisis as to freeze our constitutional understanding permanently and place of the judicial pronouncement.

11. In 2008, Supreme Court in following case upheld the OBC quota in Central Educational Institutions clearing the way For reservation of 27% seats for Backward Classes –

The Finance Act, 2017 was brought into force from 31.03.2017 to give effect to the financial proposals for the financial year 2017-18. Sections 183 to 189 thereof dealt with conditions of service of Chairperson and Members of Tribunals, Appellate Tribunals and other authorities. According to Section 183, provisions of Section 184 applied to the Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson, Chairman, Vice-Chairman, President, Vice-President, Presiding Officer or Member of the Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal and other specified authorities, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the provisions of the statutes listed in Column (3) of the Eighth Schedule. The Central Government was empowered by Section 184 to make rules to provide for qualifications, appointment, term of office, salaries and allowances, resignation, removal and other terms and conditions of service of the Chairperson and Vice-Chairperson (and commensurate positions bearing different nomenclature) and other Members. As per the first proviso, the Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson (and commensurate positions bearing different nomenclature) or Member of the Tribunal shall hold office for such term as may be specified by the rules made by the Central Government, not exceeding five years from the date on which such person enters office. The Chairperson, Chairman or President can hold office till they reach the age of 70 years and the Vice-Chairperson, Vice-Chairman, Vice-President, Presiding Officer or any other Member can continue till the age of 67 years, as per the second proviso to Section 184. 

12. Which of the following judgments is related to above said passage?

The Finance Act, 2017 was brought into force from 31.03.2017 to give effect to the financial proposals for the financial year 2017-18. Sections 183 to 189 thereof dealt with conditions of service of Chairperson and Members of Tribunals, Appellate Tribunals and other authorities. According to Section 183, provisions of Section 184 applied to the Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson, Chairman, Vice-Chairman, President, Vice-President, Presiding Officer or Member of the Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal and other specified authorities, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the provisions of the statutes listed in Column (3) of the Eighth Schedule. The Central Government was empowered by Section 184 to make rules to provide for qualifications, appointment, term of office, salaries and allowances, resignation, removal and other terms and conditions of service of the Chairperson and Vice-Chairperson (and commensurate positions bearing different nomenclature) and other Members. As per the first proviso, the Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson (and commensurate positions bearing different nomenclature) or Member of the Tribunal shall hold office for such term as may be specified by the rules made by the Central Government, not exceeding five years from the date on which such person enters office. The Chairperson, Chairman or President can hold office till they reach the age of 70 years and the Vice-Chairperson, Vice-Chairman, Vice-President, Presiding Officer or any other Member can continue till the age of 67 years, as per the second proviso to Section 184. 

13. Which of the following issues was raised in Madras Bar Association v. Union of India & Anr 2021

14. Which article deals with Power of President to promulgate Ordinances during recess of Parliament?

The Finance Act, 2017 was brought into force from 31.03.2017 to give effect to the financial proposals for the financial year 2017-18. Sections 183 to 189 thereof dealt with conditions of service of Chairperson and Members of Tribunals, Appellate Tribunals and other authorities. According to Section 183, provisions of Section 184 applied to the Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson, Chairman, Vice-Chairman, President, Vice-President, Presiding Officer or Member of the Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal and other specified authorities, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the provisions of the statutes listed in Column (3) of the Eighth Schedule. The Central Government was empowered by Section 184 to make rules to provide for qualifications, appointment, term of office, salaries and allowances, resignation, removal and other terms and conditions of service of the Chairperson and Vice-Chairperson (and commensurate positions bearing different nomenclature) and other Members. As per the first proviso, the Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson (and commensurate positions bearing different nomenclature) or Member of the Tribunal shall hold office for such term as may be specified by the rules made by the Central Government, not exceeding five years from the date on which such person enters office. The Chairperson, Chairman or President can hold office till they reach the age of 70 years and the Vice-Chairperson, Vice-Chairman, Vice-President, Presiding Officer or any other Member can continue till the age of 67 years, as per the second proviso to Section 184. 

15. Which Constitutional article defines the work of Administrative
Tribunal—

The Finance Act, 2017 was brought into force from 31.03.2017 to give effect to the financial proposals for the financial year 2017-18. Sections 183 to 189 thereof dealt with conditions of service of Chairperson and Members of Tribunals, Appellate Tribunals and other authorities. According to Section 183, provisions of Section 184 applied to the Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson, Chairman, Vice-Chairman, President, Vice-President, Presiding Officer or Member of the Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal and other specified authorities, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the provisions of the statutes listed in Column (3) of the Eighth Schedule. The Central Government was empowered by Section 184 to make rules to provide for qualifications, appointment, term of office, salaries and allowances, resignation, removal and other terms and conditions of service of the Chairperson and Vice-Chairperson (and commensurate positions bearing different nomenclature) and other Members. As per the first proviso, the Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson (and commensurate positions bearing different nomenclature) or Member of the Tribunal shall hold office for such term as may be specified by the rules made by the Central Government, not exceeding five years from the date on which such person enters office. The Chairperson, Chairman or President can hold office till they reach the age of 70 years and the Vice-Chairperson, Vice-Chairman, Vice-President, Presiding Officer or any other Member can continue till the age of 67 years, as per the second proviso to Section 184. 

16. Which Constitutional Amendment introduced the subject Tribunal in the Indian Constitution—

The Finance Act, 2017 was brought into force from 31.03.2017 to give effect to the financial proposals for the financial year 2017-18. Sections 183 to 189 thereof dealt with conditions of service of Chairperson and Members of Tribunals, Appellate Tribunals and other authorities. According to Section 183, provisions of Section 184 applied to the Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson, Chairman, Vice-Chairman, President, Vice-President, Presiding Officer or Member of the Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal and other specified authorities, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the provisions of the statutes listed in Column (3) of the Eighth Schedule. The Central Government was empowered by Section 184 to make rules to provide for qualifications, appointment, term of office, salaries and allowances, resignation, removal and other terms and conditions of service of the Chairperson and Vice-Chairperson (and commensurate positions bearing different nomenclature) and other Members. As per the first proviso, the Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson (and commensurate positions bearing different nomenclature) or Member of the Tribunal shall hold office for such term as may be specified by the rules made by the Central Government, not exceeding five years from the date on which such person enters office. The Chairperson, Chairman or President can hold office till they reach the age of 70 years and the Vice-Chairperson, Vice-Chairman, Vice-President, Presiding Officer or any other Member can continue till the age of 67 years, as per the second proviso to Section 184. 

17. Under which constitutional article, jurisdiction of the Supreme Court has been retained over the Administrative Tribunals—

In [Case 1], it was observed that a plea of partition was required to be substantiated as under law, there is a presumption as to jointness. Even separate possession by cosharers may not, by itself, lead to a presumption of partition. In [Case 2] and [Case 3], it was observed that prima facie a document expressing the intention to divide brings about a division in status, however, it is open to prove that the document was a sham or a nominal one and was not intended to be acted upon and executed for some ulterior purpose. The relations with the estate are the determining factor in the statement made in the document. The statutory requirement of substituted Section 6(5) is stricter to rule out unjust deprivation to the daughter of the coparcener’s right. In [Case 4], it was laid down that when a purported petition is proved to be a sham, the effect would be that the family is considered joint. Earlier, an oral partition was permissible, and at the same time, the burden of proof remained on the person who asserted that there was a partition. It is also settled law that Cesser of Commonality is not conclusive proof of partition, merely by the reason that the members are separated in food and residence for the convenience, and separate residence at different places due to service or otherwise does not show separation. Several acts, though not conclusive proof of partition, may lead to that conclusion in conjunction with various other facts. 

19. The above passage has been taken from which of the following recent judgement in which the Supreme Court held that daughter have equal right, like sons over parental property?

