CLAT PG 5

under Section 20 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, right of an unmarried daughter to claim maintenance from her father when she is unable to maintain herself is absolute. Such right is granted under the personal law which such daughter has every right in law to enforce against her father. As such, right under Sub-section 3 of Section 20 of the said provisions is recognized to be existing to claim maintenance after she attains majority till her marriage, from her father.

In which of the following cases the Supreme Court made it clear that u/s 20 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, the right of an unmarried daughter to claim maintenance from her father when she is unable to maintain herself is absolute?

Dependants defined, is provided in section____ of The Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act 1956

When did The Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act 1956, come into force?

Section 12 of The Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act 1956deals with_______?

The adoption is to be proved as fact and the burden is on the person who asserts, is held in which of the following case?

For the uninitiated, ‘benami transaction’ generally implies that one purchases the property in the name of somebody else, i.e., a name lender, and the purchaser does not hold beneficial interest in the property. Literally, ‘benami’ means ‘without a name’. 

Section 2(a) of the 1988 Act defines benami transactions as any transaction in which property is transferred to one person for a consideration paid or provided by another person. The law chose to include only tripartite benami transactions, while bipartite/loosely described as benami transactions, were left out of the definition. Reading the aforesaid definition to include sham/bipartite arrangements   within the ambit   would   be against the strict reading of criminal law and would amount to judicial overreach.

The absence of mens rea  creates a harsh provision having strict liability. Further, under the amended 2016 Act, the aspect of mens rea, is brought back through Section 53. Such resurrection clearly indicates that doing away of the mens rea aspect, was without any rhyme or reason, and ended up creating an unusually harsh enactment. 

The criminal provision under Section 3(1) of the 1988 Act has serious lacunae which could not have been cured by judicial forums, even through some form of harmonious interpretation. The 2016 Act contemplates an in-rem forfeiture, wherein the taint of entering into such a benami transaction is not restricted to the person who is entering into the aforesaid transaction, rather, it attaches itself to the property perpetually and extends itself to all proceeds arising from such a property, unless the defence of innocent ownership is established under Section 27(2) of the 2016 Act

In which of the following case Supreme Court held that Sections 3 and 5 of the 1988 Benami Property law “still-born” and “unconstitutional”; 2016 Amendment can only apply prospectively?

For the uninitiated, ‘benami transaction’ generally implies that one purchases the property in the name of somebody else, i.e., a name lender, and the purchaser does not hold beneficial interest in the property. Literally, ‘benami’ means ‘without a name’. 

Section 2(a) of the 1988 Act defines benami transactions as any transaction in which property is transferred to one person for a consideration paid or provided by another person. The law chose to include only tripartite benami transactions, while bipartite/loosely described as benami transactions, were left out of the definition. Reading the aforesaid definition to include sham/bipartite arrangements   within the ambit   would   be against the strict reading of criminal law and would amount to judicial overreach.

The absence of mens rea  creates a harsh provision having strict liability. Further, under the amended 2016 Act, the aspect of mens rea, is brought back through Section 53. Such resurrection clearly indicates that doing away of the mens rea aspect, was without any rhyme or reason, and ended up creating an unusually harsh enactment. 

The criminal provision under Section 3(1) of the 1988 Act has serious lacunae which could not have been cured by judicial forums, even through some form of harmonious interpretation. The 2016 Act contemplates an in-rem forfeiture, wherein the taint of entering into such a benami transaction is not restricted to the person who is entering into the aforesaid transaction, rather, it attaches itself to the property perpetually and extends itself to all proceeds arising from such a property, unless the defence of innocent ownership is established under Section 27(2) of the 2016 Act

Which of the following is correct statement as per PBPT Act, 1988?

For the uninitiated, ‘benami transaction’ generally implies that one purchases the property in the name of somebody else, i.e., a name lender, and the purchaser does not hold beneficial interest in the property. Literally, ‘benami’ means ‘without a name’. 

Section 2(a) of the 1988 Act defines benami transactions as any transaction in which property is transferred to one person for a consideration paid or provided by another person. The law chose to include only tripartite benami transactions, while bipartite/loosely described as benami transactions, were left out of the definition. Reading the aforesaid definition to include sham/bipartite arrangements   within the ambit   would   be against the strict reading of criminal law and would amount to judicial overreach.

The absence of mens rea  creates a harsh provision having strict liability. Further, under the amended 2016 Act, the aspect of mens rea, is brought back through Section 53. Such resurrection clearly indicates that doing away of the mens rea aspect, was without any rhyme or reason, and ended up creating an unusually harsh enactment. 

The criminal provision under Section 3(1) of the 1988 Act has serious lacunae which could not have been cured by judicial forums, even through some form of harmonious interpretation. The 2016 Act contemplates an in-rem forfeiture, wherein the taint of entering into such a benami transaction is not restricted to the person who is entering into the aforesaid transaction, rather, it attaches itself to the property perpetually and extends itself to all proceeds arising from such a property, unless the defence of innocent ownership is established under Section 27(2) of the 2016 Act

Can Law retroactively invigorate a stillborn criminal offence under the Criminal Jurisprudence ?

____________________ is based upon the assumption that behavior is rational and that criminal behavior can be prevented if people are afraid of the penalties.

A law that retroactively alters the definition of crimes or increases the punishment for criminal acts is known as ________________________.

The Court was of the opinion that the predominant understanding of the concept of a “family” both in the law and in society is that it consists of a single, unchanging unit with a mother and a father (who remain constant over time) and their children, ignores the fact that many circumstances lead to a change in one’s familial structure, and that many families do not conform to this expectation to begin with.

“A household may be a single parent household for any number of reasons, including the death of a spouse, separation, or divorce. Similarly, the guardians and caretakers (who traditionally occupy the roles of the “mother” and the “father”) of children may change with remarriage, adoption, or fostering. These manifestations of love and of families may not be typical but they are as real as their traditional counterparts. Such atypical manifestations of the family unit are equally deserving not only of protection under law but also of the benefits available under social welfare legislation. The black letter of the law must not be relied upon to disadvantage families which are different from traditional ones. The same undoubtedly holds true for women who take on the role of motherhood in ways that may not find a place in the popular imagination.”

The Court went on to show concern over the fact that gendered roles assigned to women and societal expectations mean that women are always pressed upon to take a disproportionate burden of childcare work.

In which of the following case Supreme Court observed that “familial relationships may take the form of domestic, unmarried partnerships or queer relationships.”

The Court was of the opinion that the predominant understanding of the concept of a “family” both in the law and in society is that it consists of a single, unchanging unit with a mother and a father (who remain constant over time) and their children, ignores the fact that many circumstances lead to a change in one’s familial structure, and that many families do not conform to this expectation to begin with.