Question 19-21

In [Case 1], it was observed that a plea of partition was required to be substantiated as under law, there is a presumption as
to jointness. Even separate possession by cosharers may not, by itself, lead to a presumption of partition. In [Case 2] and [Case 3], it was observed that prima facie a document expressing the intention to divide brings about a division in status, however, it is open to prove that the document was a sham or a nominal one and was not intended to be acted upon and executed for some ulterior purpose. The relations with the estate are the determining factor in the statement made in the document. The statutory requirement of substituted Section 6(5) is stricter to rule out unjust deprivation to the daughter of the coparcener’s right. In [Case 4], it was laid down that when a purported petition is proved to be a sham, the effect would be that the family is considered joint. Earlier, an oral partition was permissible, and at the same time, the burden of proof remained on the person who asserted that there was a partition. It is also settled law that Cesser of Commonality is not conclusive proof of partition, merely by the reason that the members are separated in food and residence for the convenience, and separate residence at different places due to service or otherwise does not show separation. Several acts, though not conclusive proof of partition, may lead to that conclusion in conjunction with various other facts. 

20. In which of the following Judgments Court discussed essential features of Coparcenary Birth and Sapindaship.

Question 19-21

In [Case 1], it was observed that a plea of partition was required to be substantiated as under law, there is a presumption as
to jointness. Even separate possession by cosharers may not, by itself, lead to a presumption of partition. In [Case 2] and [Case 3], it was observed that prima facie a document expressing the intention to divide brings about a division in status, however, it is open to prove that the document was a sham or a nominal one and was not intended to be acted upon and executed for some ulterior purpose. The relations with the estate are the determining factor in the statement made in the document. The statutory requirement of substituted Section 6(5) is stricter to rule out unjust deprivation to the daughter of the coparcener’s right. In [Case 4], it was laid down that when a purported petition is proved to be a sham, the effect would be that the family is considered joint. Earlier, an oral partition was permissible, and at the same time, the burden of proof remained on the person who asserted that there was a partition. It is also settled law that Cesser of Commonality is not conclusive proof of partition, merely by the reason that the members are separated in food and residence for the convenience, and separate residence at different places due to service or otherwise does not show separation. Several acts, though not conclusive proof of partition, may lead to that conclusion in conjunction with various other facts. 

18. Who said “The natural law being coexisting with mankind and emanating from God himself is superior to all other laws. It is binding over all the countries at all times and no man-made law will be valid if it is contrary to the law of nature.”

Question 19-21

In [Case 1], it was observed that a plea of partition was required to be substantiated as under law, there is a presumption as
to jointness. Even separate possession by cosharers may not, by itself, lead to a presumption of partition. In [Case 2] and [Case 3], it was observed that prima facie a document expressing the intention to divide brings about a division in status, however, it is open to prove that the document was a sham or a nominal one and was not intended to be acted upon and executed for some ulterior purpose. The relations with the estate are the determining factor in the statement made in the document. The statutory requirement of substituted Section 6(5) is stricter to rule out unjust deprivation to the daughter of the coparcener’s right. In [Case 4], it was laid down that when a purported petition is proved to be a sham, the effect would be that the family is considered joint. Earlier, an oral partition was permissible, and at the same time, the burden of proof remained on the person who asserted that there was a partition. It is also settled law that Cesser of Commonality is not conclusive proof of partition, merely by the reason that the members are separated in food and residence for the convenience, and separate residence at different places due to service or otherwise does not show separation. Several acts, though not conclusive proof of partition, may lead to that conclusion in conjunction with various other facts. 

21. In which Judgment it was held that Joint family property retains its character even after its passing on to the hands of a sole
surviving coparcener.

Question 19-21

In [Case 1], it was observed that a plea of partition was required to be substantiated as under law, there is a presumption as
to jointness. Even separate possession by cosharers may not, by itself, lead to a presumption of partition. In [Case 2] and [Case 3], it was observed that prima facie a document expressing the intention to divide brings about a division in status, however, it is open to prove that the document was a sham or a nominal one and was not intended to be acted upon and executed for some ulterior purpose. The relations with the estate are the determining factor in the statement made in the document. The statutory requirement of substituted Section 6(5) is stricter to rule out unjust deprivation to the daughter of the coparcener’s right. In [Case 4], it was laid down that when a purported petition is proved to be a sham, the effect would be that the family is considered joint. Earlier, an oral partition was permissible, and at the same time, the burden of proof remained on the person who asserted that there was a partition. It is also settled law that Cesser of Commonality is not conclusive proof of partition, merely by the reason that the members are separated in food and residence for the convenience, and separate residence at different places due to service or otherwise does not show separation. Several acts, though not conclusive proof of partition, may lead to that conclusion in conjunction with various other facts. 

22. “Movement of progressive societies have hitter to been from status to contract” who said so?

The Court however made the following observation against the above-mentioned contentions of the petitioners and went on to state that Section 5 of the 2002 Act is constitutionally valid as it provides for a balancing arrangement to secure the interests of the person and also ensures that the proceeds of crime remain available to be dealt with in the manner provided by the 2002 Act. Under Section 5 the power of provisional attachment is provided for ordinary situations and for other situations that need immediate attachment bypassing all the safeguards. Section 5(1) delineates sufficient safeguards to be adhered to by the authorised officer before issuing provisional attachment orders in respect of proceeds of crime. The Supreme Court further went on to observe that even though the second proviso of Section 5 provides the power of provisional attachment without the safeguards, it is necessary to view the urgency felt by the competent authority to secure the property and effectively prevent and regulate the offence of money laundering. However, the authorised officer cannot resort to the action of provisional attachment of property (proceeds of crime) mechanically and has to record satisfaction and reason for his belief in writing on the basis of material in his possession that if an immediate provisional attachment is foregone, the proceedings may be frustrated.

The Apex Court on the above-raised contentions observed that Section 17 of the 2002 Act is not unconstitutional and provides for in-built safeguards, not only mandating the exercise of power by high-ranking officials, of the rank of Director (not below the rank of Additional Secretary to the Government of India who is appointed by a committee chaired by the Central Vigilance Commissioner in terms of Section 25 of the CVC Act) or Deputy Director authorised by the Director in that regard, but also to adhere to other stipulations of recording of reasons regarding the belief formed on the basis of information in his possession about the commission of the offence of money-laundering and possession of proceeds of crime involved in money-laundering. Further, such recorded reasons along with the materials are required to be forwarded by the 3 member Adjudicating Authority (appointed under Section 6 of the 2002 Act headed by a person qualified for appointment as a District Judge) in a sealed cover to be preserved for a specified period, thus, guaranteeing fairness, transparency and accountability regarding the entire process of search and seizure.

Which of the following cases upheld the PMLA amendment? 

Which of the Article guarantees the fundamental right against self-incrimination?

“Punishment for money-laundering” is defined under which Section of PMLA Act 2002?

Which of the following is not prescribed in the provision of Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002?

Which among the following authority appointed by Central Government shall exercise jurisdiction, powers and authority conferred by or under Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002?

 Offence of money-laundering is defined in which section of PMLA Act, 2002?

“The nature of sexual violence and the contours of consent do not undergo a transformation when one decides to marry. The institution of marriage does not influence the answer to the question of whether a woman has consented to sexual relations. If the woman is in an abusive relationship, she may face great difficulty in accessing medical resources or consulting doctors.”

Besides physical consequences, unwanted pregnancies which women are forced to carry to term may have cascading effects for the rest of her life by interrupting her education, her career, or affecting her mental wellbeing.”

Note: The Court has used the term “woman” in this judgment as including persons other than cis-gender women who may require access to safe medical termination of their pregnancies.

Supreme Court: An unemployed unmarried woman found out in June that she was pregnant. In the same month her partner abandoned her. Delhi High Court held that she does not have a right to a safe abortion as her case was “clearly not covered” in any of the categories mentioned under Rule 3B of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Rules, 2003 (MTP Rules).

When the matter reached before the Supreme Court, on 21.07.2022 the 3-judge bench of Supreme Court in a progressive take, held that a woman cannot be denied the right to a safe abortion only on the ground of her being unmarried. It observed that after the 2021 amendment to the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 (MTP Act), the phrase ‘married woman’ has been replaced by ‘any woman’ and the word ‘husband’ has been replaced by ‘partner. Which goes on to show that the legislature did not intend to leave out unmarried women from the scope of the Act.

Hence, Rule 3B (c) which provides for “change of marital status during the ongoing pregnancy” should be given purposive interpretation to include an unmarried woman who’s partner has abandoned her.

The Court said that there is no basis to deny unmarried women the right to medically terminate the pregnancy, when the same choice is available to other categories of women, especially when live-in relationships have already been recognized by the Court.

Which of following cases Supreme Court upheld that Woman cannot be denied right to safe abortion only on the ground of her being unmarried?

“The nature of sexual violence and the contours of consent do not undergo a transformation when one decides to marry. The institution of marriage does not influence the answer to the question of whether a woman has consented to sexual relations. If the woman is in an abusive relationship, she may face great difficulty in accessing medical resources or consulting doctors.”

Besides physical consequences, unwanted pregnancies which women are forced to carry to term may have cascading effects for the rest of her life by interrupting her education, her career, or affecting her mental wellbeing.”

Note: The Court has used the term “woman” in this judgment as including persons other than cis-gender women who may require access to safe medical termination of their pregnancies.

Supreme Court: An unemployed unmarried woman found out in June that she was pregnant. In the same month her partner abandoned her. Delhi High Court held that she does not have a right to a safe abortion as her case was “clearly not covered” in any of the categories mentioned under Rule 3B of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Rules, 2003 (MTP Rules).

When the matter reached before the Supreme Court, on 21.07.2022 the 3-judge bench of Supreme Court in a progressive take, held that a woman cannot be denied the right to a safe abortion only on the ground of her being unmarried. It observed that after the 2021 amendment to the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 (MTP Act), the phrase ‘married woman’ has been replaced by ‘any woman’ and the word ‘husband’ has been replaced by ‘partner. Which goes on to show that the legislature did not intend to leave out unmarried women from the scope of the Act.

Hence, Rule 3B (c) which provides for “change of marital status during the ongoing pregnancy” should be given purposive interpretation to include an unmarried woman who’s partner has abandoned her.

The Court said that there is no basis to deny unmarried women the right to medically terminate the pregnancy, when the same choice is available to other categories of women, especially when live-in relationships have already been recognized by the Court.

Which of the following is not correct about the 2021 amendment to the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971( MTP Act)?

“The nature of sexual violence and the contours of consent do not undergo a transformation when one decides to marry. The institution of marriage does not influence the answer to the question of whether a woman has consented to sexual relations. If the woman is in an abusive relationship, she may face great difficulty in accessing medical resources or consulting doctors.”

Besides physical consequences, unwanted pregnancies which women are forced to carry to term may have cascading effects for the rest of her life by interrupting her education, her career, or affecting her mental wellbeing.”

Note: The Court has used the term “woman” in this judgment as including persons other than cis-gender women who may require access to safe medical termination of their pregnancies.

Supreme Court: An unemployed unmarried woman found out in June that she was pregnant. In the same month her partner abandoned her. Delhi High Court held that she does not have a right to a safe abortion as her case was “clearly not covered” in any of the categories mentioned under Rule 3B of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Rules, 2003 (MTP Rules).

When the matter reached before the Supreme Court, on 21.07.2022 the 3-judge bench of Supreme Court in a progressive take, held that a woman cannot be denied the right to a safe abortion only on the ground of her being unmarried. It observed that after the 2021 amendment to the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 (MTP Act), the phrase ‘married woman’ has been replaced by ‘any woman’ and the word ‘husband’ has been replaced by ‘partner. Which goes on to show that the legislature did not intend to leave out unmarried women from the scope of the Act.

Hence, Rule 3B (c) which provides for “change of marital status during the ongoing pregnancy” should be given purposive interpretation to include an unmarried woman who’s partner has abandoned her.

The Court said that there is no basis to deny unmarried women the right to medically terminate the pregnancy, when the same choice is available to other categories of women, especially when live-in relationships have already been recognized by the Court.

Based on the excerpt, which of the following was held by the Supreme Court of India in relation to the MTP Act?

“The nature of sexual violence and the contours of consent do not undergo a transformation when one decides to marry. The institution of marriage does not influence the answer to the question of whether a woman has consented to sexual relations. If the woman is in an abusive relationship, she may face great difficulty in accessing medical resources or consulting doctors.”

Besides physical consequences, unwanted pregnancies which women are forced to carry to term may have cascading effects for the rest of her life by interrupting her education, her career, or affecting her mental wellbeing.”

Note: The Court has used the term “woman” in this judgment as including persons other than cis-gender women who may require access to safe medical termination of their pregnancies.

Supreme Court: An unemployed unmarried woman found out in June that she was pregnant. In the same month her partner abandoned her. Delhi High Court held that she does not have a right to a safe abortion as her case was “clearly not covered” in any of the categories mentioned under Rule 3B of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Rules, 2003 (MTP Rules).

When the matter reached before the Supreme Court, on 21.07.2022 the 3-judge bench of Supreme Court in a progressive take, held that a woman cannot be denied the right to a safe abortion only on the ground of her being unmarried. It observed that after the 2021 amendment to the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 (MTP Act), the phrase ‘married woman’ has been replaced by ‘any woman’ and the word ‘husband’ has been replaced by ‘partner. Which goes on to show that the legislature did not intend to leave out unmarried women from the scope of the Act.

Hence, Rule 3B (c) which provides for “change of marital status during the ongoing pregnancy” should be given purposive interpretation to include an unmarried woman who’s partner has abandoned her.

The Court said that there is no basis to deny unmarried women the right to medically terminate the pregnancy, when the same choice is available to other categories of women, especially when live-in relationships have already been recognized by the Court.

Which of the following statement is not true from above said case ?

“The nature of sexual violence and the contours of consent do not undergo a transformation when one decides to marry. The institution of marriage does not influence the answer to the question of whether a woman has consented to sexual relations. If the woman is in an abusive relationship, she may face great difficulty in accessing medical resources or consulting doctors.”

Besides physical consequences, unwanted pregnancies which women are forced to carry to term may have cascading effects for the rest of her life by interrupting her education, her career, or affecting her mental wellbeing.”

Note: The Court has used the term “woman” in this judgment as including persons other than cis-gender women who may require access to safe medical termination of their pregnancies.

Supreme Court: An unemployed unmarried woman found out in June that she was pregnant. In the same month her partner abandoned her. Delhi High Court held that she does not have a right to a safe abortion as her case was “clearly not covered” in any of the categories mentioned under Rule 3B of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Rules, 2003 (MTP Rules).

When the matter reached before the Supreme Court, on 21.07.2022 the 3-judge bench of Supreme Court in a progressive take, held that a woman cannot be denied the right to a safe abortion only on the ground of her being unmarried. It observed that after the 2021 amendment to the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 (MTP Act), the phrase ‘married woman’ has been replaced by ‘any woman’ and the word ‘husband’ has been replaced by ‘partner. Which goes on to show that the legislature did not intend to leave out unmarried women from the scope of the Act.