“A household may be a single parent household for any number of reasons, including the death of a spouse, separation, or divorce. Similarly, the guardians and caretakers (who traditionally occupy the roles of the “mother” and the “father”) of children may change with remarriage, adoption, or fostering. These manifestations of love and of families may not be typical but they are as real as their traditional counterparts. Such atypical manifestations of the family unit are equally deserving not only of protection under law but also of the benefits available under social welfare legislation. The black letter of the law must not be relied upon to disadvantage families which are different from traditional ones. The same undoubtedly holds true for women who take on the role of motherhood in ways that may not find a place in the popular imagination.”

The Court went on to show concern over the fact that gendered roles assigned to women and societal expectations mean that women are always pressed upon to take a disproportionate burden of childcare work.

The maternity benefit act’s objectives were achieved by the enactment of _______________

The Court was of the opinion that the predominant understanding of the concept of a “family” both in the law and in society is that it consists of a single, unchanging unit with a mother and a father (who remain constant over time) and their children, ignores the fact that many circumstances lead to a change in one’s familial structure, and that many families do not conform to this expectation to begin with.

“A household may be a single parent household for any number of reasons, including the death of a spouse, separation, or divorce. Similarly, the guardians and caretakers (who traditionally occupy the roles of the “mother” and the “father”) of children may change with remarriage, adoption, or fostering. These manifestations of love and of families may not be typical but they are as real as their traditional counterparts. Such atypical manifestations of the family unit are equally deserving not only of protection under law but also of the benefits available under social welfare legislation. The black letter of the law must not be relied upon to disadvantage families which are different from traditional ones. The same undoubtedly holds true for women who take on the role of motherhood in ways that may not find a place in the popular imagination.”

The Court went on to show concern over the fact that gendered roles assigned to women and societal expectations mean that women are always pressed upon to take a disproportionate burden of childcare work.

_____________ means in relation to an establishment being a mine (or an establishment wherein persons are employed for the exhibition of equestrian, acrobatic and other performances) the Central government and in relation to any other establishment.

The Court was of the opinion that the predominant understanding of the concept of a “family” both in the law and in society is that it consists of a single, unchanging unit with a mother and a father (who remain constant over time) and their children, ignores the fact that many circumstances lead to a change in one’s familial structure, and that many families do not conform to this expectation to begin with.

“A household may be a single parent household for any number of reasons, including the death of a spouse, separation, or divorce. Similarly, the guardians and caretakers (who traditionally occupy the roles of the “mother” and the “father”) of children may change with remarriage, adoption, or fostering. These manifestations of love and of families may not be typical but they are as real as their traditional counterparts. Such atypical manifestations of the family unit are equally deserving not only of protection under law but also of the benefits available under social welfare legislation. The black letter of the law must not be relied upon to disadvantage families which are different from traditional ones. The same undoubtedly holds true for women who take on the role of motherhood in ways that may not find a place in the popular imagination.”

The Court went on to show concern over the fact that gendered roles assigned to women and societal expectations mean that women are always pressed upon to take a disproportionate burden of childcare work.

Which of the Section of Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 deal with Crèche facility?

The Court was of the opinion that the predominant understanding of the concept of a “family” both in the law and in society is that it consists of a single, unchanging unit with a mother and a father (who remain constant over time) and their children, ignores the fact that many circumstances lead to a change in one’s familial structure, and that many families do not conform to this expectation to begin with.

“A household may be a single parent household for any number of reasons, including the death of a spouse, separation, or divorce. Similarly, the guardians and caretakers (who traditionally occupy the roles of the “mother” and the “father”) of children may change with remarriage, adoption, or fostering. These manifestations of love and of families may not be typical but they are as real as their traditional counterparts. Such atypical manifestations of the family unit are equally deserving not only of protection under law but also of the benefits available under social welfare legislation. The black letter of the law must not be relied upon to disadvantage families which are different from traditional ones. The same undoubtedly holds true for women who take on the role of motherhood in ways that may not find a place in the popular imagination.”

The Court went on to show concern over the fact that gendered roles assigned to women and societal expectations mean that women are always pressed upon to take a disproportionate burden of childcare work.

What is the maximum period for which any woman is entitled to maternity benefit ?

The Court observed that merely because a writ petition can be maintained against the private individuals discharging the public duties and/or public functions, the same should not be entertained if the enforcement is sought to be secured under the realm of a private law.

1. An application under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable against a person or a body discharging public duties or public functions. The public duty cast may be either statutory or otherwise and where it is otherwise, the body or the person must be shown to owe that duty or obligation to the public involving the public law element. Similarly, for ascertaining the discharge of public function, it must be established that the body or the person was seeking to achieve the same for the collective benefit of the 64 public or a section of it and the authority to do so must be accepted by the public.
2. Even if it be assumed that an educational institution is imparting public duty, the act complained of must have a direct nexus with the discharge of public duty. It is indisputably a public law action which confers a right upon the aggrieved to invoke the extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 for a prerogative writ. Wherever Courts have intervened in their exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, either   the  service conditions were regulated by the statutory provisions or the employer had the status of “State” within the expansive definition under Article 12 or it was found that the action complained of has public law element.
3. While a body may be discharging a public function or performing a public duty and thus its actions becoming amenable to  judicial review by a Constitutional Court, its employees would not have the right to invoke the powers of the High Court conferred by Article 226 in respect of matter relating to service where they are not governed or controlled by the statutory provisions. An educational institution may fall within the domain of a “public function” or “public duty” be undisputedly open to challenge and scrutiny under Article 226 of the Constitution, however, the actions or decisions taken solely within the confines of an ordinary contract of service, having no statutory force or backing, cannot be recognised as being amenable to challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the absence of the service conditions being controlled or governed by statutory provisions, the matter would remain in the realm of an ordinary contract of service.

In which of the following Supreme Court held that Employees cannot invoke writ jurisdiction against private educational institution for disputes relating to ordinary contract of service

The Court observed that merely because a writ petition can be maintained against the private individuals discharging the public duties and/or public functions, the same should not be entertained if the enforcement is sought to be secured under the realm of a private law.

1. An application under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable against a person or a body discharging public duties or public functions. The public duty cast may be either statutory or otherwise and where it is otherwise, the body or the person must be shown to owe that duty or obligation to the public involving the public law element. Similarly, for ascertaining the discharge of public function, it must be established that the body or the person was seeking to achieve the same for the collective benefit of the 64 public or a section of it and the authority to do so must be accepted by the public.
2. Even if it be assumed that an educational institution is imparting public duty, the act complained of must have a direct nexus with the discharge of public duty. It is indisputably a public law action which confers a right upon the aggrieved to invoke the extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 for a prerogative writ. Wherever Courts have intervened in their exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, either   the  service conditions were regulated by the statutory provisions or the employer had the status of “State” within the expansive definition under Article 12 or it was found that the action complained of has public law element.
3. While a body may be discharging a public function or performing a public duty and thus its actions becoming amenable to  judicial review by a Constitutional Court, its employees would not have the right to invoke the powers of the High Court conferred by Article 226 in respect of matter relating to service where they are not governed or controlled by the statutory provisions. An educational institution may fall within the domain of a “public function” or “public duty” be undisputedly open to challenge and scrutiny under Article 226 of the Constitution, however, the actions or decisions taken solely within the confines of an ordinary contract of service, having no statutory force or backing, cannot be recognised as being amenable to challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the absence of the service conditions being controlled or governed by statutory provisions, the matter would remain in the realm of an ordinary contract of service.

Which of the following case is not related to Writ Jurisdiction?

The Court observed that merely because a writ petition can be maintained against the private individuals discharging the public duties and/or public functions, the same should not be entertained if the enforcement is sought to be secured under the realm of a private law.

1. An application under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable against a person or a body discharging public duties or public functions. The public duty cast may be either statutory or otherwise and where it is otherwise, the body or the person must be shown to owe that duty or obligation to the public involving the public law element. Similarly, for ascertaining the discharge of public function, it must be established that the body or the person was seeking to achieve the same for the collective benefit of the 64 public or a section of it and the authority to do so must be accepted by the public.
2. Even if it be assumed that an educational institution is imparting public duty, the act complained of must have a direct nexus with the discharge of public duty. It is indisputably a public law action which confers a right upon the aggrieved to invoke the extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 for a prerogative writ. Wherever Courts have intervened in their exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, either   the  service conditions were regulated by the statutory provisions or the employer had the status of “State” within the expansive definition under Article 12 or it was found that the action complained of has public law element.
3. While a body may be discharging a public function or performing a public duty and thus its actions becoming amenable to  judicial review by a Constitutional Court, its employees would not have the right to invoke the powers of the High Court conferred by Article 226 in respect of matter relating to service where they are not governed or controlled by the statutory provisions. An educational institution may fall within the domain of a “public function” or “public duty” be undisputedly open to challenge and scrutiny under Article 226 of the Constitution, however, the actions or decisions taken solely within the confines of an ordinary contract of service, having no statutory force or backing, cannot be recognised as being amenable to challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the absence of the service conditions being controlled or governed by statutory provisions, the matter would remain in the realm of an ordinary contract of service.

The power to issue writs by the Supreme Court has been envisaged under which of the following articles?

Writ of Mandamus can’t be issued, where a fundamental Right is Infringed by

The Court observed that merely because a writ petition can be maintained against the private individuals discharging the public duties and/or public functions, the same should not be entertained if the enforcement is sought to be secured under the realm of a private law.

1. An application under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable against a person or a body discharging public duties or public functions. The public duty cast may be either statutory or otherwise and where it is otherwise, the body or the person must be shown to owe that duty or obligation to the public involving the public law element. Similarly, for ascertaining the discharge of public function, it must be established that the body or the person was seeking to achieve the same for the collective benefit of the 64 public or a section of it and the authority to do so must be accepted by the public.
2. Even if it be assumed that an educational institution is imparting public duty, the act complained of must have a direct nexus with the discharge of public duty. It is indisputably a public law action which confers a right upon the aggrieved to invoke the extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 for a prerogative writ. Wherever Courts have intervened in their exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, either   the  service conditions were regulated by the statutory provisions or the employer had the status of “State” within the expansive definition under Article 12 or it was found that the action complained of has public law element.
3. While a body may be discharging a public function or performing a public duty and thus its actions becoming amenable to  judicial review by a Constitutional Court, its employees would not have the right to invoke the powers of the High Court conferred by Article 226 in respect of matter relating to service where they are not governed or controlled by the statutory provisions. An educational institution may fall within the domain of a “public function” or “public duty” be undisputedly open to challenge and scrutiny under Article 226 of the Constitution, however, the actions or decisions taken solely within the confines of an ordinary contract of service, having no statutory force or backing, cannot be recognised as being amenable to challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the absence of the service conditions being controlled or governed by statutory provisions, the matter would remain in the realm of an ordinary contract of service.

In which Situation Writ under Article 226 is writ petition can be maintained against the private individuals discharging the public duties and/or public functions?

The apex court in Nikesh Tarachand Shah vs. Union of India, the PMLA provision had challenged under Article 14, the Supreme Court considered the discrimination caused by (a) the classification of the offences under Section 45(1) and (b) the application of Section 45(1) to various situations. The Supreme Court held that a classification based on sentence of imprisonment of the Scheduled Offence, had no rational relation to the object of the PMLA, i.e. attaching and bringing back into the economy large amounts byway of proceeds of crime. The court considered that the money/proceeds could also be derived from other serious offences under the IPC (i.e. offences with a maximum punishment of 10 years), which were not explicitly mentioned in Part A, however, a person accused of such an offence could get bail without the application of the Impugned Conditions.

It is the duty of the court to examine the jurisdictional facts including the mandate of Section 45 of the PMLA Act, which must be kept in mind, the bench comprising Justices AM Khanwilkar and CT Ravi Kumar observed while setting aside an order passed by the High Court of Telangana by which it granted anticipatory bail to an accused in connection with offence concerning the Prevention of Money Laundering Act.

The court observed that Indeed, the offence under the PMLA Act is dependent on the predicate offence which would be under ordinary law, including provisions of Indian Penal Code. That does not mean that while considering the prayer for grant of anticipatory bail in connection with PMLA offence, the mandate of Section 45 of the PMLA Act would not come into play.

In which of the following case Supreme Court observed that anticipatory application under CrPC is maintainable under PMLA?

In which of the following case the Supreme Court struck down the provision of Section 45(1) on the ground that it violated Article 14 and Article 21 of the Constitution of India, i.e. provisions which protect the constitutional right to equality and the right to life and personal liberty, and it directed all the petitions (arising from bail applications) to be remanded to the respective courts to be heard and decided on merits, without the application of the additional conditions contained in Section 45(1) of the PMLA.

Classification of compoundable & non-compoundable offences has been provided under

In which of the following case SC re-stated the ‘triple test’ for granting bail.?

The Supreme Court highlighted the difference between the perception of the society toward traditional crimes and economic offences

The mandate of law itself postulated that examination-in-chief followed with cross-examination is to be recorded either on the same day or on the day following. In other words, there should not be any ground for adjournment in recording the examination-in-chief/cross-examination of the prosecution witness, as the case may be.”

Section 309 of the Cr.P.C. states that: Power to postpone or adjourn proceedings.

(1) In every inquiry or trial, the proceedings shall be held as expeditiously as possible, and in particular, when the examination of witnesses has once begun, the same shall be continued from day to day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined, unless the Court finds the adjournment of the same beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons to be recorded.