Hence, Rule 3B (c) which provides for “change of marital status during the ongoing pregnancy” should be given purposive interpretation to include an unmarried woman who’s partner has abandoned her.

The Court said that there is no basis to deny unmarried women the right to medically terminate the pregnancy, when the same choice is available to other categories of women, especially when live-in relationships have already been recognized by the Court.

Which of the following judges of the Supreme Court of India were part of the Bench in the Judgment as given in the excerpt?

If the doctrine of precedents i.e. stability in the law were to be departed from and the legitimacy of a subsequent larger Bench ruling were to be doubted on the ground that it comprises of either plurality of opinions or a narrow majority as compared with a previous Bench ruling (which might be either unanimous or of a larger majority, but of lower Bench strength), there would be uncertainty and lack of clarity in the realm of precedential certainty. If precedential legitimacy of a larger Bench ruling were thus to be doubted, there are no rules to guide the courts’ hierarchy or even later Benches of the same court about which is the appropriate reading to be adopted (such as for instance, the number of previous judgments to be considered for determining the majority, and consequently the correct law). 

The existence of a plurality of opinions or discordant or dissident judgments in the past — which might even have led to a majority (on an overall headcount) supporting a particular rule in a particular case cannot detract from the legitimacy of a rule enunciated by a later, larger Bench.

Which of the following cases Supreme Court said Binding nature of a judgment depends on the Bench Strength and not the numerical strength of the Judges taking majority view?

A precedent is:

According to the ‘declaratory theory of jurisprudence, the judges only declare the law and they do not make any law. The supporters of this theory were__________?

Which one of the following pairs is correctly matched?

The minimum number of Judges of the Supreme Court required for hearing any case involving interpretation of the Constitution is

All the cases regarding interpretation of the Constitution can be brought to the Supreme Court under its

In India, when the corporate insolvency process commences, the adjudicating authority is mandated to declare a moratorium on continuation or initiation of any coercive legal action against the Corporate Debtor. Even if a company goes into liquidation, a moratorium continues in terms of the IBC.

The IBC prescribes a moratorium on the initiation of CIRP proceedings and its effects. One of the purposes of the moratorium is to keep the assets of the Corporate Debtor together during the insolvency resolution process and to facilitate orderly completion of the processes envisaged under the statute. Such measures ensure the curtailing of parallel proceedings and reduce the possibility of conflicting outcomes in the process. Further, one of the motivations of imposing a moratorium of the IBC to form a shield that protects pecuniary attacks against the Corporate Debtor. This is done in order to provide the Corporate Debtor with breathing space, to allow it to continue as a going concern and rehabilitate itself.

The Court, hence, observed that any contrary interpretation would crack this shield and would have adverse consequences on the objective sought to be achieved.

The Court, further, explained that, the IBC, being the more recent statute, clearly overrides the Customs Act. Section 142A of the Customs Act notes that the Custom Authorities would have first charge on the assets of an assessee under the Customs Act, except with respect to cases under Section 529A of Companies Act 1956, Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act 1993, Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 and the IBC, 2016. This exception created under the Customs Act is duly acknowledged under Section 238 of the IBC as well.  Section 238 of the IBC clearly overrides any provision of law which is inconsistent with the IBC. It was, hence, held that,

“The Customs Act and the IBC act in their own spheres. In case of any conflict, the IBC overrides the Customs Act.”

On the scope of power of CBIC, the Court held that CBIC can only initiate assessment or re-assessment of the duties and other levies. They cannot transgress such boundary and proceed to initiate recovery in violation of Sections 14 or 33(5) of the IBC. The interim resolution professional, resolution professional or the liquidator, as the case may be, has an obligation to ensure that assessment is legal and he has been provided with sufficient power to question any assessment, if he finds the same to be excessive.

Based on the given excerpt, which of the following judgments is related to the IBC prevails over Customs Act once moratorium is imposed?

In India, when the corporate insolvency process commences, the adjudicating authority is mandated to declare a moratorium on continuation or initiation of any coercive legal action against the Corporate Debtor. Even if a company goes into liquidation, a moratorium continues in terms of the IBC.

The IBC prescribes a moratorium on the initiation of CIRP proceedings and its effects. One of the purposes of the moratorium is to keep the assets of the Corporate Debtor together during the insolvency resolution process and to facilitate orderly completion of the processes envisaged under the statute. Such measures ensure the curtailing of parallel proceedings and reduce the possibility of conflicting outcomes in the process. Further, one of the motivations of imposing a moratorium of the IBC to form a shield that protects pecuniary attacks against the Corporate Debtor. This is done in order to provide the Corporate Debtor with breathing space, to allow it to continue as a going concern and rehabilitate itself.

The Court, hence, observed that any contrary interpretation would crack this shield and would have adverse consequences on the objective sought to be achieved.

The Court, further, explained that, the IBC, being the more recent statute, clearly overrides the Customs Act. Section 142A of the Customs Act notes that the Custom Authorities would have first charge on the assets of an assessee under the Customs Act, except with respect to cases under Section 529A of Companies Act 1956, Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act 1993, Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 and the IBC, 2016. This exception created under the Customs Act is duly acknowledged under Section 238 of the IBC as well.  Section 238 of the IBC clearly overrides any provision of law which is inconsistent with the IBC. It was, hence, held that,

“The Customs Act and the IBC act in their own spheres. In case of any conflict, the IBC overrides the Customs Act.”

On the scope of power of CBIC, the Court held that CBIC can only initiate assessment or re-assessment of the duties and other levies. They cannot transgress such boundary and proceed to initiate recovery in violation of Sections 14 or 33(5) of the IBC. The interim resolution professional, resolution professional or the liquidator, as the case may be, has an obligation to ensure that assessment is legal and he has been provided with sufficient power to question any assessment, if he finds the same to be excessive.

Which of the following is correct regarding moratorium under the IBC?

In India, when the corporate insolvency process commences, the adjudicating authority is mandated to declare a moratorium on continuation or initiation of any coercive legal action against the Corporate Debtor. Even if a company goes into liquidation, a moratorium continues in terms of the IBC.

The IBC prescribes a moratorium on the initiation of CIRP proceedings and its effects. One of the purposes of the moratorium is to keep the assets of the Corporate Debtor together during the insolvency resolution process and to facilitate orderly completion of the processes envisaged under the statute. Such measures ensure the curtailing of parallel proceedings and reduce the possibility of conflicting outcomes in the process. Further, one of the motivations of imposing a moratorium of the IBC to form a shield that protects pecuniary attacks against the Corporate Debtor. This is done in order to provide the Corporate Debtor with breathing space, to allow it to continue as a going concern and rehabilitate itself.

The Court, hence, observed that any contrary interpretation would crack this shield and would have adverse consequences on the objective sought to be achieved.

The Court, further, explained that, the IBC, being the more recent statute, clearly overrides the Customs Act. Section 142A of the Customs Act notes that the Custom Authorities would have first charge on the assets of an assessee under the Customs Act, except with respect to cases under Section 529A of Companies Act 1956, Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act 1993, Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 and the IBC, 2016. This exception created under the Customs Act is duly acknowledged under Section 238 of the IBC as well.  Section 238 of the IBC clearly overrides any provision of law which is inconsistent with the IBC. It was, hence, held that,

“The Customs Act and the IBC act in their own spheres. In case of any conflict, the IBC overrides the Customs Act.”

On the scope of power of CBIC, the Court held that CBIC can only initiate assessment or re-assessment of the duties and other levies. They cannot transgress such boundary and proceed to initiate recovery in violation of Sections 14 or 33(5) of the IBC. The interim resolution professional, resolution professional or the liquidator, as the case may be, has an obligation to ensure that assessment is legal and he has been provided with sufficient power to question any assessment, if he finds the same to be excessive.