(2) If the Court, after taking cognizance of an offence, or commencement of trial, finds it necessary or advisable to postpone the commencement of, or adjourn, any inquiry or trial, it may, from time to time, for reasons to be recorded, postpone or adjourn the same on such terms as it thinks fit, for such time as it considers reasonable, and may by a warrant remand the accused if in custody:

Provided that no Magistrate shall remand an accused person to custody under this section for a term exceeding fifteen days at a time: Provided further that when witnesses are in attendance, no adjournment or postponement shall be granted, without examining them, except for special reasons to be recorded in writing:

Provided also that no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose only of enabling the accused person to show cause against the sentence proposed to be imposed on him.

Explanation 1.- If sufficient evidence has been obtained to raise a suspicion that the accused may have committed an offence, and it appears likely that further evidence may be obtained by a remand, this is a reasonable cause for a remand. 

Explanation 2.- The terms on which an adjournment or postponement may be granted include, in appropriate cases, the payment of costs by the prosecution or the accused.

Based on the given excerpt, which of the following judgments Supreme Court held that Chief Examination & Cross-Examination Of Witness Must Be Recorded On The Same Day Or Following Day? 

Under section 311 of CrPC, a witness can be called

Power under section 319 of CrPC can be exercised

Which case is related of the power of the court to examine the accused?

In which of the following judgements delivered by the Supreme Court in 2015, it was held that “it is imperative if the examination-in-chief is over, the cross-examination should be completed the same day”?

     “Wrong is in morals the contrary of right. Right action is that which moral rules prescribe or commend wrong action is that which they forbid. For legal purposes anything is wrong which is forbidden by law; there is a Wrong done whenever a legal duty is broken. A wrong may be described, in the largest sense, as anything done omitted contrary to legal duty, considered insofar as it gives rise to liability. Hence the existence of Duty, as it involves right, involves also the possibility of wrong; logically no more than this possibility, though we know too well that all rules are in fact sometimes broken. Duty, right and wrong or not separate or divisible heads of legal rules or of their subject-matter, but different legal aspects of the same rules and events. There may be duties and rights without any wrong; this happens whenever legal duties are justly and truly fulfilled. There cannot, of course be a wrong without duty already existing, but wrongs also create new duties and liabilities. Strictly speaking, therefore, there can be no such thing as a distinct law of wrongs. By the law of wrongs we can mean only the law of duties, or some class of duties, considered as exposed to infraction, and the special rules for awarding redress or punishment which came into play when infraction has taken place. There is not one Law of rights or duties and another Law or wrongs. Nevertheless there are some kinds of duties which are more conspicuous in the breach than in the observance. The natural end of positive duty is performance. A thing has to be done, and when it is duty done the duty is, as we say, discharged; the man who lawfully bound is lawfully free. We contemplate performance, not breach. Appointments officers are made, or ought to be, in the expectation that the persons appointed will adequately fulfill their official duties.

The natural end of a positive duty is termed as:

“Wrong is in morals the contrary of right. Right action is that which moral rules prescribe or commend wrong action is that which they forbid. For legal purposes anything is wrong which is forbidden by law; there is a Wrong done whenever a legal duty is broken. A wrong may be described, in the largest sense, as anything done omitted contrary to legal duty, considered insofar as it gives rise to liability. Hence the existence of Duty, as it involves right, involves also the possibility of wrong; logically no more than this possibility, though we know too well that all rules are in fact sometimes broken. Duty, right and wrong or not separate or divisible heads of legal rules or of their subject-matter, but different legal aspects of the same rules and events. There may be duties and rights without any wrong; this happens whenever legal duties are justly and truly fulfilled. There cannot, of course be a wrong without duty already existing, but wrongs also create new duties and liabilities. Strictly speaking, therefore, there can be no such thing as a distinct law of wrongs. By the law of wrongs we can mean only the law of duties, or some class of duties, considered as exposed to infraction, and the special rules for awarding redress or punishment which came into play when infraction has taken place. There is not one Law of rights or duties and another Law or wrongs. Nevertheless there are some kinds of duties which are more conspicuous in the breach than in the observance. The natural end of positive duty is performance. A thing has to be done, and when it is duty done the duty is, as we say, discharged; the man who lawfully bound is lawfully free. We contemplate performance, not breach. Appointments officers are made, or ought to be, in the expectation that the persons appointed will adequately fulfill their official duties.

Which of the following can’t be termed as wrong?

“Wrong is in morals the contrary of right. Right action is that which moral rules prescribe or commend wrong action is that which they forbid. For legal purposes anything is wrong which is forbidden by law; there is a Wrong done whenever a legal duty is broken. A wrong may be described, in the largest sense, as anything done omitted contrary to legal duty, considered insofar as it gives rise to liability. Hence the existence of Duty, as it involves right, involves also the possibility of wrong; logically no more than this possibility, though we know too well that all rules are in fact sometimes broken. Duty, right and wrong or not separate or divisible heads of legal rules or of their subject-matter, but different legal aspects of the same rules and events. There may be duties and rights without any wrong; this happens whenever legal duties are justly and truly fulfilled. There cannot, of course be a wrong without duty already existing, but wrongs also create new duties and liabilities. Strictly speaking, therefore, there can be no such thing as a distinct law of wrongs. By the law of wrongs we can mean only the law of duties, or some class of duties, considered as exposed to infraction, and the special rules for awarding redress or punishment which came into play when infraction has taken place. There is not one Law of rights or duties and another Law or wrongs. Nevertheless there are some kinds of duties which are more conspicuous in the breach than in the observance. The natural end of positive duty is performance. A thing has to be done, and when it is duty done the duty is, as we say, discharged; the man who lawfully bound is lawfully free. We contemplate performance, not breach. Appointments officers are made, or ought to be, in the expectation that the persons appointed will adequately fulfill their official duties.

Which of the following maxim enshrines the principle that ‘there can’t be a wrong, without be a wrong, without a corresponding duty?

Who said that ‘legal right as the capacity residing in one man of controlling, with the assent and the assistance of the state the actions of the others?

“Wrong is in morals the contrary of right. Right action is that which moral rules prescribe or commend wrong action is that which they forbid. For legal purposes anything is wrong which is forbidden by law; there is a Wrong done whenever a legal duty is broken. A wrong may be described, in the largest sense, as anything done omitted contrary to legal duty, considered insofar as it gives rise to liability. Hence the existence of Duty, as it involves right, involves also the possibility of wrong; logically no more than this possibility, though we know too well that all rules are in fact sometimes broken. Duty, right and wrong or not separate or divisible heads of legal rules or of their subject-matter, but different legal aspects of the same rules and events. There may be duties and rights without any wrong; this happens whenever legal duties are justly and truly fulfilled. There cannot, of course be a wrong without duty already existing, but wrongs also create new duties and liabilities. Strictly speaking, therefore, there can be no such thing as a distinct law of wrongs. By the law of wrongs we can mean only the law of duties, or some class of duties, considered as exposed to infraction, and the special rules for awarding redress or punishment which came into play when infraction has taken place. There is not one Law of rights or duties and another Law or wrongs. Nevertheless there are some kinds of duties which are more conspicuous in the breach than in the observance. The natural end of positive duty is performance. A thing has to be done, and when it is duty done the duty is, as we say, discharged; the man who lawfully bound is lawfully free. We contemplate performance, not breach. Appointments officers are made, or ought to be, in the expectation that the persons appointed will adequately fulfill their official duties.

Who said that ‘a right is an interest and protected by a rule of right. It is an interest, respect for which is a duty and disregard of which is wrong’?

In the case of a group of people had sold their tea estate to a company that was incorporated by them itself. They tried to avoid the ad valorem duty stating that they were themselves the shareholder of the company. Therefore it would be a transfer by them to themselves in another name. The Calcutta High court refused this observation and held that the company is  from member, shareholders, promoters, etc. & the duty is to be paid by the shareholders to the company. This was established in India much before the famous UK (3) case had come into existence. It was recognized as the principle of (4) & was later prescribed in many statutes including (5). Also, in the case of (6), promoter incorporated an Air Farming Company, being the managing director he appointed himself as a pilot. One day in a normal course of business he expired due to a flying accident. His wife recovered the compensation under .

Explain the principle referred in question 4.

In the case of a group of people had sold their tea estate to a company that was incorporated by them itself. They tried to avoid the ad valorem duty stating that they were themselves the shareholder of the company. Therefore it would be a transfer by them to themselves in another name. The Calcutta High court refused this observation and held that the company is  from member, shareholders, promoters, etc. & the duty is to be paid by the shareholders to the company. This was established in India much before the famous UK (3) case had come into existence. It was recognized as the principle of (4) & was later prescribed in many statutes including (5). Also, in the case of (6), promoter incorporated an Air Farming Company, being the managing director he appointed himself as a pilot. One day in a normal course of business he expired due to a flying accident. His wife recovered the compensation under .

Which Statute is referred in (5)?

In the case of a group of people had sold their tea estate to a company that was incorporated by them itself. They tried to avoid the ad valorem duty stating that they were themselves the shareholder of the company. Therefore it would be a transfer by them to themselves in another name. The Calcutta High court refused this observation and held that the company is  from member, shareholders, promoters, etc. & the duty is to be paid by the shareholders to the company. This was established in India much before the famous UK (3) case had come into existence. It was recognized as the principle of (4) & was later prescribed in many statutes including (5). Also, in the case of (6), promoter incorporated an Air Farming Company, being the managing director he appointed himself as a pilot. One day in a normal course of business he expired due to a flying accident. His wife recovered the compensation under .

Which case is replaced with (3)?

Which of the following cases corporate veil of the company has not been lifted by the court:

In the case of a group of people had sold their tea estate to a company that was incorporated by them itself. They tried to avoid the ad valorem duty stating that they were themselves the shareholder of the company. Therefore it would be a transfer by them to themselves in another name. The Calcutta High court refused this observation and held that the company is  from member, shareholders, promoters, etc. & the duty is to be paid by the shareholders to the company. This was established in India much before the famous UK (3) case had come into existence. It was recognized as the principle of (4) & was later prescribed in many statutes including (5). Also, in the case of (6), promoter incorporated an Air Farming Company, being the managing director he appointed himself as a pilot. One day in a normal course of business he expired due to a flying accident. His wife recovered the compensation under .

“Nothing connected with the internal disputes between the shareholders is to be the subject of an action by a shareholder.” This majority rule was laid down in the celebrated case of

This case was one of the earliest international environment law cases that involved a dispute over Transboundary air pollution from a factory. It gave rise to Polluters Pay Principle (PPP) that was a key foundation of international environmental law. The first endorsement of the precautionary principle was made in 1982 when World Charter for nature was adopted by UNGA of United Nations Organization and its implementation was done through  for the first time. The International Court of Justice in  was presented with an opportunity to consider the legal status of principles of sustainable development, the precautionary principles and the environmental impact assessment and that the sustainable development is considered as a major principle in the international environmental law.

In which of the following cases was it observed that the laws of the flag state will apply when crimes have occurred on board ship even while it is on foreign waters?

This case was one of the earliest international environment law cases that involved a dispute over Transboundary air pollution from a factory. It gave rise to Polluters Pay Principle (PPP) that was a key foundation of international environmental law. The first endorsement of the precautionary principle was made in 1982 when World Charter for nature was adopted by UNGA of United Nations Organization and its implementation was done through  for the first time. The International Court of Justice in  was presented with an opportunity to consider the legal status of principles of sustainable development, the precautionary principles and the environmental impact assessment and that the sustainable development is considered as a major principle in the international environmental law.

Which of the following statements is correct about an archipelagic state?

This case was one of the earliest international environment law cases that involved a dispute over Transboundary air pollution from a factory. It gave rise to Polluters Pay Principle (PPP) that was a key foundation of international environmental law. The first endorsement of the precautionary principle was made in 1982 when World Charter for nature was adopted by UNGA of United Nations Organization and its implementation was done through  for the first time. The International Court of Justice in  was presented with an opportunity to consider the legal status of principles of sustainable development, the precautionary principles and the environmental impact assessment and that the sustainable development is considered as a major principle in the international environmental law.

The first endorsement of the precautionary principle was made in 1982 when World Charter for nature was adopted by UNGA of United Nations Organization and its implementation was done.

The Supreme of India observed that the precautionary principle, polluters pay principle and the concept of sustainable development are part of customary international law and there should be no difficulty in accepting these principle in domestic laws of India and that according to new concept the burden of proof lies on the developer or industrialists. Which case of India is referred in?

This case was one of the earliest international environment law cases that involved a dispute over Transboundary air pollution from a factory. It gave rise to Polluters Pay Principle (PPP) that was a key foundation of international environmental law. The first endorsement of the precautionary principle was made in 1982 when World Charter for nature was adopted by UNGA of United Nations Organization and its implementation was done through  for the first time. The International Court of Justice in  was presented with an opportunity to consider the legal status of principles of sustainable development, the precautionary principles and the environmental impact assessment and that the sustainable development is considered as a major principle in the international environmental law.

Which among the following produced the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)?

The bench pointed out that under Article 145(5), the concurrence of majority judges is viewed as judgment of the Court. It also noted that the same issue was answered by Justice Nageswara Rao’s judgment in Dr.Jayasree Patil case (Maratha quota case).