In Sundresh Bhat v. Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1101, a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India said IBC prevails over Customs Act once moratorium is imposed; CBIC has limited jurisdiction, cannot initiate recovery of dues? 

In India, when the corporate insolvency process commences, the adjudicating authority is mandated to declare a moratorium on continuation or initiation of any coercive legal action against the Corporate Debtor. Even if a company goes into liquidation, a moratorium continues in terms of the IBC.

The IBC prescribes a moratorium on the initiation of CIRP proceedings and its effects. One of the purposes of the moratorium is to keep the assets of the Corporate Debtor together during the insolvency resolution process and to facilitate orderly completion of the processes envisaged under the statute. Such measures ensure the curtailing of parallel proceedings and reduce the possibility of conflicting outcomes in the process. Further, one of the motivations of imposing a moratorium of the IBC to form a shield that protects pecuniary attacks against the Corporate Debtor. This is done in order to provide the Corporate Debtor with breathing space, to allow it to continue as a going concern and rehabilitate itself.

The Court, hence, observed that any contrary interpretation would crack this shield and would have adverse consequences on the objective sought to be achieved.

The Court, further, explained that, the IBC, being the more recent statute, clearly overrides the Customs Act. Section 142A of the Customs Act notes that the Custom Authorities would have first charge on the assets of an assessee under the Customs Act, except with respect to cases under Section 529A of Companies Act 1956, Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act 1993, Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 and the IBC, 2016. This exception created under the Customs Act is duly acknowledged under Section 238 of the IBC as well.  Section 238 of the IBC clearly overrides any provision of law which is inconsistent with the IBC. It was, hence, held that,

“The Customs Act and the IBC act in their own spheres. In case of any conflict, the IBC overrides the Customs Act.”

On the scope of power of CBIC, the Court held that CBIC can only initiate assessment or re-assessment of the duties and other levies. They cannot transgress such boundary and proceed to initiate recovery in violation of Sections 14 or 33(5) of the IBC. The interim resolution professional, resolution professional or the liquidator, as the case may be, has an obligation to ensure that assessment is legal and he has been provided with sufficient power to question any assessment, if he finds the same to be excessive.

Which of the following provisions is the term “moratorium” dealt?

In India, when the corporate insolvency process commences, the adjudicating authority is mandated to declare a moratorium on continuation or initiation of any coercive legal action against the Corporate Debtor. Even if a company goes into liquidation, a moratorium continues in terms of the IBC.

The IBC prescribes a moratorium on the initiation of CIRP proceedings and its effects. One of the purposes of the moratorium is to keep the assets of the Corporate Debtor together during the insolvency resolution process and to facilitate orderly completion of the processes envisaged under the statute. Such measures ensure the curtailing of parallel proceedings and reduce the possibility of conflicting outcomes in the process. Further, one of the motivations of imposing a moratorium of the IBC to form a shield that protects pecuniary attacks against the Corporate Debtor. This is done in order to provide the Corporate Debtor with breathing space, to allow it to continue as a going concern and rehabilitate itself.

The Court, hence, observed that any contrary interpretation would crack this shield and would have adverse consequences on the objective sought to be achieved.

The Court, further, explained that, the IBC, being the more recent statute, clearly overrides the Customs Act. Section 142A of the Customs Act notes that the Custom Authorities would have first charge on the assets of an assessee under the Customs Act, except with respect to cases under Section 529A of Companies Act 1956, Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act 1993, Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 and the IBC, 2016. This exception created under the Customs Act is duly acknowledged under Section 238 of the IBC as well.  Section 238 of the IBC clearly overrides any provision of law which is inconsistent with the IBC. It was, hence, held that,

“The Customs Act and the IBC act in their own spheres. In case of any conflict, the IBC overrides the Customs Act.”

On the scope of power of CBIC, the Court held that CBIC can only initiate assessment or re-assessment of the duties and other levies. They cannot transgress such boundary and proceed to initiate recovery in violation of Sections 14 or 33(5) of the IBC. The interim resolution professional, resolution professional or the liquidator, as the case may be, has an obligation to ensure that assessment is legal and he has been provided with sufficient power to question any assessment, if he finds the same to be excessive.

Based on the given excerpt, which of the following was held by the Supreme Court of India in relation to the IBC?

In India, when the corporate insolvency process commences, the adjudicating authority is mandated to declare a moratorium on continuation or initiation of any coercive legal action against the Corporate Debtor. Even if a company goes into liquidation, a moratorium continues in terms of the IBC.

The IBC prescribes a moratorium on the initiation of CIRP proceedings and its effects. One of the purposes of the moratorium is to keep the assets of the Corporate Debtor together during the insolvency resolution process and to facilitate orderly completion of the processes envisaged under the statute. Such measures ensure the curtailing of parallel proceedings and reduce the possibility of conflicting outcomes in the process. Further, one of the motivations of imposing a moratorium of the IBC to form a shield that protects pecuniary attacks against the Corporate Debtor. This is done in order to provide the Corporate Debtor with breathing space, to allow it to continue as a going concern and rehabilitate itself.

The Court, hence, observed that any contrary interpretation would crack this shield and would have adverse consequences on the objective sought to be achieved.

The Court, further, explained that, the IBC, being the more recent statute, clearly overrides the Customs Act. Section 142A of the Customs Act notes that the Custom Authorities would have first charge on the assets of an assessee under the Customs Act, except with respect to cases under Section 529A of Companies Act 1956, Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act 1993, Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 and the IBC, 2016. This exception created under the Customs Act is duly acknowledged under Section 238 of the IBC as well.  Section 238 of the IBC clearly overrides any provision of law which is inconsistent with the IBC. It was, hence, held that,

“The Customs Act and the IBC act in their own spheres. In case of any conflict, the IBC overrides the Customs Act.”

On the scope of power of CBIC, the Court held that CBIC can only initiate assessment or re-assessment of the duties and other levies. They cannot transgress such boundary and proceed to initiate recovery in violation of Sections 14 or 33(5) of the IBC. The interim resolution professional, resolution professional or the liquidator, as the case may be, has an obligation to ensure that assessment is legal and he has been provided with sufficient power to question any assessment, if he finds the same to be excessive.

Which of the following enactments has not been amended as part of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016?

In India, when the corporate insolvency process commences, the adjudicating authority is mandated to declare a moratorium on continuation or initiation of any coercive legal action against the Corporate Debtor. Even if a company goes into liquidation, a moratorium continues in terms of the IBC.

The IBC prescribes a moratorium on the initiation of CIRP proceedings and its effects. One of the purposes of the moratorium is to keep the assets of the Corporate Debtor together during the insolvency resolution process and to facilitate orderly completion of the processes envisaged under the statute. Such measures ensure the curtailing of parallel proceedings and reduce the possibility of conflicting outcomes in the process. Further, one of the motivations of imposing a moratorium of the IBC to form a shield that protects pecuniary attacks against the Corporate Debtor. This is done in order to provide the Corporate Debtor with breathing space, to allow it to continue as a going concern and rehabilitate itself.

The Court, hence, observed that any contrary interpretation would crack this shield and would have adverse consequences on the objective sought to be achieved.

The Court, further, explained that, the IBC, being the more recent statute, clearly overrides the Customs Act. Section 142A of the Customs Act notes that the Custom Authorities would have first charge on the assets of an assessee under the Customs Act, except with respect to cases under Section 529A of Companies Act 1956, Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act 1993, Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 and the IBC, 2016. This exception created under the Customs Act is duly acknowledged under Section 238 of the IBC as well.  Section 238 of the IBC clearly overrides any provision of law which is inconsistent with the IBC. It was, hence, held that,

“The Customs Act and the IBC act in their own spheres. In case of any conflict, the IBC overrides the Customs Act.”

On the scope of power of CBIC, the Court held that CBIC can only initiate assessment or re-assessment of the duties and other levies. They cannot transgress such boundary and proceed to initiate recovery in violation of Sections 14 or 33(5) of the IBC. The interim resolution professional, resolution professional or the liquidator, as the case may be, has an obligation to ensure that assessment is legal and he has been provided with sufficient power to question any assessment, if he finds the same to be excessive.

When NCLT doesn’t confirm the proposed name of resolution professional within the specified period then:

That constitutional purpose and constitutional harmony would be maintained and preserved, if a Speaker refrains from adjudication of a petition for disqualification under the Tenth Schedule, whilst his own position, as the Speaker, is under challenge. This would also, allow the two provisions [Article 179(c) and the Tenth Schedule] to operate in their individual constitutional space, without encroaching on the other.”

The Court observed that this proposition of law laid down by the Constitution bench in Nebam Rebia case, stands on contradictory reasoning, which requires gap filling to uphold the constitutional morality. Hence, this question must be referred to Constitution bench for the requisite gap filling exercise to be conducted.

Based on the given excerpt, which of the following judgments is related to the power of the Governor and Speaker while discharging duty under Schedule X of the Constitution?

That constitutional purpose and constitutional harmony would be maintained and preserved, if a Speaker refrains from adjudication of a petition for disqualification under the Tenth Schedule, whilst his own position, as the Speaker, is under challenge. This would also, allow the two provisions [Article 179(c) and the Tenth Schedule] to operate in their individual constitutional space, without encroaching on the other.”

The Court observed that this proposition of law laid down by the Constitution bench in Nebam Rebia case, stands on contradictory reasoning, which requires gap filling to uphold the constitutional morality. Hence, this question must be referred to Constitution bench for the requisite gap filling exercise to be conducted.

Which Article deals with the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of Legislative Assembly ?

That constitutional purpose and constitutional harmony would be maintained and preserved, if a Speaker refrains from adjudication of a petition for disqualification under the Tenth Schedule, whilst his own position, as the Speaker, is under challenge. This would also, allow the two provisions [Article 179(c) and the Tenth Schedule] to operate in their individual constitutional space, without encroaching on the other.”

The Court observed that this proposition of law laid down by the Constitution bench in Nebam Rebia case, stands on contradictory reasoning, which requires gap filling to uphold the constitutional morality. Hence, this question must be referred to Constitution bench for the requisite gap filling exercise to be conducted.

Holding of periodic, free and fair elections by the Election Commission is part of the basic structure of the Constitution as per the following:

That constitutional purpose and constitutional harmony would be maintained and preserved, if a Speaker refrains from adjudication of a petition for disqualification under the Tenth Schedule, whilst his own position, as the Speaker, is under challenge. This would also, allow the two provisions [Article 179(c) and the Tenth Schedule] to operate in their individual constitutional space, without encroaching on the other.”

The Court observed that this proposition of law laid down by the Constitution bench in Nebam Rebia case, stands on contradictory reasoning, which requires gap filling to uphold the constitutional morality. Hence, this question must be referred to Constitution bench for the requisite gap filling exercise to be conducted.

The satisfaction of the President means the satisfaction of the Council of Ministers and not his personal satisfaction, held in

Each case should be scrutinised thoroughly by the public employer concerned, through its designated officials–more so, in the case of recruitment for the police force, who are under a duty to maintain order, and tackle lawlessness, since their ability to inspire public confidence is a bulwark to society’s security. Even in a case where the employee has made declaration truthfully and correctly of a concluded criminal case, the employer still has the right to consider the antecedents and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate. The acquittal in a criminal case would not automatically entitle a candidate for appointment to the post. It would be still open to the employer to consider the antecedents and examine whether the candidate concerned is suitable and fit for appointment to the post.

The suppression of material information and making a false statement in the verification Form relating to arrest, prosecution, conviction etc., has a clear bearing on the character, conduct and antecedents of the employee. If it is found that the employee had suppressed or given false information in regard to the matters having a bearing on his fitness or suitability to the post, he can be terminated from service. The generalisations about the youth, career prospects and age of the candidates leading to condonation of the offenders’ conduct, should not enter the judicial verdict and should be avoided.

In which of the following judgments, the Supreme Court of India has opined that “termination of a CRPF probationer for suppressing material information relating to his criminal antecedents” is not bad in eyes of law? 

Each case should be scrutinised thoroughly by the public employer concerned, through its designated officials–more so, in the case of recruitment for the police force, who are under a duty to maintain order, and tackle lawlessness, since their ability to inspire public confidence is a bulwark to society’s security. Even in a case where the employee has made declaration truthfully and correctly of a concluded criminal case, the employer still has the right to consider the antecedents and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate. The acquittal in a criminal case would not automatically entitle a candidate for appointment to the post. It would be still open to the employer to consider the antecedents and examine whether the candidate concerned is suitable and fit for appointment to the post.

The suppression of material information and making a false statement in the verification Form relating to arrest, prosecution, conviction etc., has a clear bearing on the character, conduct and antecedents of the employee. If it is found that the employee had suppressed or given false information in regard to the matters having a bearing on his fitness or suitability to the post, he can be terminated from service. The generalisations about the youth, career prospects and age of the candidates leading to condonation of the offenders’ conduct, should not enter the judicial verdict and should be avoided.

Which of the following judges of the Supreme Court of India were part of the Bench in the Judgment as given in the excerpt?

Each case should be scrutinised thoroughly by the public employer concerned, through its designated officials–more so, in the case of recruitment for the police force, who are under a duty to maintain order, and tackle lawlessness, since their ability to inspire public confidence is a bulwark to society’s security. Even in a case where the employee has made declaration truthfully and correctly of a concluded criminal case, the employer still has the right to consider the antecedents and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate. The acquittal in a criminal case would not automatically entitle a candidate for appointment to the post. It would be still open to the employer to consider the antecedents and examine whether the candidate concerned is suitable and fit for appointment to the post.

The suppression of material information and making a false statement in the verification Form relating to arrest, prosecution, conviction etc., has a clear bearing on the character, conduct and antecedents of the employee. If it is found that the employee had suppressed or given false information in regard to the matters having a bearing on his fitness or suitability to the post, he can be terminated from service. The generalisations about the youth, career prospects and age of the candidates leading to condonation of the offenders’ conduct, should not enter the judicial verdict and should be avoided.

Which of the following judgments of the Supreme Court of India does not deal with probationer who suppresses a material fact?

Each case should be scrutinised thoroughly by the public employer concerned, through its designated officials–more so, in the case of recruitment for the police force, who are under a duty to maintain order, and tackle lawlessness, since their ability to inspire public confidence is a bulwark to society’s security. Even in a case where the employee has made declaration truthfully and correctly of a concluded criminal case, the employer still has the right to consider the antecedents and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate. The acquittal in a criminal case would not automatically entitle a candidate for appointment to the post. It would be still open to the employer to consider the antecedents and examine whether the candidate concerned is suitable and fit for appointment to the post.

The suppression of material information and making a false statement in the verification Form relating to arrest, prosecution, conviction etc., has a clear bearing on the character, conduct and antecedents of the employee. If it is found that the employee had suppressed or given false information in regard to the matters having a bearing on his fitness or suitability to the post, he can be terminated from service. The generalisations about the youth, career prospects and age of the candidates leading to condonation of the offenders’ conduct, should not enter the judicial verdict and should be avoided.

Which of the following provisions contain Appellate Jurisdiction of Supreme Court in Criminal matters?

After the submission of the draft of the Indian Penal Code in 1837, who reviewed the draft Code?