The issue was referred by a 2-judge comprising Justices RF Nariman and Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul in 2017 observing :

“If a unanimous 5 Judge Bench decision is overruled by a 7 Judge Bench, with four learned Judges speaking for the majority, and three learned Judges speaking for the minority, can it be said that the 5 Judge Bench has been overruled? Under the present practice, it is clear that the view of four learned Judges speaking for the majority in a 7 Judge Bench will prevail over a unanimous 5 Judge Bench decision, because they happen to speak for a 7 Judge Bench. Has the time come to tear the judicial veil and hold that in reality a view of five learned Judges cannot be overruled by a view of four learned Judges speaking for a Bench of 7 learned Judges? This is a question which also needs to be addressed and answered”.

In which of the following cases Supreme Court held that Larger Bench Judgment Will Prevail Regardless Of Number Of Judges In Majority?

What is the minimum number of Judges of the Supreme Court required for hearing any case involving interpretation of the Constitution?

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) would prevail over the Customs Act, 1962 to the extent that once moratorium is imposed in terms of Sections 14 or 33(5) of the IBC as the case may be, the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs (CBIC) only has a limited jurisdiction to assess/determine the quantum of customs duty and other levies as it does not have the power to initiate recovery of dues by means of sale/confiscation, as provided under the Customs Act.

In India, when the corporate insolvency process commences, the adjudicating authority is mandated to declare a moratorium on continuation or initiation of any coercive legal action against the Corporate Debtor. Even if a company goes into liquidation, a moratorium continues in terms of Section 33(5) of the IBC.

Section 14 of the IBC prescribes a moratorium on the initiation of CIRP proceedings and its effects. One of the purposes of the moratorium is to keep the assets of the Corporate Debtor together during the insolvency resolution process and to facilitate orderly completion of the processes envisaged under the statute. Such measures ensure the curtailing of parallel proceedings and reduce the possibility of conflicting outcomes in the process. Further, one of the motivations of imposing a moratorium is for Section 14(1)(a), (b), and (c) of the IBC to form a shield that protects pecuniary attacks against the Corporate Debtor. This is done in order to provide the Corporate Debtor with breathing space, to allow it to continue as a going concern and rehabilitate itself.

The Court, hence, observed that any contrary interpretation would crack this shield and would have adverse consequences on the objective sought to be achieved.

The Court, further, explained that, the IBC, being the more recent statute, clearly overrides the Customs Act. Section 142A of the Customs Act notes that the Custom Authorities would have first charge on the assets of an assessee under the Customs Act, except with respect to cases under Section 529A of Companies Act 1956, Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act 1993, Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 and the IBC, 2016. This exception created under the Customs Act is duly acknowledged under Section 238 of the IBC as well.  Section 238 of the IBC clearly overrides any provision of law which is inconsistent with the IBC. It was, hence, held that,

“The Customs Act and the IBC act in their own spheres. In case of any conflict, the IBC overrides the Customs Act.”

On the scope of power of CBIC, the Court held that CBIC can only initiate assessment or re-assessment of the duties and other levies. They cannot transgress such boundary and proceed to initiate recovery in violation of Sections 14 or 33(5) of the IBC. The interim resolution professional, resolution professional or the liquidator, as the case may be, has an obligation to ensure that assessment is legal and he has been provided with sufficient power to question any assessment, if he finds the same to be excessive.

The Court also took note of the fact that issuing a notice under Section 72 of the Customs Act for non-payment of customs duty falls squarely within the ambit of initiating legal proceedings against a Corporate Debtor. Even under the liquidation process, the liquidator is given the responsibility to secure assets and goods of the Corporate Debtor under Section 35(1)(b) of IBC. On the other hand, the authorities under the Customs Act have a limited jurisdiction to determine the quantum of operational debt in order to stake claim in terms of Section 53 of the IBC before the liquidator. CBIC does not have the power to execute its claim beyond the ambit of Section 53 of the IBC.

In which of the following case Supreme Court held that IBC will be prevails over Customs Act?

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) would prevail over the Customs Act, 1962 to the extent that once moratorium is imposed in terms of Sections 14 or 33(5) of the IBC as the case may be, the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs (CBIC) only has a limited jurisdiction to assess/determine the quantum of customs duty and other levies as it does not have the power to initiate recovery of dues by means of sale/confiscation, as provided under the Customs Act.

In India, when the corporate insolvency process commences, the adjudicating authority is mandated to declare a moratorium on continuation or initiation of any coercive legal action against the Corporate Debtor. Even if a company goes into liquidation, a moratorium continues in terms of Section 33(5) of the IBC.

Section 14 of the IBC prescribes a moratorium on the initiation of CIRP proceedings and its effects. One of the purposes of the moratorium is to keep the assets of the Corporate Debtor together during the insolvency resolution process and to facilitate orderly completion of the processes envisaged under the statute. Such measures ensure the curtailing of parallel proceedings and reduce the possibility of conflicting outcomes in the process. Further, one of the motivations of imposing a moratorium is for Section 14(1)(a), (b), and (c) of the IBC to form a shield that protects pecuniary attacks against the Corporate Debtor. This is done in order to provide the Corporate Debtor with breathing space, to allow it to continue as a going concern and rehabilitate itself.

The Court, hence, observed that any contrary interpretation would crack this shield and would have adverse consequences on the objective sought to be achieved.

The Court, further, explained that, the IBC, being the more recent statute, clearly overrides the Customs Act. Section 142A of the Customs Act notes that the Custom Authorities would have first charge on the assets of an assessee under the Customs Act, except with respect to cases under Section 529A of Companies Act 1956, Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act 1993, Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 and the IBC, 2016. This exception created under the Customs Act is duly acknowledged under Section 238 of the IBC as well.  Section 238 of the IBC clearly overrides any provision of law which is inconsistent with the IBC. It was, hence, held that,

“The Customs Act and the IBC act in their own spheres. In case of any conflict, the IBC overrides the Customs Act.”

On the scope of power of CBIC, the Court held that CBIC can only initiate assessment or re-assessment of the duties and other levies. They cannot transgress such boundary and proceed to initiate recovery in violation of Sections 14 or 33(5) of the IBC. The interim resolution professional, resolution professional or the liquidator, as the case may be, has an obligation to ensure that assessment is legal and he has been provided with sufficient power to question any assessment, if he finds the same to be excessive.

The Court also took note of the fact that issuing a notice under Section 72 of the Customs Act for non-payment of customs duty falls squarely within the ambit of initiating legal proceedings against a Corporate Debtor. Even under the liquidation process, the liquidator is given the responsibility to secure assets and goods of the Corporate Debtor under Section 35(1)(b) of IBC. On the other hand, the authorities under the Customs Act have a limited jurisdiction to determine the quantum of operational debt in order to stake claim in terms of Section 53 of the IBC before the liquidator. CBIC does not have the power to execute its claim beyond the ambit of Section 53 of the IBC.

Which of the Section of IBC deals with the moratorium?

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) would prevail over the Customs Act, 1962 to the extent that once moratorium is imposed in terms of Sections 14 or 33(5) of the IBC as the case may be, the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs (CBIC) only has a limited jurisdiction to assess/determine the quantum of customs duty and other levies as it does not have the power to initiate recovery of dues by means of sale/confiscation, as provided under the Customs Act.

In India, when the corporate insolvency process commences, the adjudicating authority is mandated to declare a moratorium on continuation or initiation of any coercive legal action against the Corporate Debtor. Even if a company goes into liquidation, a moratorium continues in terms of Section 33(5) of the IBC.

Section 14 of the IBC prescribes a moratorium on the initiation of CIRP proceedings and its effects. One of the purposes of the moratorium is to keep the assets of the Corporate Debtor together during the insolvency resolution process and to facilitate orderly completion of the processes envisaged under the statute. Such measures ensure the curtailing of parallel proceedings and reduce the possibility of conflicting outcomes in the process. Further, one of the motivations of imposing a moratorium is for Section 14(1)(a), (b), and (c) of the IBC to form a shield that protects pecuniary attacks against the Corporate Debtor. This is done in order to provide the Corporate Debtor with breathing space, to allow it to continue as a going concern and rehabilitate itself.

The Court, hence, observed that any contrary interpretation would crack this shield and would have adverse consequences on the objective sought to be achieved.

The Court, further, explained that, the IBC, being the more recent statute, clearly overrides the Customs Act. Section 142A of the Customs Act notes that the Custom Authorities would have first charge on the assets of an assessee under the Customs Act, except with respect to cases under Section 529A of Companies Act 1956, Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act 1993, Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 and the IBC, 2016. This exception created under the Customs Act is duly acknowledged under Section 238 of the IBC as well.  Section 238 of the IBC clearly overrides any provision of law which is inconsistent with the IBC. It was, hence, held that,

“The Customs Act and the IBC act in their own spheres. In case of any conflict, the IBC overrides the Customs Act.”

On the scope of power of CBIC, the Court held that CBIC can only initiate assessment or re-assessment of the duties and other levies. They cannot transgress such boundary and proceed to initiate recovery in violation of Sections 14 or 33(5) of the IBC. The interim resolution professional, resolution professional or the liquidator, as the case may be, has an obligation to ensure that assessment is legal and he has been provided with sufficient power to question any assessment, if he finds the same to be excessive.

The Court also took note of the fact that issuing a notice under Section 72 of the Customs Act for non-payment of customs duty falls squarely within the ambit of initiating legal proceedings against a Corporate Debtor. Even under the liquidation process, the liquidator is given the responsibility to secure assets and goods of the Corporate Debtor under Section 35(1)(b) of IBC. On the other hand, the authorities under the Customs Act have a limited jurisdiction to determine the quantum of operational debt in order to stake claim in terms of Section 53 of the IBC before the liquidator. CBIC does not have the power to execute its claim beyond the ambit of Section 53 of the IBC.

Which of the following grounds is not covered under misconduct in course of corporate insolvency resolution process:

A decision which curtails fundamental rights without appropriate justification will be classified as disproportionate. The concept of proportionality requires a restriction to be tailored in accordance with the territorial extent of the restriction, the stage of emergency the nature of  urgency, duration of such restrictive measure and nature of such restriction. In which case Supreme Court held so:-

In which case Supreme Court held that right to equality under Article 14 is not negative  equality. If some persons are given benefit wrongly. the same cannot form basis for claiming  similar reliet It cannot be relied upon to perpetuate illegality or irregularity.

In which of the following case Supreme Court held that Articles 16(4) and 16(4-A) do not confer fundamental right to claim reservations in promotion. They are in the nature of enabling provisions vesting a discretion on the State Government to consider providing reservations ii circumstances so  warrant. State Governments cannot be directed to provide reservations for appointments in public posts.

The ceiling limit of 50%. the concept of creamy layer and the compelling reasons namely, backwardness. inadequacy of representation and overall administrative efficiency are all constitutional requirements without which the strLx:ture of equality of opportunity in Article 16wouId collapse. This observation was made in which case

Collection of quantifiable data on the inadequacy of representation of SCs and STs in promotional posts in the State is mandatory pre-condition for grant of reservation in promotion with consequential seniority under Article 16 (4-A}. Supreme Court observed this in which of the following case

The contract of indemnity is a contract by which one party promises to save the other from loss caused to him by the conduct of the promisor himself or by the conduct of any other person. In a contract of indemnity, a promisee acting within the scope of his authority is entitled to recover from the promisor all damages and all costs which he may incur.

a contract of guarantee, on the other hand, is a promise whereby the promisor promises to discharge the liability of a third person in case of his default. The person who gives the guarantee is called the surety. The person in respect of whose default, the guarantee is given is the principal debtor and the person to whom the guarantee is given is the creditor. Anything done or any promise made for the benefit of the principal debtor may be a sufficient consideration to the surety for giving the guarantee. On the other hand, the bailment of goods as security for payment of a debt or performance of a promise is a pledge. 

When Premier failed to make repayments in terms of the Loan-cum-Pledge Agreements, the Financial Creditor, called upon Premier and Doshi Holdings, also described as the borrower under the Loan-cum-Pledge Agreements, to pay the entire outstanding loan amount of Rs. 8,35,25,398/-.

It was argued before the Court that no amount under the Loan-cum-Pledge Agreements 4 was disbursed by the Financial Creditor to Doshi Holdings. The Financial Creditor granted loans to Premier. The loans were disbursed to Premier. Doshi Holdings did not utilize any part of the money disbursed by the Financial Creditor under the Loan-cum-Pledge Agreement. Hence, there was no obligation on the part of Doshi Holdings to make any repayment to the Financial Creditor and that there was no financial debt owed by Doshi Holdings to the Financial Creditor under Section 5(8) of the IBC. Insofar as Doshi Holdings is concerned, the Loan-cum-Pledge Agreements only created a pledge of the shares of Doshi Holdings in Premier in favour of the Financial Creditor. Hence, the petition under Section 7 of the IBC against the Corporate Debtor was not maintainable.

In which of the following cases held that if there are two borrowers or if two corporate bodies fall within the ambit of corporate debtors, there is no reason why proceedings under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) cannot be initiated against both the Corporate Debtors?