The Court found it necessary to make this time bound decision so that it does not result in an unending exercise and, thus, the Government of India must exercise the aforesaid powers or render advice on which the President of India is expected to act, within a month of the period of completion of sentence.

“We say so also to respect the very basis on which the Courts of Portugal observed the principles of comity of courts by recognising that there is a separation of powers in India and, thus, the Courts cannot give any assurance. The corresponding principle of comity of courts, thus, has to be observed such that the Government of India having given the solemn assurance, and having accepted the same before us, is bound to act in terms of the aforesaid. We are, thus, taking a call on this issue now and do not want to leave it to any uncertainty in future. This is of course subject to any aggravating aspect of the appellant.”

In which of the following case Supreme Court ruled that Centre Government must honour the commitment it made to Portugal “as per the sovereign assurance and the principle of comity of countries”

International Law also develops through State Practice, it is known as:

Extradition is the process of: –

Harmon Doctrine is:

De Jure Belli Ac Pacis (The Law of War and Peace) was written by:

Principal of “specialty” means that:

principal of “double criminality” means that:

It is one of the most controversial questions that has been debated and on which jurist’s opinions hugely differ. One view considers International law not a true law, rather, a code of rule of conduct backed by morality. On the other hand, International law is considered to be a true law and is regarded as a law, similar to that of ordinary laws of a state, binding upon the citizens..

According to Brierly, “ unless we distort facts so as to feed them into the definition, it cannot account for the existence of English common law.” further, Sir Frederick Pollock writes, and as probably most competent jurist would today agree, the only essential conditions for the existence of law are a political community and the recognition by its members of settled rules binding upon them in that capacity, international law seems on the whole to satisfy these conditions.” Criticising the Australian definition of the “law”, Prof. H.L.A. Hart has also written that this concept plainly approximates closer to penal statutes enacted by legislature of a modern State than to any other variety of law.”

“International law is not true law but a positive international Morality” , said

It is one of the most controversial questions that has been debated and on which jurist’s opinions hugely differ. One view considers International law not a true law, rather, a code of rule of conduct backed by morality. On the other hand, International law is considered to be a true law and is regarded as a law, similar to that of ordinary laws of a state, binding upon the citizens..

According to Brierly, “ unless we distort facts so as to feed them into the definition, it cannot account for the existence of English common law.” further, Sir Frederick Pollock writes, and as probably most competent jurist would today agree, the only essential conditions for the existence of law are a political community and the recognition by its members of settled rules binding upon them in that capacity, international law seems on the whole to satisfy these conditions.” Criticising the Australian definition of the “law”, Prof. H.L.A. Hart has also written that this concept plainly approximates closer to penal statutes enacted by legislature of a modern State than to any other variety of law.”

Hot persuit is the principle designed to ensure:

It is one of the most controversial questions that has been debated and on which jurist’s opinions hugely differ. One view considers International law not a true law, rather, a code of rule of conduct backed by morality. On the other hand, International law is considered to be a true law and is regarded as a law, similar to that of ordinary laws of a state, binding upon the citizens..

According to Brierly, “ unless we distort facts so as to feed them into the definition, it cannot account for the existence of English common law.” further, Sir Frederick Pollock writes, and as probably most competent jurist would today agree, the only essential conditions for the existence of law are a political community and the recognition by its members of settled rules binding upon them in that capacity, international law seems on the whole to satisfy these conditions.” Criticising the Australian definition of the “law”, Prof. H.L.A. Hart has also written that this concept plainly approximates closer to penal statutes enacted by legislature of a modern State than to any other variety of law.”

Features of international law include all except which of the following:

It is one of the most controversial questions that has been debated and on which jurist’s opinions hugely differ. One view considers International law not a true law, rather, a code of rule of conduct backed by morality. On the other hand, International law is considered to be a true law and is regarded as a law, similar to that of ordinary laws of a state, binding upon the citizens..

According to Brierly, “ unless we distort facts so as to feed them into the definition, it cannot account for the existence of English common law.” further, Sir Frederick Pollock writes, and as probably most competent jurist would today agree, the only essential conditions for the existence of law are a political community and the recognition by its members of settled rules binding upon them in that capacity, international law seems on the whole to satisfy these conditions.” Criticising the Australian definition of the “law”, Prof. H.L.A. Hart has also written that this concept plainly approximates closer to penal statutes enacted by legislature of a modern State than to any other variety of law.”

Treaty of Westphalia was signed in:

Culvo Clause means

Stare decisis is also known as the concept of precedent, which means the decision taken by the higher courts shall be followed/binding on the lower courts, which stands as a precedent to the lower courts. This gives the law finality and maintains consistency and permanence. Principle settled, accepted, and acted upon for a long should not be easily departed from. While departing from the settled law or practice, the courts cannot ignore the harm that is likely to happen by unsettling the law that has been settled. This principle was initially coined in medieval England and America, where the courts looked into the judgment of earlier cases as guidance also had the power to reject those which they do not consider good or which they considered bad in their judgment. Article 141 of the Indian Constitution states that “Any law declared by Supreme Court to be binding on all courts within the territory of India.” Therefore, while applying the decision of S.C. by other courts, what is required is to understand the right principle laid down by the previous decision.
In the case of ICICI Bank v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay (2005), it was held that the decision given by the Apex Court must be read following the context of the statutory provisions which have been interpreted by the competent court. It was also stated that no judgement can be read if it is a statute. Since the law cannot always be static, based on the relevant principles and rules, the Judges must cautiously make use of the precedents in deciding cases.

Stare Decisis means the previous judgments shall be 

Stare decisis is also known as the concept of precedent, which means the decision taken by the higher courts shall be followed/binding on the lower courts, which stands as a precedent to the lower courts. This gives the law finality and maintains consistency and permanence. Principle settled, accepted, and acted upon for a long should not be easily departed from. While departing from the settled law or practice, the courts cannot ignore the harm that is likely to happen by unsettling the law that has been settled. This principle was initially coined in medieval England and America, where the courts looked into the judgment of earlier cases as guidance also had the power to reject those which they do not consider good or which they considered bad in their judgment. Article 141 of the Indian Constitution states that “Any law declared by Supreme Court to be binding on all courts within the territory of India.” Therefore, while applying the decision of S.C. by other courts, what is required is to understand the right principle laid down by the previous decision.
In the case of ICICI Bank v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay (2005), it was held that the decision given by the Apex Court must be read following the context of the statutory provisions which have been interpreted by the competent court. It was also stated that no judgement can be read if it is a statute. Since the law cannot always be static, based on the relevant principles and rules, the Judges must cautiously make use of the precedents in deciding cases.

Obiter dicta means saying

Stare decisis is also known as the concept of precedent, which means the decision taken by the higher courts shall be followed/binding on the lower courts, which stands as a precedent to the lower courts. This gives the law finality and maintains consistency and permanence. Principle settled, accepted, and acted upon for a long should not be easily departed from. While departing from the settled law or practice, the courts cannot ignore the harm that is likely to happen by unsettling the law that has been settled. This principle was initially coined in medieval England and America, where the courts looked into the judgment of earlier cases as guidance also had the power to reject those which they do not consider good or which they considered bad in their judgment. Article 141 of the Indian Constitution states that “Any law declared by Supreme Court to be binding on all courts within the territory of India.” Therefore, while applying the decision of S.C. by other courts, what is required is to understand the right principle laid down by the previous decision.
In the case of ICICI Bank v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay (2005), it was held that the decision given by the Apex Court must be read following the context of the statutory provisions which have been interpreted by the competent court. It was also stated that no judgement can be read if it is a statute. Since the law cannot always be static, based on the relevant principles and rules, the Judges must cautiously make use of the precedents in deciding cases.

Lex Externa is the ordinance of

The definition of “proceeds of crime” in PML Act, inter alia, means any property derived or obtained by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. The offences punishable under Sections 7, 12 and 13 are scheduled offences, as is evident from paragraph 8 of Part-A of the Schedule to the PML Act. Any property thus derived as a result of criminal activity relating to offence mentioned in said paragraph 8 of Part-A of the Schedule would certainly be “proceeds of crime”.

“It is true that so long as the amount is in the hands of a bribe giver, and till it does not get impressed with the requisite intent and is actually handed over as a bribe, it would definitely be untainted money. If the money is handed over without such intent, it would be a mere entrustment. If it is thereafter appropriated by the public servant, the offence would be of misappropriation or species thereof but certainly not of bribe. 

Which of the following judgments, the Supreme Court of India held that ‘Bribe Giver’ Is A Party Connected To ‘Proceeds Of Crime’ ; Can Be Prosecuted Under PMLA?

The definition of “proceeds of crime” in PML Act, inter alia, means any property derived or obtained by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. The offences punishable under Sections 7, 12 and 13 are scheduled offences, as is evident from paragraph 8 of Part-A of the Schedule to the PML Act. Any property thus derived as a result of criminal activity relating to offence mentioned in said paragraph 8 of Part-A of the Schedule would certainly be “proceeds of crime”.

“It is true that so long as the amount is in the hands of a bribe giver, and till it does not get impressed with the requisite intent and is actually handed over as a bribe, it would definitely be untainted money. If the money is handed over without such intent, it would be a mere entrustment. If it is thereafter appropriated by the public servant, the offence would be of misappropriation or species thereof but certainly not of bribe. 

When did The Prevention of Money Laundering Act 2002, come into force?

The definition of “proceeds of crime” in PML Act, inter alia, means any property derived or obtained by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. The offences punishable under Sections 7, 12 and 13 are scheduled offences, as is evident from paragraph 8 of Part-A of the Schedule to the PML Act. Any property thus derived as a result of criminal activity relating to offence mentioned in said paragraph 8 of Part-A of the Schedule would certainly be “proceeds of crime”.

“It is true that so long as the amount is in the hands of a bribe giver, and till it does not get impressed with the requisite intent and is actually handed over as a bribe, it would definitely be untainted money. If the money is handed over without such intent, it would be a mere entrustment. If it is thereafter appropriated by the public servant, the offence would be of misappropriation or species thereof but certainly not of bribe. 

Which section of The Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 deals with the Offense relating to bribing a public servant by a commercial organization.?

The definition of “proceeds of crime” in PML Act, inter alia, means any property derived or obtained by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. The offences punishable under Sections 7, 12 and 13 are scheduled offences, as is evident from paragraph 8 of Part-A of the Schedule to the PML Act. Any property thus derived as a result of criminal activity relating to offence mentioned in said paragraph 8 of Part-A of the Schedule would certainly be “proceeds of crime”.

“It is true that so long as the amount is in the hands of a bribe giver, and till it does not get impressed with the requisite intent and is actually handed over as a bribe, it would definitely be untainted money. If the money is handed over without such intent, it would be a mere entrustment. If it is thereafter appropriated by the public servant, the offence would be of misappropriation or species thereof but certainly not of bribe. 

When trying any case, a special Judge may also try any offence, other than an offence specified in section 3 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, with which the accused may, under the?

The definition of “proceeds of crime” in PML Act, inter alia, means any property derived or obtained by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. The offences punishable under Sections 7, 12 and 13 are scheduled offences, as is evident from paragraph 8 of Part-A of the Schedule to the PML Act. Any property thus derived as a result of criminal activity relating to offence mentioned in said paragraph 8 of Part-A of the Schedule would certainly be “proceeds of crime”.

“It is true that so long as the amount is in the hands of a bribe giver, and till it does not get impressed with the requisite intent and is actually handed over as a bribe, it would definitely be untainted money. If the money is handed over without such intent, it would be a mere entrustment. If it is thereafter appropriated by the public servant, the offence would be of misappropriation or species thereof but certainly not of bribe. 

Which of the following section of the IPC deal with the punishment of Bribery?

Freedoms as recognized by the Constitution are inseparable from existence as human beings. People have entrusted power to State under the Constitution which it holds it in trust and as such it is accountable to people in exercise of power. Supreme Court observed this in which of the

Indefinite suspension of internet is not permissible and that repeated orders under Section 144 CrPC will amount to abuse of power. Government should publish all orders of restrictions. And should follov/the principles of proportionality to adopt less restrictive measures. Supreme Court observed this in which of the following case*

Holding meeting by blocking public place or road in protest against particular legislation for indefinite period without permission from authorities is not democratic way of expressing protest. Administration must take necessary action to clear encroachment or obstruction created by such protesters. Supreme Court observed this in which of the following case

The concept of security of State is narrower than public order. A line is required to be drawn between those serious and aggravated forms of public disorder which are calculated to endanger security of State and relatively minor breaches of peace of purely local significance. observed this in which of the following case

In which of the following case Supreme Court held that there cannot be a total prohibition of dance bars in Maharashtra.*

Deity may be a juristic person for purpose of religious laws and capable of asserting property rights. However, deity is not a’person’for the purpose of Part III of the Constitution. Supreme Court observed this in which of the following case*

In which case Supreme Court Up held the validity of national Eligibility Cum Entrance Test (NEET} for admission to medical and dental courses*

In which case Supreme Court held that Writ under Article 32 not maintainable for enforcement of personal contractual rights

In which case Supreme Court held that Speaker of the Legislative Assembly should decide on a petition seeking disqualification of a member under Tenth Schedule of the Constitution within a period of three months, in the absence of exceptional reasons*

In which case Supreme Court held that The Speaker does not have any explicit power to specify the period of disqualification under the Tenth Schedule or bar a Member from contesting elections after disqualification until the end of the term of the Legislative Assembly*

In which case Supreme Court while hearing the Sabarimala reference has held that the Supreme Court can refer questions of law to a larger bench while exercising its review jurisdiction*

In which case Supreme Court held that Civil judges are not eligible to seek direct recruitment to post of District Judges in bar quota*

In which case Supreme Court held that condonation of delay is a   of judicial discretion which must be exercised judiciously is period of limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice.

The concept of’ justice equity and good conscience’ as a tool to ensure a just outcome also finds aspersion in Article 142 of the Constitution. The is necessary for doing complete justice’ is of wide amplitude and encompasses a power of equity which is employed when the strict application of law is inadequate to produce just outcome. Supreme Court observed this in which of the following case*

In which case Supreme Court held that the principle that the High Court should not exercise its extraordinary writ jurisdiction when an efficacious alternative remedy is available. is a rule of prudence and not a rule of law’

In which case Supreme Court held that default sentence must be in access of or in addition to the substantive sentence. Concurrent running of default sentence inter se or with substantive sentence is not permissible*

The Supreme Court in which case held that it is a mandatory legal requirement to specify whether sentences awarded to an accused convicted for two or more offences would run concurrently or consecutively*

In case of trial of offences under special law, the offences shall be tried by the court specifically mentioned in the special law, if the special law is silent about the court by which it can be tried then such an offence is shown in the first Schedule of Cr.P.C to be triable. Supreme court observed this which of the following case*

For fulfilling true spirit of beneficial legislation of section I25 CrPC strict proof of marriage is not required. Long cohabitation between women and man may lead to presumption of marriage entitling maintenance for women and children born to them. This presumption is a rebuttable presumption. Supreme court observed this in which of the following case *

In which case supreme court held that court after passing judgment or final order under section 125 Cr.P.C does not become funcuts officio Section 125 itself contains provision where order passed can be cancelled or altered. It is covered by an exception contained in section 362 Cr.P.C.