The person who promises to make good the loss is called the:

A contract of indemnity may be called as:

 A contract to perform the promise, or discharge the liability of a third person in case of his default is called as:

The person in respect of whose default the guarantee is given is called:

Anything done or any promise made for the benefit of the principal may be to the surety for giving guarantee:

Which of the following is not a financial debt:

Does a financial creditor include a secured creditor:

Which of the following statement relating to operational creditors is true:

To decide when an act is to be treated as arbitrary, the court must find out whether the impugned decision is based on any principle. If not, it may unerringly point to arbitrariness. Some circumstances that may point towards arbitrariness of an action are:

• If the act betrays caprice or the mere exhibition of the whim of the authority.
• If there is absence of good faith and the action is actuated with an oblique motive.
• A total nonapplication of mind without due regard to the rights of the parties and public interest.
• A wholly unreasonable decision which is little different from a perverse decision under the Wednesbury doctrine.

However, ordinarily visiting a party with the consequences of its breach under a contract may not be an arbitrary decision.

Private law remedy vis-à-vis Private Dispute

It is, undoubtedly, true that the writ jurisdiction is a public law remedy. A matter, which lies entirely within a private realm of affairs of public body, may not lend itself for being dealt with under the writ jurisdiction of the Court. However, after the contract is entered into, there can be a variety of circumstances, which may provide a cause of action to a party to the contract with the State, to seek relief by filing a Writ Petition.

For example, there may be circumstances that may include the relief of seeking payment of amounts due to the aggrieved party from the State. The State can, indeed, be called upon to honour its obligations of making payment, unless it be that there is a serious and genuine dispute raised relating to the liability of the State to make the payment. Such dispute, ordinarily, would include the contention that the aggrieved party has not fulfilled its obligations and the Court finds that such a contention by the State is not a mere ruse or a pretence.

In which of the following cases apex court held that if a contract is non-statutory, there is no absolute bar in dealing with a cause of action based on acts or omission by the State or its instrumentalities?

To decide when an act is to be treated as arbitrary, the court must find out whether the impugned decision is based on any principle. If not, it may unerringly point to arbitrariness. Some circumstances that may point towards arbitrariness of an action are:

• If the act betrays caprice or the mere exhibition of the whim of the authority.
• If there is absence of good faith and the action is actuated with an oblique motive.
• A total nonapplication of mind without due regard to the rights of the parties and public interest.
• A wholly unreasonable decision which is little different from a perverse decision under the Wednesbury doctrine.

However, ordinarily visiting a party with the consequences of its breach under a contract may not be an arbitrary decision.

Private law remedy vis-à-vis Private Dispute

It is, undoubtedly, true that the writ jurisdiction is a public law remedy. A matter, which lies entirely within a private realm of affairs of public body, may not lend itself for being dealt with under the writ jurisdiction of the Court. However, after the contract is entered into, there can be a variety of circumstances, which may provide a cause of action to a party to the contract with the State, to seek relief by filing a Writ Petition.

For example, there may be circumstances that may include the relief of seeking payment of amounts due to the aggrieved party from the State. The State can, indeed, be called upon to honour its obligations of making payment, unless it be that there is a serious and genuine dispute raised relating to the liability of the State to make the payment. Such dispute, ordinarily, would include the contention that the aggrieved party has not fulfilled its obligations and the Court finds that such a contention by the State is not a mere ruse or a pretence.

Which of the following judges of Supreme Court of India were part of the Bench in Judgement as given in the excerpt?

Which of the following is correct regarding the Doctrine of Wednesbury doctrine?

To decide when an act is to be treated as arbitrary, the court must find out whether the impugned decision is based on any principle. If not, it may unerringly point to arbitrariness. Some circumstances that may point towards arbitrariness of an action are:

• If the act betrays caprice or the mere exhibition of the whim of the authority.
• If there is absence of good faith and the action is actuated with an oblique motive.
• A total nonapplication of mind without due regard to the rights of the parties and public interest.
• A wholly unreasonable decision which is little different from a perverse decision under the Wednesbury doctrine.

However, ordinarily visiting a party with the consequences of its breach under a contract may not be an arbitrary decision.

Private law remedy vis-à-vis Private Dispute

It is, undoubtedly, true that the writ jurisdiction is a public law remedy. A matter, which lies entirely within a private realm of affairs of public body, may not lend itself for being dealt with under the writ jurisdiction of the Court. However, after the contract is entered into, there can be a variety of circumstances, which may provide a cause of action to a party to the contract with the State, to seek relief by filing a Writ Petition.

For example, there may be circumstances that may include the relief of seeking payment of amounts due to the aggrieved party from the State. The State can, indeed, be called upon to honour its obligations of making payment, unless it be that there is a serious and genuine dispute raised relating to the liability of the State to make the payment. Such dispute, ordinarily, would include the contention that the aggrieved party has not fulfilled its obligations and the Court finds that such a contention by the State is not a mere ruse or a pretence.

(i) while there is no prohibition, in the Writ Court even deciding disputed questions of fact, particularly when the dispute surrounds demystifying of documents only, the Court may relegate the party to the remedy by way of a civil suit.

(ii) The existence of a provision for arbitration, which is a forum intended to quicken the pace of dispute resolution, is viewed as a near bar to the entertainment of a Writ Petition.

(iii) Violation of natural justice has been recognised as a ground signifying the presence of a public law element and can found a cause of action premised on breach of Article 14.

Choose the correct answer form the Code given below:

The Court was dealing with the appeal against Andhra Pradesh High Court judgment relating to the rejection of an Education Society’s claim for registration as a fund or trust or institution or any university or other educational institution set up for the charitable purpose of education, under the Income Tax Act, 1961 on the ground that the Society/Trust was not created ‘solely’ for the purpose of education, and also that it was not registered under the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987 (A.P. Charities Act) as condition precedent for grant of approval.

Which of the following case Supreme Court held that Profit-oriented Educational Institutions not  entitled to tax emption under Section 10(23C) of the Income Tax Act, 1961?

Which of the following provisions contain the Right to Established the “The right to establish an educational institution”

Which of the following judges of Supreme Court of India were part of the Bench in Judgement as given in the excerpt?

The legislature understands and appreciates the needs of its own people and its laws are directed to the problems made manifest by experience, and its discriminations are based on adequate norms. Therefore, the constitutional amendment could not be struck down as discriminatory if the state of facts are reasonably conceived to justify it. 

In this country with a population of around 1.41 billion, the economic backwardness is not confined only to those who are covered by Article 15(4) or Article 16(4) of the Constitution. In a country where only a small percentage of the population is above the poverty line, to deny opportunities of higher education (which secures employment) and employment is to deny to those who are qualified and deserving what is or at least should be their due. There can be reservation for certain weaker sections other than the SCs/STs and socially and educationally backward classes. The impugned amendment is meant for weaker sections of the society who are economically weak and cannot afford to impart education to their children or are unable to secure employment in the services of the State.

In which of the following cases apex court upheld the validity of EWS reservation in Educational Instution and Public Employments?

Which of the following amendment inserted the reservation on Economic Bases in the Constitution?

The amend Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution of India by adding two new clauses?

Who are dissenting judges in the above said extract?